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Edited by JOHN PAUL JONES
On June 30, 1865, Samuel A. Mudd was
convicted of conspiring with John Wilkes
Booth and others ro assassinate President
Abraham Lincoln. He was sentenced ro life
imprisonment on an island off the coast of
Florida. Dr. Mudd was pardoned in 1869 by
President Andrew Johnson, based on his
assistance in a yellow fever epidemic rather
than on the merits. of his case, leaving unresolved until the present day the question of
his ultimate guilt or innocence.
On February 12, 1993, the University of
Richmond School of Law convened a distinguished group of jurists and Civil War historians to thoroughly present both sides of the
case of Samuel Mudd and the broader Lincoln
Conspiracy before a panel of judges in an
actual courtroom.
Dr. Mudd was represented by F. Lee Bailey,
Attorney at Law and former Marine fighter
pilot and legal officer; and Candida Ewing
Staempfli Steel, Attorney at Law and greatgreat-granddaughter of General Thomas
Ewing, Dr. Mudd's original counsel.
The government was represented by John
Jay Douglass, Dean of the National College of
District Attorneys and former Commandant
(continued on back flap)

{continued ftom ftont flap)

of the Judge Advocate General's School; and
Admiral JohnS. Jenkins, Associate Dean and
Lecturer at the George Washington University National Law Center, and former Judge
Advocate General of the U.S. Navy.
The attorneys presented their arguments
with all the detail and color of a modern legal
case. Dr. Mudd and the Lincoln Assassination
is the complete record of the proceedings,
with added commentaty by distinguished
historians.
Some scholars argue that Mudd was completely innocent, while others cite eyewitness
reports of seeing Mudd in the company of
John Wilkes Booth in Washington prior to
the assassination. In Dr. Mudd and the
Lincoln Assassination the legality of the
military tribunal that tried Mudd is both
defended and attacked in fascinating detail.
This volume combines the drama of the
Civil War with the suspense of a modern trial
and contains a wealth of detail on the Lincoln
Conspiracy, much of it unknown to the
general public.
Dr. Mudd contains the complete text of
recent decisions by the U.S. Court of Military
Appeals and other bodies in the matter of
Samuel Mudd, a case still pending in U.S.
courts. The main text is backed up by extensive references for further reading, few of
which normally appear in Civil War books.
Editor John Paul Jones is a former naval
aviator and intelligence officer and teaches
administrative, constitutional and military
law at the University of Richmond School of
Law.
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In the words of F. Lee Bailey, counsel for the accused:
" ... the fabric of any criminal proceeding is that which deserves the
overview-the calm, deliberate, combined wisdom in the overview of
an appellate court."
"Here is history at its best, relived with all its controversies, passions, and struggles for
justice."
-Senator Paul Simon

As a simultaneous contribution to legal studies and Civil War studies, Dr. Mudd and the
Lincoln Assassination: The Case Reopened is a perfect example of the kind of fresh perspective the United States Civil War Center supports as one of its major missions.
-David Madden, Director, The United States
Civil War Center, Louisiana State University
Here's a fresh and provocative look at legal aspects of the Mudd conviction. Since it consists
largely of pro and con analyses, it bears directly upon other Civil War cases. Even more
important is the fashion in which it throws a great deal of light upon the whole issue of civil
rights under a military regime.
-Webb Garrison, author of The Lincoln No One Knows
They have assembled in a single volume a prodigious collection of legal and historical
opinion and documentation. The exercise of re-visiting the case of Samuel Mudd was a
procedure useful not just to those scholars fascinated with the intricacies of the legal dispute, but also to historians and readers drawn to this story because of the drama and
poignancy associated with this man and his family, caught as if in some time warp of
unresolved accusation, guilt and doubt.
-Dan Roberts, National Public Radio's
"A Moment in Time"
This book provides the modern reader with the arguments needed to make the difficult
decision as to whether or not Samuel Mudd was guilty as charged of conspiring with John
Wilkes Booth to assassinate Abraham Lincoln.
-Joseph R. George, Jr. , Professor Emeritus,
Villanova University
Dr. Mudd and the Lincoln Assassination is thorough history and remarkable courtroom
advocacy. Had Dr. Mudd enjoyed benefit of counsel equal to Professor Jones' law students,
the defendant-appellant would not have gone to prison.
-Douglas Savage, author of
The Court Martial of Robert E Lee
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Introduction

On June 30, 1865, Samuel A. Mudd was convicted of
consp iring with John Wilkes Booth and others to assassina te
President Lincoln and other leaders of the Union. The Maryland planter and physician was also found guilty of aiding
and abetting the assassins in the execution of their plot. Dr.
Mudd' s conviction, and a sentence to prison for the remainder
of his life, issued from a type of military court know n as a
commission. Seven senior officers of the Union army comprised the commission that tried Dr. Mudd. Its most senior
member, Major General David Hunter, acted as its president;
history has given it his name.
As Commander in Chief, President Johnson h ad convened
the Hunter Commission and referred to it Mudd's case, and
those of seven others said to co!llprise Booth's gang. Samuel
Mudd fared better than most; after a trial of eighteen days, the
commission found all eight defendants guilty, and sen tenced
four, David Herold, George Atzerodt, Lewis Payne, and Mary
Surratt, to death. The commission spared from the gallows
Mudd and three others, Mich ael O'Laughlin, Edward Spangler,
and Samuel Arnold, sentencing them instead to prison. Presid ent Johnson reviewed and approved the sentences. He
ordered that Mudd serve his life sentence at Fort Jefferson, an
island penitentiary off the coast of Florida. Mudd's lawyers
then tried for a writ of habeas corpus, but to no avail. In the
United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida,
Judge Thomas J. Boynton refused to hold that the Hunter
vii
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Commission lacked authority to try a civilian like Mudd for
the crimes in question. Judge Boynton's opinion represents
the only formal assessment of Mudd's case by a federal judge
to date. Never officially published, it appears in this book as
Appendix A.
As it happened, Mudd served less than four years before
the same President pardoned him. There is no hint in that
pardon that the President acted to correct a miscarriage of
justice by the doctor's earlier conviction; indeed, the President took the opportunity to reaffirm his satisfaction that the
evidence proved Mudd had aided and abetted Booth and
Herold in their escape. Instead, the President based his decision to p ardon Mudd on the doctor's humanitarian efforts in
combatting a yellow fever epidemic at Fort Jefferson. In 1869,
the President, therefore, merely freed Samuel Mudd; he did
not absolve him. Mudd returned to Maryland where, notwithstanding prison's toll on his health, he lived another
fourteen years, siring fourteen children. For the rest of his life,
he would publicly insist on his innocence of any complicity
with Booth. After Mudd's death, his family and friends
would continue to agitate on his behalf, seeking some definitive statement that the United States had convicted and punished an innocent man.
For the most part, that campaign focused on the likelihood
of prejudice in a jury of Union officers, some of them personally acquainted with the murdered President, on the manner
in which the trial was conducted, and on the evidence that
was offered by the government. Th e United States has never
admitted error, but the resultant' and enduring controversy
has made the doctor a cause celebre, an American Dreyfus.
In early 1992, lawyers representing Dr. Mudd's family
obtained a hearing before the Army Board for the Correction
of Military Records, a tribunal of civil servants hearing claims
that particular military records are in error. Typically, the
board hears cases from aggrieved soldiers and veterans who
claim they were wrongfully d~nied an award or promotion,
insufficiently compensated, or refused disability benefits.
The board acts somewhat like a court, taking evidence and
making findings of fact and conclusions of law . Unlike a
court, however, the board lacks the power to decide; it can
only recommend that military records be altered in the inter-
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ests of justice. Its findings and conclusions serve only to
inform the final decision maker, the Secretary of the Army, or
his designated subordinate. In Dr. Mudd's case, the family
argued, and the board found, that, since the conviction existed in the record of a military court, the board could hear the
family's claim of error, and, if it agreed, recommend that the
record be expunged. The board heard arguments and evidence offered by the family, the most important of which was
the opinion of an expert, Colonel Jan Horbaly, that no basis
existed in 1865 for assertion by the military of jurisdiction
over crimes by civilians in the circumstances of Lincoln's
assassination. The board looked only at the question of
whether the law permitted a military commission to try a
civilian like Dr. Mudd; it carefully avoided weighing the
evidence on which Dr. Mudd's conviction must have been
based.
The board's hearings are not adversarial; an Examiner,
trained in law and acting for the board, presents the salient
facts and relevant law in the case. The board may put questions to its Examiner; it may direct him or her to conduct
additional investigation of the facts or research in the law and
report back. Otherwise, the board may conclude on what is
placed before it. Thus, in the hearing on Dr. Mudd's conviction, it was not out of the ordinary that nobody appeared to
defend President Johnson's convening order and its execution by the Hunter Commission. The board subsequently
adopted its Examiner's recommendation that relief be granted
Samuel Mudd and his family, and referred the case to the
Secretary for final action. The 'board's report appears in this
book as Appendix B.
On behalf of the Secretary of the Army, the Acting Assistant Secretary then reviewed the board's findings, but rejected its recommendation. Secretary Clark refused to act in
Dr. Mudd's case because he found it improper for the board
to reconsider historical controversies so long after legal authorities had rendered their best judgments. His letter communicating this decision to the board appears in this book as
Appendix C.
After the board had submitted its assessment of the Mudd
family's case, but before Secretary Clark could issue his opinion, the University of Richmond School of Law approached
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the family's tireless spokesman, Richard Mudd of Saginaw,
Michigan. The law school proposed a full, adversarial, and
expert hearing for the family's claims, in a moot staged in its
courtroom. For more than three hundred years, students of
the law have considered hypothetical cases anddifficul t legal
issues in moots, simulated hearings before mock judicial
panels. The practice originated in the English Inns of Court,
where barristers had trained since the fifteenth century, and
experienced a revival in American law schools in the nineteenth century. Nowadays, several moots occur each academic year in most law schools. The University of Richmond
proposed an appellate hearing before experienced jurists
trained in military law, a hearing in which not only the
commission's jurisdiction might be considered, but also the
fairness of the way in which Dr. Mudd's trial was conducted,
as well as the persuasiveness of the evidence originally offered against him. In accordance with a fundamental principle of judicial review, the moot court's judges and advocates
would be asked to limit themselves to addressing the
commission's 1865 decision, and therefore only those facts
and legal rules available to the commission at the time.
For the family, Richard Mudd accepted with enthusiasm.
The novelty of the questions and the drama in the facts
enabled the school to enlist exceptionally experienced courtroom lawyers to present Dr. Mudd's case for expungement
and the United States government's defense of its commission. F. Lee Bailey appeared for the petitioner with Candida
Ewing Steel, the great great granddaughter of Union Army
Brigadier Thomas Ewing, Jr:, who had so ably represented
Samuel Mudd at trial. Rear Admiral JohnS. Jenkins, former
Judge Advocate General of the Navy and Special Counsel to
the Secretary of the Navy, joined Colonel John Jay Douglass,
former Commandant of the Judge Advocate General's School
and Dean of the National College of 'District Attorneys, in
defending the decision and workings of the Hunter Commission. For each side, the law school recruited a staff of student
researchers and brief writers. Furnished with copies of the
commission's actual records, and the contents of the ten best
military law collections in American libraries, the two teams
labored for more than three months drafting the appellate
briefs for each side.
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To constitute a court for the hearing of Dr. Mudd's case,
the law school had no choice but to indulge in a legal fiction.
In fact, no judicial organ existed in 1867 to consider the
decisions of either courts martial or military commissions.
Except when the sentence was death, the judgment of any
military court after trial was finat subject only to action by the
military commander who had convened it and thus could set
aside its findings or reduce the sentence it recommended. In
those cases in which a death penalty was approved by the
convening authority, the Commander in Chief had also to
concur. Not until 1920 would Congress at last establish a
board of judge advocates, and thus, for the first time, guarantee for military convictions review by professionals trained in
the discipline. Not unti11950, would Congress at last appoint
civilian judges to a genuine court reviewing military cases. If
Mudd's case were to receive contemporaneous review by a
true appellate court, history would have to be altered, at least
a little. This was accomplished by simply inventing the threejudge Special Court of Military Appeal, and the 1865 Act of
Congress that created it.
During their preparations, the team representing Dr. Mudd
learned that, at the time of Dr. Mudd's trial, the government
had possessed a diary written by John Wilkes Booth. The
prosecution had not offered the diary in evidence at the trial,
nor had it informed the defense of its existence, although
mention of it had appeared in the New York Times and other
newspapers almost two weeks before the trial began. On
behalf of Dr. Mudd, his legal team argued strenuously in 1992
that the Special Court ought to order the government to either
share the document or else deny its possession. With equal
vigor, the government argued that, even if the diary were
produced, it would be inadmissible as evidence because it
would constitute hearsay, i.e., a statement made out of the
court's presence offered as proof of what it says. Without
reaching either petitioner's argument that the prosecution
had concealed potentially exculpatory evidence, or the
government's argument that the diary was inadmissible anyway, the court refused to permit the diary to be added to the
record before it. In the court's view, newspaper stories about
the diary before trial put defense counsel on notice then, and
counsel's failure to raise the matter at trial could not be
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excused sufficiently to warrant action so long afterward.
Skirmishing complete, preparation continued.
To hear the case as the Special Court of Military Appeal,
the law school recruited three eminent jurists well-versed not
only in the military law of the United States, but in the
international law of armed conflict (for the government was
sure to argue that jurisdiction rested on jus belli, the law of
war). The Honorable Robinson 0. Everett, former Chief
Judge of the United States Court of Military Appeals (and
now Senior Judge of its successor, the United States Court of
Appeals for the Armed Forces) accepted an invitation with
enthusiasm. The Honorable Edward D. Re, Chief Judge
Emeritus and Senior Judge (ret.) of the United States Court of
International Trade and Judge Walter Thompson Cox III of
the then Court of Military Appeals (now Court of Appeals for
the Armed Forces) promptly joined Judge Everett to form the
three-judge panel.
The hearing took place at the law school, in a packed
courtroom on February 12, 1993. Despite a severe winter
storm, other spectators crowded three adjacent classrooms
and watched on dosed-circuit television. For ninety minutes,
the two sides presented their positions orally and fielded
questions from the bench. When they were done, the court
adjourned to consider what it had heard, returning within the
hour to render judgment and share the considerations that
produced it. Each judge offered his own opinion. All agreed
that the judgment of the Hunter Commission had been in
error and should be set aside.
Part One of this book presents the arguments for Dr.
Mudd and the government, a verbatim record of the oral
argument, and the final versions of the judgment and opinions of the court. Part One concerns itself with a question
narrow in scope: whether the Hunter Commission made a
legal blunder that ought to have been cor-rected. As the Acting
Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Army correctly noted last
year, the commission's judgment should not be impeached by
resort to modern legal standards foreign to the era in which
the trial occurred. Similarly, the commission's judgment
should not be impeached by reference to facts of which it had
no inkling at the time. Part One, therefore, answers only the
question of whether Mudd was wronged by the commission,
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not whether he was wronged by history.
Part Two offers the comments of several legal and historical experts familiar with the law and facts relevant to the case.
Part Two concerns itself with the broader and remaining
question: whether the light of history reveals that Samuel
Mudd was wrongly condemned. The essayists in Part Two
have been left free to use facts unknown to the commission,
some emergent only long after the triaL Their work taps the
full measure of history's preoccupation with this particular
case, among the thousands tried by Union military commissions during the Civil War. Part Two, therefore, judges not
the commission but the accused.
Final judgment remains to be pronounced. It has not come
from this moot court, and it will not come from the Secretary
of the Army, who has yet to rule on Mrs. Steel's appeal on
behalf of the family. Samuel Mudd has become history's
chattel, and history shall judge him again and again. To its
record, this book is submitted by the authors.
A number of people contributed generously in various
ways to the moot court and to this book. The encouragement
and support of Joe Harbaugh, Dean of the University of
Richmond School of Law, were vital to the success of the
former and the realization of the latter. Nancy O'Brien, my
secretary and right arm, managed innumerable tasks and
delicate situations throughout. David Madden, Director of
the U.S. Civil War Center at Louisiana State University, kindly
furnished advice essential to the book's publication. The law
firm of Hunton & Williams, Virginia's largest, generously
supported its editing. Sean Everhart, Janet Jenness, Janet
Munro, and Adele Nighman, outstanding members of the
Class of 1995, exhibited exceptional initiative, rare savvy, and
formidable endurance in preparing the manuscripts for print.
Shelley Jones stood by with patience, love, and a sharp eye.
For all the pleasure I took from this sojourn in scholarship, 1
am, to them aJt very gratefuL
John Paul Jones
Richmond, 1994

Part One

The Appeal

Brief on Behalf
of Samuel A. Mudd
Catherine Stuart Greer,* W. Scott Magargee,**
and John Thurston Pendletont

INTRODUCTION
On the night of Aprill4, 1865, John Wilkes Booth apparently assassinated Abraham Lincoln, the President of the
United States, in Washington, D.C. Somehow, the assassin
injured his leg after shooting the President. Accompanied by
David E. Herold, Booth sought medical attention early the
next morning at the Charles County, Maryland residence of
Dr. Samuel A. Mudd. Several days later, Federal troops killed
Booth near Fredericksburg, Virginia as he resisted apprehension. Thus, the person said to be the President's murderer was
never brought to book; eight other persons, however, including Dr. Mudd, were subsequently arrested by Federal authorities and tried in connection with the assassination.
All the defendants were civilians. Even though ordinary
courts were open and functioning regularly in both the District of Columbia and Maryland, President Johnson ordered
Dr. Mudd and the others tried by a military commission of the
new President's choosing. On June 30, 1865, that tribunal
found the defendants guilty, sentencing four to death and Dr.
Mudd to imprisonment at hard labor for life. On July 5,
*J.D., 1993, University of Richmond; B.A., 1988, University of Virginia.
**J.D., 1993, University of Richmond; A.B., 1988, Princeton University.
t J.D., 1993, University of Richmond; B.A., 1989, Trinity College.
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President Johnson approved the sentences. It is from this
conviction that Dr. Mudd appeals to this Special Court of
Military Appeal.
For three reasons, Dr. Mudd's conviction was unlawful:
first, it came at the hands of a tribunal that lacked authority to
try him; second, it resulted from a process contrary to the
United States Constitution and to the law of the United States
governing military trials; and third, it came after the prosecution had failed to carry its burden of proof. Each of these
errors will be set forth in greater detail in what follows.
PART ONE: JURISDICTION
The Special Court of Military Appeal must find the
commission's judgment in Dr. Mudd's case invalid and set it
aside because the commission lacked jurisdiction, the power
to decide. The first section of Article III of the United States
Constitution vests the judicial power of the United States "in
one Supreme Court and in such inferior courts as the Congress may, from time to time, ordain and establish." Congress
did not vestthe military commission that tried Dr. Mudd with
judicial power. Thus, the proceedings of this commission
must be declared a nullity unless the Constitution could
otherwise authorize its jurisdiction.
Heretofore, as the Attorney General admitted in his opinion for President Johnson on the Constitutional power of a
military commission to try this case, such a tribunal has had
jurisdiction to try civilians in the United States only for crimes
committed during a period of martial law or for violations of
the law ofwar. 1 Martial law derives from the laws and usages
of war, as well as from reason. Like martial law, the laws of
war are based in reason and exist, according to the Supreme
Court, to "mitigate the cruelties and misery produced by the
scourge of war. " 2
Neither martial law, nor the laws of war, authorized a
military commission to try Dr. Mudd in June 1865 in Washington, D.C. The case against him involved neither public necessity nor an offense peculiar to the laws of war, so there was no
reason for substituting an extraordinary military tribunal for
the ordinary civil courts in the trial of a civilian resident of a
loyal state. Without such justification, a military commission
lacked jurisdiction over this case and this defendant.
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Pursuant to traditional concepts of martial law, a military
commission may try crimes only in cases of public necessity.
As a New York court noted recently in Matter of Egan,' a state
of such necessity must be proved definitively by the one
claiming it. Absent such proof, the doctrine of necessity does
not justify the exercise of martial law when the civil laws can
be exercised.
In Luther v. Borden•, the United States Supreme Court
admitted that a real crisis in government may lead to martial
law, but cautioned that this does not mean martial law can
serve as a pretext for oppression. Even where martial law
exists, the Constitution remains superior to martial law as the
guardian of the private citizen who is neither a government
enemy nor a hostile foe. Such was the position taken recently
by the Supreme Court of Kentucky in Corbin v. Marsh.'
That martial law may exist only by necessity is beyond
dispute. Blackstone and Hale, for example, agree that this
restriction forms part of the common law. 6 As Blackstone put
it, "The necessity of order and discipline in an army is the only
thing which can give it countenance; and therefore, it ought
not to be permitted in time of peace, when the king' s courts
are open to all persons to receive justice according to the laws
of the land." The despotism made possible by martial law
and enforceable by a military commission ought not prevail
when the regularly established civil courts are capable of
routinely administering justice.
The United States Supreme Court has recently and completely settled this issue, finding martial law an inadequate
excuse for the exercise of military jurisdiction over a civilian
resident of a loyal state. In Ex parte Milligan,' the Court
reviewed the conviction by military commission of a civilian
residing in Indiana. Among the numerous charges against
Milligan were those that he had afforded aid to rebels, incited
insurrection, engaged in disloyal practices, and violated the
laws of war. Before the Supreme Court, the government
argued that loyal states were placed within military districts
and that martial law existed because Indiana properly constituted a "theater of military operations." The Court could find,
however, no condition of necessity that would have warranted martial law in Indiana at the time of Milligan's arrest
and trial. The mere existence of strife in one part of the
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country does not sanction the suspension of laws pursuant to
martial law in other, loyal parts of the country where the
Constitution and other laws are capable of enforcement by
ordinary means. According to the Court, martial law permits
trial by military authority only if the necessity that creates
martial law is real and existing. As the Court saw it, armies
were present in Indiana only to be located to another district
where hostilities were actually occurring. In Indiana, "There
was no hostile foot; if once invaded, that invasion was at an
end and with it all pretext for martial law."
The Court went on to reject the argument that martial law
could exist in response to a "threatened invasion," observing
that, "the necessity must be actual and present; the invasion
real, such as effectually closes the courts and deposes the civil
administration." Martial law is properly limited to the "locality of actual war" and in time by the necessity creating its
existence. "It is," wrote Justice Davis for the Court, "the
birthright of every American citizen when charged with a
crime, to be tried and punished according to law."
The government also contended in Milligan that a military
commission could have jurisdiction to try a civilian under the
"laws and usages of war." The Supreme Court rejected this
contention as well, stating that, "It can serve no useful purpose to inquire what the laws and usages are, ... they can never
be applied to citizens in states which have upheld the authority ofthe government, and where the courts are open and their
process unobstructed." Because the civil courts in Indiana
were open and operating regularly, a military commission
could not try a civilian residing in Indiana. The ancient and
fundamental right of trial by jury found in the Bill of Rights
"cannot be frittered away on any plea of state or political
necessity."
The President's suspension of the writ of habeas corpus
does not warrant a different conclusion in this case. The
power to suspend the Great Writ set forth in Article I, Section
9 should not be read as inferring a condition in addition to
those expressly limiting the grant of judicial power in Article
III, Section 1. Indeed, the Court in Milligan found that the
Constitution "does not say after a writ of habeas corpus is
denied a citizen, that he shall be tried otherwise than by the
course of the common law; if it had intended this result, it was
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easy by the use of direct words to have accomplished it."
If the Constitution does not authorize jurisdiction over a
civilian by a military commission, the commission's proceedings against Dr. Mudd must be a nullity. The Supreme Court
noted in Milligan that the Constitution lays down the law in
war as well as in peace, finding that, "No doctrine, involving
more pernicious consequences, was ever invented by the wit
of man than any of its provisions can be suspended during
any of the great exigencies of government." The Court's
holding in Ex parte Milligan is simple and clear: even in time
of civil war, the Constitution does not permit military jurisdiction over a civilian resident in a loyal state when the civil
courts are open and operating.
The law enunciated by the Supreme Court binds this
court. "The practical effect of a judicial precedent of the
Supreme Court is to settle a rule of construction for all inferior
courts."' If, despite the circumstance of martial law, military
jurisdiction over Mr. Milligan could not lie in the State of
Indiana in 1864, it surely could not lie over Dr. Mudd in the
State of Maryland or in the District of Columbia a year later.
In this case, the government has not even attempted to
meet its burden of proving that the courts of the District of
Columbia and the State of Maryland were not open and
operating at the time of appellant's arrest and trial. Indeed,
such an attempt would have been futile, as the published
decisions of those courts in numerous cases decided at that
time make abundantly clear. Attorney General Speed, in his
opinion for the President, admitted that, notwithstanding the
declaration of martial law in the District of Columbia, "The
civil courts were open and held their regular sessions, and
transacted business as in times of peace."' The same could as
easily have been said of the civil courts of Maryland. It
follows, therefore, that this court must find that, like the
military commission convened at Indianapolis to try Mr.
Milligan, the military commission convened at Washington to
try Dr. Mudd was without authority under the Constitution.
Nor can it be said that the law of nations permits what the
Constitution does not. Even if it were assumed for the moment that the law of nations implicitly limits the United States
Constitution respecting both the judicial power and the Bill of
Rights, international law would not warrant jurisdiction over
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Dr. Mudd in this case. That aspect of the law of nations known
as jus belli, the law of war, operates only between belligerents.
The law of war applies only in a state of war. War arises
from acts of sovereignty, creating rights of belligerency, making enemies of opposing factions. At best, the Confederacy
represented states in insurrection or rebellion as declared by
Congress in the Act of July 13, 1861. Indeed, the United States
never declared war because, as Wheaton puts it, "there was no
body-politic against which to declare it, the very existence of
the Confederate government being treason .... " 10 An insurrection does not warrant application of the law of war unless
the rebels assume the legal status of belligerents. According
to the War Department's own General Orders No. 100, issued
April24, 1863, an insurrection may lead to rebellion that can
rise to civil war, but there remains a distinction between
insurgency and belligerency. A civil war remains an insurgency until the government recognizes its adversary as a
belligerent. In the words of Chancellor Kent,
But though a solemn declaration, or previous notice to
the enemy, be now laid aside, it is essential that some
formal act, proceeding directly from the competent
source, should announce to the people at home their
new relations and duties growing out of a state of war,
and which should equally apprize neutral nations of
the fact, to enable them to conform their conduct to the
rights belonging to the new state of things. 11
Without some formal act from the "competent source," notifying that the opposing factions would act as belligerents, the
laws of war cannot govern.
No formal act of this nature respecting the Confederacy
and its armies ever occurred. According to the eighth section
of Article I of the United States Constitution, the Congress is
the organ of government authorized to make such a notification, that is, to declare war. But the Congress did not declare
war during the recent rebellion. By the Act ofJuly 13,1861, the
Congress did permit the President to declare a state of insurrection, and, by the Act of July 29, 1861, it did authorize him
to call forth the militia to suppress the rebellion in states
opposing the United States laws, but it never declared war. A
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civil war de facto, perhaps, the rebellion nevertheless remained an insurrection de jure and never attained the legal
status that would afford the rebels rights or liabilities derived
by the law of nations from belligerency. There was simply
never any acknowledgment by the United States that the
seceding states had formed an independent nation.
That, from a civil war, may sometimes emerge a government enjoying international recognition and belligerency status does not mean that the Confederacy must. The recent
experience of the United States is readily distinguishable
from that of Great Britain during its civil war. At all times
during the late insurrection, the United and Confederate
States remained one nation, albeit one in which raged a
rebellion. From April 1861 until its demise in 1865, the
Confederacy never constituted even a de facto government
engaged in war with the United States. Unlike Cromwell, the
leaders of the Confederacy never succeeded in ousting the
public officials of the Federal Government from this country,
never formed treaties, and never gained recognition for the
Confederacy as an independent power from the United States
or a foreign nation. Cromwell's government was viewed by
other nations as having the authority to make laws and
contracts and to form treaties; Jefferson Davis's organization
was not.
Rights of a belligerent can exist only during war. However, as the War Department has noted in General Orders No.
100, belligerent status is not conferred upon the mere treatment and exchange of prisoners of war, the acceptance of flags
symbolizing truce, the proclamation of martial law in rebel
territory, or other agreements to moderate war. Although the
United States may have treated the rebels in some respect as
it would treat belligerents, this, according to Wheaton:
was not a recognition of belligerent rights in the rebels,
or a recognition of a legal status in them as belligerents.
It was a course of policy from day to day, and from
place to place, held under political discretion all the
while ... Y
Certain practices by the United States government may have
mitigated the harshness of the late hostilities, but, without the
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intention that they do so, they cannot be nottaken as acknowledgment of belligerency status.
What the Union did not intend, foreign sovereigns could
not otherwise accomplish. Recognition by the Queen of
England on May 13, 1861, of hostilities between the United
and the Confederate States was not sufficient to confer the
legal status of belligerency. So noted a Federal court in the
1862 case, United States v. One Hundred Barrels of Cement:
The position of foreign nations with respect to this
insurrection, it must be remembered, does not
determine its status in American courts. The latter
follow exclusively the decision of the political
department of the United States government on that
question. Even if other nations had recognized the socalled Confederate government as an independent
power, their recognition would bind themselves and
their subjects alone -not the United States .... All
American courts are bound to treat the insurrectionary
states as integral parts of the Union, and subject to its
constitution and laws 13
As the Supreme Court has said in the Prize Cases, proclamation by a foreign sovereign of hostilities between two nations
can preclude the sovereign's own people from denying the
existence of war, but only the government of the United
States, in exercise of the sovereignty of the United States, can
confer the legal status of belligerency upon opposing rebels.
The government made no such conferral in the late rebellion.
It might be argued that the exercise of a belligerent right
by the United States, in establishing a blockade of the Confederate states, had the consequence of conferring belligerent
status on those states and their armed forces. Even if this
exercise of a belligerent right by the United States during the
rebellion could be taken as the basis for conferring belligerency status on the rebels under the law of war, such status
would not have lasted as late as the time of appellant's arrest
and trial.
Blockade is a belligerent right under the law of nations. In
the Prize Cases, the Court held that the President's "proclamation of blockade [was] itself official conclusive evidence to the
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Court that a state of war existed which demanded and authorized a recourse to such a measure .... " The Supreme Court
deferred to the President's discretion in establishing the blockade, finding him the appropriate person to make this proclamation in his role as Commander in Chief. This court need not
in Dr. Mudd's case consider the separate question of whether
this act was sufficient to bestow belligerency rights upon the
Confederacy. Even if it were assumed that the President's
proclamation had such an unintended result, the fact remains
that a subsequent proclamation ended the blockade. By
proclamation on April 29, 1865, President Johnson declared:
[t]hat all restrictions upon internal, domestic, and
coastwise commercial intercourse be discontinued in
such parts of the [southern] States ... [and] ... military
and naval orders in any manner restricting internal,
domestic, and coastwise commercial intercourse and
trade with or in the localities above named be, and the
same are hereby, revoked ....
Even if this court were disposed to recognizing belligerency
status as a consequence of the blockade, it ought to defer with
grace equal to that of the Supreme Court in the Prize Cases and
find that a necessary consequence of President Johnson's
proclamation lifting the blockade was the termination of
whatever belligerency status President Lincoln's proclamation might have unintentionally conferred.
Absent belligerency, the law of war has no sway, and the
jurisdiction of a military commission to try a civilian resident
of a loyal state cannot survive the extinguishment of belligerency status. In this case, it follows therefore that trial by a
commission not even created until two days after the blockade-ending proclamation is unwarranted by the law of war.
By May 9,1865, when Dr. Mudd's trial began, the war de facto
was over, and war de jure had never been declared. Lee had
surrendered his forces at Appomattox on April 9, and the
President had ordered the removal of all trade restrictions on
April29. No formal surrender on behalf of the Confederacy
itself could be demanded or obtained because, as Wheaton
observed, the United States did not recognize any authority
competent to make such a surrender. The Presidents' procla-
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mations in 1861 and 1865 thus represent the best evidence of
both the beginning and the end of the war. On this evidence,
Dr. Mudd was tried too late for the law of war to sanction trial
by a military commission.
PART TWO: PROCEDURE
Samuel Mudd's conviction should also be overturned
because his trial by a military commission in Washington,
D.C. violated his rights under the United States Constitution's
third article and its Fifth and Sixth Amendments.
As the Supreme Court declared in Marbury v. Madison, 14
the Constitution represents "the fundamental and paramount
law ofthe nation." Indeed, the Attorney General advised the
President that the military commission that convicted Samuel
Mudd had a "duty" to try him in" obedience to the Constitution and the law." The Constitution protects persons within
the United States during peace or war. As the court noted in
Corbin v. Marsh, military power, even in the conduct of war,
cannot authorize that which the Constitution prohibits, nor
deny that which the Constitution guarantees.
The last sentence of the second section of Article III of the
Constitution requires that the "Trial of all Crimes, except in
Cases of Impeachment; shall be by Jury; and such Trial shall
be held in the State where the said Crimes shall have been
committed; but when not committed within any State, the
Trial shall be at such Place or Places as the Congress may by
Law have directed." Implicit in this specification of a particular procedure- trial by jury and venue in the state in which
the crime is said to have been committed -is a Constitutional
right on the part of the accused to trial as specified. In the
Sixth Amendment, a similar specification of procedure and
venue appears: "In all criminal prosecutions, the accused
shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial, by an
impartial jury of the State and district wherein the crime shall
have been committed; which district shall have been previously ascertained by law .... " Thus, both the basic document
and its contemporaneous amendment by the Bill of Rights
guarantee an accused trial by jury in the place in which his
offense is said to have occurred. Dr. Mudd was accused of
conspiring with Booth during the actor's visit to Charles
County, Maryland, and of aiding and abetting Booth and his
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accomplice by sheltering them in his Charles County home,
yet he was denied a trial in a Maryland court and a jury of the
men of Charles County.
It is no defense of these Constitutional deprivations to
note the existence of a rebellion in 1865. Even if the dying
embers of that rebellion elsewhere could justify suspension of
the writ of habeas corpus in loyal Maryland at that time, the
rights to jury and venue, unlike the right to the Great Writ, are
set out in absolute, not conditional terms. Every man's right
to a writ of habeas corpus may be suspended in time of
rebellion only because that exception is set forth explicitly
where the Great Writ is mentioned in Article I. To the
contrary, no man's rights to a jury and to proper venue can be
suspended precisely because no exception appears in either
Article III or the Sixth Amendment. Courts should not infer
exceptions to Constitutional rights set down without exception by the Framers.
That the absolute terms of the jury and venue rights in
Article III and the Sixth Amendment were not oversights by
the Framers is reinforced by the text of the Fifth Amendment,
which in pertinent part promises that, "No person shall be
held to answer for a capital, or otherwise infamous crime,
unless on a presentment or indictment of a Grand Jury, except
in cases arising in the land or naval forces, or in the Militia,
when in actual service in time of War or public danger." As
this clause illustrates, where the Framers intended a different
criminal process for military courts, the Framers took care to
say so explicitly. The jury and venue rights of the Third
Article and the Sixth Amendment ought to be read free of
exceptions for military justice precisely because the Fifth
Amendment contains such an exception. Speaking of the jury
right, the Supreme Court recently said in Ex parte Milligan, a
case on all fours with that of Dr. Mudd, that, "This privilege
is a vital principle, underlying the whole administration of
criminal justice; it is not held by sufferance, and cannot be
frittered away on any plea of state or political necessity."" Dr.
Mudd therefore correctly challenges his conviction as void for
want of a jury and for want of a Maryland venue.
Dr. Mudd also attacks his conviction for want of prior
Grand Jury action. By the express words of the Fifth Amendment, no person can be held to account for crimes of the sort
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of which Dr. Mudd was convicted unless on the presentment
or indictment of a Grand Jury, except in cases arising in the
land or naval forces. According to the Supreme Court in Ex
parte Milligan, the Constitution preserves this right to every
one accused of crime who is not attached to the army, the
navy, or the militia in actual service. It is uncontested that
Samuel Mudd was a civilian resident of a free state, and that
he was unconnected with the military. His trial by a military
commission in the District of Columbia therefore violated his
Constitutional right to a Grand Jury as well as his Constitutional rights to a petit jury and to a Maryland trial. As the
Supreme Court observed in the Milligan case:
If it was dangerous, in the distracted condition of

affairs, to leave Milligan unrestrained of his liberty,
because he 'conspired against the government, afforded
aid and comfort to rebels, ... ,' the law said arrest him,
confine him closely, render him powerless to do further
mischief; and then present his case to the grand jury of
the district, with proofs of his guilt, and, ifindicted, try
him according to the course of the common law. If this
had been done, the Constitution would have been
vindicated, ... and the securities for personal liberty
preserved and defended. 16
Although the nation may have been "distracted" over the
President's death, the civil courts in Maryland were capable
of trying Dr. Mudd. His trial by military commission was
improper under the Constitution, and his conviction should
be set aside.
The government charged Dr. Mudd in such vague terms
as to violate his Constitutional right to due process. The Fifth
Amendment ensures that criminal charges will be set out with
particularity sufficient to permit the· accused to make an
adequate defense. In this case, the charge and specification
were deficient in three ways: first, they failed to advise the
accused according to what law or code the commission would
proceed; second, they failed to make clear for what crime
previously recognized at law he would be tried; and third, the
charge contained a series of separate and distinct accusations
that were not set out in separate and distinct counts.
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The military commission that tried Dr. Mudd failed to
inform him of the law by which he would be tried. The
government proceeded by reference to the custom or common
law of war, but the charge and specifications are devoid of any
reference to such a source. There is no body of law recognized
as a common law of war. Instead, as Captain De Hart has
observed, "The custom of war is rather sought for, as explanatory of some doubtful question in which, without its aid, a
decision might be uncertain, than as a source of authority by
itself." 17
Even if Dr. Mudd had been notified by the charges and
specifications that a common law of war formed the basis of
his culpability, Dr. Mudd could not defend himself against a
body of law that did not exist. The commission refused to say
what precedents would be considered controlling under the
common law of war leaving Dr. Mudd severely handicapped
in the preparation of his defense. When invited to specify
whether this "common law of war" referred to English common law, military common law, or the law of nations, the
commission remained silent. Accordingly, Dr. Mudd was
forced to construct his defense based on tentative assumptions regarding what law would both inform and bind the
commission's rulings, hardly the opportunity envisioned by
those who framed the Fifth Amendment.
Not only was Dr. Mudd denied adequate reference to the
body of law according by which he was tried, he was also
denied an adequate statement of the offense or offenses of
which he stood accused. According to Major General Macomb,
the Constitution, the Articles of War, and the common law
agree that an accused is entitled to know and face the charges
made against him. Specifically, the charge
must set forth the crime or offense in a manner
sufficiently specific, to enable the person accused to
know to what he is to answer .... The facts ought also
to be distinctly specified or alleged, in such a manner,
that neither the prisoner nor the Court can have any
difficulty in knowing what is the precise object of the
trial. The same minuteness and precision ought to be
observed in specifying the time and place, when and
where, the facts charged were committedY
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The correctness of General Macomb's statement of the
applicable standard is borne out by United States v. Sharp." In
that case, the court refused to refer to a jury the charge of
making a revolt, a capital offense "insufficiently defined by
[the statute] or by any other standard, to which reference
could safely be made .... If we resort to definitions given by
philologists," wrote Justice Washington, "they are so multifarious, and so different, that I cannot avoid feeling a natural
repugnance, to selecting from this mass of definitions, one,
which may fix a crime upon these men."
In United States v. MacKenzie, it was held that federal
courts can take no cognizance of any matter not
specifically declared to be a crime or offense by Act of
Congress, and accordingly cannot inquire into
violations of the common law, or law of nations, ...
[unless] the act is prohibited and punished by express
statutory provisions. 20
What federal courts cannot do, federal military commissions
cannot do. Even what the common law might permit, however, the law of war does not.
A military commission cannot make law as it goes along,
that is, make definite by its own statement what the law of war
does not. The customary law of war ought not to be confused
with the common law. The former, part of the law of nations,
cannot trace its development in the accretion of case decisions, as does the latter. Thus, military tribunals cannot make
the law of war as courts embodying Anglo-Saxon tradition
make common law. According to Whiting, a military commission can only hear cases that are" established by evidence,
in conformity with known punishments in like cases in some
one of the States of the United States of America." 21 Here,
Whiting has simply refined, in the particular context of military law, a principle operating generally in federal law. Federal courts are not common law courts; the Constitution
withholds from them the common law power to pronounce
adjudicative law. In United States v. Hudson," the Supreme
Court held that a federal court could not entertain an indictment for libel on the President because the crime existed, if at
all, only at common law and not by Federal statute. Because
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Article III courts lack jurisdiction to hear cases involving
common law crimes, they necessarily lack the power to add
crimes to the common law's collection. A lawmaking power
that the Supreme Court has denied Article III tribunals surely
ought not be ascribed by this court to a tribunal empowered
only by an inference from Article IL Without that power, the
commission that tried Dr. Mudd could not have repaired the
fatally imprecise charge and specification with which it was
presented.
The single charge against Dr. Mudd and seven co-defendants improperly commingled facts and crimes. The military
law of the United States incorporates the same pleading
standard which Federal law has inherited from the common
law. 23 In the words of General Macomb, "Facts distinct in
their nature, are not to be included in one and the same
charge, or specification of a charge, but must be the subject of
a distinct charge or specification."" According to Captain De
Hart, "The facts ought also to be distinctly specified or alleged, in such a manner, that neither the prisoner nor the court
can have any difficulty in knowing what is the precise object
of the trial." 25 Dr. Mudd was denied his right to a charge in
conformity with this standard. The single count accusing Dr.
Mudd and the others could be taken to refer to at least four
crimes: conspiring in aid of the existing armed rebellion to
murder the President and others; murdering the President in
pursuance of this conspiracy, assaulting with intent to murder the Secretary of State; and lying in wait with intent to kill
the Vice President and General Grant. Such a charge prevented Dr. Mudd from determining with which of the four
crimes he himself was charged, and from thereby marshalling
a responsive defense. The lack of specificity made it impossible for Dr. Mudd to know what evidence he needed to refute
or establish in order to verify his innocence.
On this ground alone, Dr. Mudd's conviction ought to be
overturned. As General Macomb put it; "The total want of
specification in the charge, may be urged ... as a ground for
acquitting the prisoner, and that such a defect would render
the proceedings nugatory. " 26
The charge against Dr. Mudd stated that he "did, at
Washington City, ... on or before the 6th day of March, A.D.
1865, and on divers other days and times between that day
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and the 20th day of April, A.D. 1865, advise, encourage,
receive, entertain, harbor, and conceal, aid and assist" the
conspiracy. Dr. Mudd could not construct an effective defense against such a general charge. No specific act was
alleged, nor was a specific date or time set forth. The charge
left the defendant to account for the entire period between the
6th day of March and the 20th day of April. Therefore, he was
unable to rebut effectively the evidence submitted against
him by the prosecution. According to General Macomb:
The facts ought also to be distinctly specified or alleged,
in such a manner, that neither the prisoner nor the
Court can have any difficulty in knowing what is the
precise object of the trial. The same minuteness and
precision ought to be observed in specifying the time
and place, when and where, the facts charged were
committed, for such specification may be essentially
necessary to the prisoner's defense."
Before the military commission in Washington, therefore,
Dr. Mudd was denied adequate notice of both the procedure
according to which his trial would be staged and the specific
offense to which he had to mount a defense. Either inadequacy constitutes reversible error in the form of a violation
of the Fifth Amendment's guarantee of due process. Consequently, this court ought to reverse Dr. Mudd's conviction.
Even if it were admitted that the charge and specification
against Dr. Mudd was not so vague and indiscriminate as to
lack sufficient meaning for the Fifth Amendment, its most
discernible meaning would be that Dr. Mudd was accused of
treason. The only charge against Dr. Mudd opens by describing him as "maliciously, unlawfully, and traitorously, and in aid
of the armed rebellion against the United States ... combining,
confederating and conspiring." It follows by referring to the
conspiracy as "malicious, unlawful, and traitorous." It reports
that Dr. Mudd and others went about murder of the President,
assault on the Secretary of State, and attempts to ambush the
Vice President and General Grant "IT)aliciously, unlawfully,
and traitorously." Moreover, the only specification directed at
Dr. Mudd describes him as acting in aid of the conspiracy by
advising, concealing, aiding and assisting others "with know!-
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edge of the murderous and traitorous conspiracy." Any ambiguity in the criminal charge and specific a lion ought to be read
against the drafter; here, the government. In this case, such a
reading would lead naturally to the conclusion that the
government's repeated use of the words "traitorous" and
"traitorously" in the charge and specification shows that the
government intended to try Dr. Mudd for treason. Such an
interpretation would mean his conviction was unconstitutional.
If Dr. Mudd was tried for treason, he was convicted in
violation of the Constitution. The third section of Article III
defines treason as "levying war against the [United States], or
in adhering to their enemies, giving them aid and comfort,"
and conditions conviction for treason on either the testimony
of two witnesses to the same overt act or else the defendant's
confession in open court. Thus, Dr. Mudd could not have
been convicted of treason according to the Constitution unless the record of the military commission contained the
requisite testimony of two witnesses or his confession. The
record contains no such evidence. His conviction ought
therefore be overturned for failure of compliance with the
procedural prerequisites found in the third section of Article
III.
The Constitution's Sixth Amendment guarantees every
accused the assistance of counsel for his defense. Captain
Benet noted recently that the right pertains equally in prosecutions at military law. 28 Twenty-five years ago, General
Macomb wrote that a prisoner was not "precluded the advantage of [counsel's] presence." 2 ~ Captain De Hart seconded
this view when he wrote in 1846 that, "Courts-martial always
admit counsel for the prisoner; and all military writers admit
it to the custom to allow prisoners to have counsel." 30 Held
incommunicado before trial, Dr. Mudd was arraigned without counsel, on charges unclear even to. those trained in the
law. He was only permitted counsel after his plea to the
charge had been taken. He was then given but one night to
collaborate with his counsel in preparation of a defense.
Denying Dr. Mudd access to counsel during the pleading
process is action by the commission contrary to the established military law of criminal procedure.
The commission also denied Dr. Mudd due process by
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improperly limiting the admission of defense testimony to the
scope of the prosecution's case, contrary to accepted practice
in military courts. Military law permits a defendant to present
evidence not touched on in the prosecution's case or to impeach prosecution evidence by introducing new evidence of
his own. As General Macomb put it: "The utmost liberty
consistent with the interest of parties not before the court and
with the respect due to the court itself, should, at all times, be
allowed a prisoner .... The Court is bound to hear whatever
address, in his defense, the accused may think fit to offer, not
being in itself contemptuous or disrespectful."" Here again,
military law only reflects in its particular context a rule of law
generally recognized in the courts of the United States. See,
for example, United States v. Craig,'' in which the court noted
that "the declarations of the prisoner may be admitted to
account for his silence when that silence would operate against
him," and Sessions v. Little, 33 where the court observed that
"whenever the conduct of a person at a given time becomes
the subject ofinquiry, his expressions, as constituting a part of
his conduct and indicating his intention, can not be rejected as
irrelevant, but are admissible as part of the res gestae."
The commission refused on more than one occasion to
admit material evidence offered by Dr. Mudd in his defense.
For instance, the record shows that the commission refused to
hear a defense witness, Bennet Gwynn, tell his version of an
episode in 1863 or 1864 in which Dr. Mudd was said to have
concealed persons in Confederate service from Federal authorities. The prosecution had earlier introduced this episode
as tending to prove Dr. Mudd's inclination toward treason.
Dr. Mudd offered Gwynn's testimony to prove not only that
the episode had occurred years earlier than the prosecution
suggested, but also that the persons involved, while fugitive,
were not in Confederate service. The commission sustained
the Assistant Judge Advocate's objection that this line of
questioning went beyond the Government's case. Similar
objections by the Assistant Judge Advocate were sustained
when Dr. Mudd sought to question Dr. George Mudd and
Benjamin Gardiner. The defense had s 0 ught their accounts of
a meeting with Dr. Mudd on Sunday morning, April 16,
during which he was said to have expressed his intent to
inform federal authorities of the presence at his farm of two
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suspicious persons. Such testimony went to the heart of the
matter, that is, to whether Dr. Mudd knowingly or willingly
concealed the escaping assassin and his henchman. Its exclusion, on the sole ground that it exceeded the scope of the
government's case, is contrary to prevailing standards of
military law and manifestly prejudicial to Dr. Mudd.
The commission also denied Dr. Mudd due process by
improperly refusing severance of his trial from that of his codefendants.
The compound charge against Dr. Mudd accused him and
his co-defendants of conspiring to murder the President and
other government officials. Compelling Dr. Mudd to accept
trial jointly with his alleged co-conspirators denied Dr. Mudd
the chance to exonerate himself through the testimony of the
others, for a defendant cannot testify. In the aforementioned
case of United States v. Sharp, the court granted a motion for
severance of the trials of several sailors charged in one indictment with the same offense, endeavoring to make a revolt. In
Sharp, as in Dr. Mudd's case, several co-defendants faced the
same charge, a charge that required the government to prove
concert of action. In Sharp, it was endeavoring to make a
revolt; in Dr. Mudd's case, it was conspiring to murder the
President. In both cases, joint trial would have denied an
accused the opportunity to elicit exculpatory testimony from
other defendants. The military commission denied Dr. Mudd
his Fifth Amendment right to present his defense; otherwise,
at the very least, it abused its discretion when it refused
severance.
The 1827 case of United States v. Marchant 34 does not persuade an opposite conclusion. In that case, the Supreme
Court declined to recognize co-defendants' rights to separate
trials derived from co-defendants' common law rights to
accept or oppose individual jurors for their jury panel. The
Supreme Court properly limited its decision in Marchant &
Colby to that question, and that case ought to be regarded as
inapposite here, where no jury at all was involved.
At military law, a joint trial presents the same impediment
for an accused, for, as Captain De Hart observes, "Persons
collectively arraigned are incompetent tor each other." 35 On
the other hand, accomplices separately indicted for the same
offense may be called to testify for each other. In their
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treatises, Captains De Hart and Benet agree that a prisoner
who desires to avail himself of the testimony of others charged
with the same offense, ought to petition the convening authority for a separate trial. 36 In the event that the convening
authority declines, military law recognizes the military
prisoner's right to judicial relief. In this case, by overruling
Dr. Mudd's application for severance, the commission denied
him the opportunity to elicit from his co-defendants testimony that he was no part of the alleged conspiracy. Contrary
to notions of due process embodied in both the Constitution
and military law of the United States, this decision warrants
reversal of Dr. Mudd's subsequent conviction.
The commission also denied Dr. Mudd due process by
refusing to admit the testimony of Mrs. Mudd. While it is
generally true that the law does not permit a spouse to testify,
military law sometimes recognizes an exception. According
to Greenleaf, the other spouse may testify when the act with
which the accused spouse is charged is so private that the
other is the only one who can prove or disprove the charge. 37
Now that Booth is dead, the charge of treason against Dr.
Mudd cannot stand without the testimony of Mrs. Mudd, for
treason must be proved by the testimony of two witnesses,
and only Herold and Mrs. Mudd were there when Dr. Mudd
received the injured actor in his home on April 15, 1865. As
Captain De Hart notes, the competence or incompetence of a
spouse to testify does not depend on whether she testifies for
or against the interests of her husband. Because Mrs. Mudd's
testimony would be necessary to convict Dr. Mudd of treason,
her testimony that he was not a traitor ought to have been
admitted. The commission's failure to admit her testimony
thus denied Dr. Mudd due process and warrants reversal of
the conviction that followed.
PART THREE: PROOF
Even if the commission had jurisdiction to try Dr. Mudd,
and even if its many procedural errors did not annul its
judgment, Dr. Mudd's conviction should nevertheless be
overturned because the record cannot S<\tisfy the government's
burden of proof.
According to Captain M'Naghten, a military court must
provide the highest level of justice available under the cir-
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cumstances. 38 Notions of due process and fundamental fairness require the government to carry the burden of proving
Dr. Mudd was guilty of the charges beyond a reasonable
doubt. The government's evidence linking Dr. Mudd to the
late President's assassination clearly fails to satisfy this burden of proof. Accordingly, this court should set aside the
commission's judgment.
Both the common law and the Fifth Amendment of the
Constitution impose on a felony prosecution the strictest
standard of proof, that which is sufficient to produce in the
decision maker certainty beyond any reasonable doubt. Indeed, many reported decisions in the United States establish
that a person accused of a crime must be found guilty beyond
a reasonable doubt. In State v. Roe, 39 the Supreme Court of
Vermont declared that "the only degree of certainty known to
the law and recognized, is this: conviction beyond a reasonable doubt." Decisions of the highest courts of New York,
Pennsylvania, and Massachusetts confirm the position of the
court in State v. Roe. 40 In the words of Chief Justice Shaw,
writing for the Massachusetts Supreme Court in Commonwealth v. Webster:
What is reasonable doubt? ... The evidence must
establish the truth of the fact to a reasonable and a
moral certainty; a certainty that convinces and directs
the understanding, and satisfies the reason and
judgment, of those who are bound to act conscientiously
upon it. 41
The highest courts of New Jersey and of California have
specifically relied upon Webster when insisting that the prosecution offer proof beyond a reasonable doubt. 42 Both
Greenleaf and Halsted!' in their celebrated works on the law
of evidence, acknowledge the prevalence in American law of
the reasonable doubt standard. That a similar- or even more
stringent standard- applies in cases governed by the military law of the United States is clear from General Macomb's
observation that no person may be conv,icted by court martial
"unless upon the strongest and most satisfactory evidence." 44
If the charge and specification against Dr. Mudd amounted
to treason, the government had to prove Dr. Mudd knew
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Booth was a public enemy when he gave him aid and comfort;
if the charge and specification amounted to conspiracy, the
government had to prove Dr. Mudd knew Booth and the
others had agreed to murder the President; if the charge and
specification amounted to aiding and abetting a felon, the
government had to prove Dr. Mudd knew Booth had murdered the President. Judged by the most lenient of proof
standards, the government's evidence, as set forth in the
commission's record, would prove wanting; judged by the
applicable reasonable doubt standard, the government's evidence is wholly inadequate. Therefore, the Court should
overturn the commission's judgment for its failure to find
proof of an essential element of any of the crimes derivable
from the charge and specification.
Before the commission, witnesses for the government, as
well as those for the defense, testified that Dr. Mudd had met
with Booth when he visited Charles County in December of
1864, some months prior to the President's murder. The
record thus shows that the doctor was acquainted with the
actor. It does not show, however, that they joined in a
conspiracy. Regarding that Charles County meeting, the only
testimony that went directly to the substance of Dr. Mudd's
conversations with Booth came from defense witnesses Thompson and Bowman, both of whom reported conversation
of lawful and innocuous business.
Only one government witness, Weichmann, placed Dr.
Mudd again in the company of Booth or any of his alleged
gang during the several months before the assassination.
Weichmann testified that he witnessed a meeting between Dr.
Mudd and Booth in Washington's National Hotel on January
15. On the stand, Weichmann offered to fix this date with
greater certainty using the register of the Pennsylvania House,
the hotel at which he said Dr. Mudd had registered. The
defense later showed that the only time the doctor had stayed
in the Pennsylvania House was on December 23, not January
15, calling into question the accuracy of Weichmann's testimony. As to the business between the actor and the doctor on
that occasion, Weichmann' s testimony was.that he was out of
earshot, but that the doctor and the actor afterwards told him
they discussed a real estate transaction.
Two other government witnesses placed Dr. Mudd in the
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city of Washington in the first three days of March, when the
government claimed Booth was meeting with his henchmen.
Evans testified that he saw Dr. Mudd enter Mrs. Suratt's
house on March 1 or 2. Norton placed the doctor in the
National Hotel on March 3. Defense witnesses, however,
insisted the doctor was in and around Bryantown, Maryland
during that period. Even if the commission accepted the
testimony of Evans and Norton, and rejected the testimony of
the doctor's five alibi witnesses, the most that the testimony of
Evans and Norton can prove is that Dr. Mudd passed through
Washington's National Hotel at a time when Booth was registered. Neither of these witnesses could put the two men
together, much less report the nature of the business they
might have conducted had they met.
Of all the crimes that might be construed from the charge
and specification against Dr. Mudd, the only two that remained capable of proof when the government closed its case
were conspiracy to commit murder and aiding and abetting
the assassin. As to the conspiracy charge, the record was
devoid of direct evidence of Dr. Mudd's involvement, since it
contained nothing as to whether Dr. Mudd had learned, much
less embraced, the object of the alleged conspiracy before
April15. Any inference regarding Dr. Mudd's knowledge of,
and commitment to, Booth's intentions drawn from the circumstantial evidence of one or more meetings between Dr.
Mudd and Booth, must come, if at all, from the doctor's
actions after the assassination. If the doctor knew Booth had
killed the President when he sheltered Booth after the assassination, then the commission might infer that his meetings
beforehand had been to plan such an object. If the doctor did
not know that Booth and Herold were connected with the
assassination until after they left his care, then there is no
basis in the record for assuming Dr. Mudd's part in Booth's
conspiracy. The government's case for· conspiracy is therefore inextricably intertwined with its case for aiding and
abetting.
Before turning to the state of the record regarding a case
against Dr. Mudd for aiding and abetting in Booth's escape,
there remains to be addressed one more weakness in the
government's case against Dr. Mudd for the charge of conspiracy with Booth to murder the president and other officers.
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Even if it were accepted that Dr. Mudd conspired with Booth
as early as November of 1864 or earlier, the record shows that
the object of such a conspiracy was not the murder of the
President. A conspirator may not be held accountable for the
acts of a co-conspirator which were beyond the scope of the
conspiracy's common purpose. Wharton writes that:
while the parties are responsible for consequent acts,
growing out of the general design, they are not for
independent acts growing out of one of the particular
malice of individuals. Thus, if one of the party, on his
own hook, turns aside to commit a felony foreign to the
original design, his companions do not participate in
his guilt. 45
The record contains uncontradicted evidence of the govern-ment's own witness, Chester, that Booth at first planned
only to kidnap the President and take him to Richmond.
Chester testified that Booth did not abandon his intention to
kidnap in favor of one to murder until mid-February. There is
no evidence at all that Booth communicated with Dr. Mudd
after January. Thus, even if Dr. Mudd had once been a party to
Booth's kidnapping plan, the government offered no evidence that Dr. Mudd even knew of the subsequent murder
plan. The only charge against Dr. Mudd was conspiracy to
murder, not conspiracy to kidnap. As the record clearly
shows, Booth's conspiracy underwent a fundamental change
of object after Dr. Mudd's last alleged communication with
the group. The government has therefore failed to prove for this defendant- a key element of the crime of conspiracy,
any commitment of Dr. Mudd to its common object.
Essential to the government's case against Dr. Mudd for
both conspiracy and aiding and abetting is whether the doctor
recognized Booth and knew he had murdered the President
when Booth stopped for help at the farm on April 15. If the
government did not prove that Dr. Mudd knew he was helping an assassin, there was no basis even in the circumstantial
evidence of the record from which the commission could infer
an unlawful purpose to Dr. Mudd's earlier meetings with
Booth. The record would therefore fail to prove Dr. Mudd
knowingly took part in the conspiracy. If the government did
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not prove that Dr. Mudd knew he was treating and harboring
the President's assassin, then the government failed also to
prove the doctor intended to aid and abet an escaping felon.
The government called several witnesses to show that Dr.
Mudd aided Booth knowing what Booth had done. Lieutenant Lovett testified that, onApril18, Dr. Mudd volunteered to
him that two strangers had come to his house on the morning
of Saturday, AprillS, and that he had treated one of them for
a broken leg. Dr. Mudd told Lt. Lovett that he could not
identify either of his visitors, and that his patient had shaved
a mustache but retained a pair of long whiskers. Lt. Lovett
also testified that Dr. Mudd pointed out to him the route by
which, the next day, the doctor had directed them through the
nearby swamp to Dr. Wilmer's, before Dr. Mudd rode on to
church. According to Lt. Lovett, Dr. Mudd said he only
learned of the assassination when he spoke with fellow worshippers at church. Colonel Wells testified regarding three
conversations with the doctor. According to the Colonel, the
doctor told him substantially what the doctor had already
told the lieutenant, that Dr. Mudd had entertained two strangers on Saturday, treating one for an injured leg; that his
patient arrived with a mustache and whiskers; and that the
doctor did not recognize his patient as John Wilkes Booth.
To rebut Dr. Mudd's claim that he neither recognized
Booth nor knew Booth had anything to do with the assassination when he treated him, the government offered testimony
that the doctor visited Bryantown on Saturday afternoon,
after news of the assassination and of Booth's role had been
broadcast. That Dr. Mudd traveled that afternoon to town
and heard of the assassination was never disputed. The issue
is whether he heard on that trip that Booth was wanted as the
assassin. Three government witnesses testified that they
learned of the assassination in Bryantown on Saturday afternoon. Only one of these was able to discover the name of the
alleged assassin; the others were not. There was testimony
that Bryantown rumors that Saturday afternoon otherwise
identified the murderer, including some that named Boyle, a
locally notorious outlaw. Ultimately, however, the government failed to produce evidence directly contradicting the
doctor's statements to the government's investigators, Lieutenant Lovett and Colonel Wells. At best, the government
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proved that Dr. Mudd had an opportunity to learn Booth was
being sought earlier than the doctor claimed. It failed to prove
that Dr. Mudd took that opportunity.
Review of the record before the commission shows that
the government failed to offer any evidence which could be
said to prove Dr. Mudd's intentional participation in any
conspiracy, much less in one for murder as to which he was
charged. It also shows that the government failed to offer any
evidence which could be said to prove Dr. Mudd knew he was
harboring a felon when he set Booth's leg and sent his travelers back on the road that fateful Saturday. For this failure of
proof respecting essential elements of the crimes of conspiracy and aiding and abetting, the commission's judgment
should be set aside and the case against Dr. Mudd dismissed.
CONCLUSION
The conviction of Dr. Mudd should be overturned because
the record shows that the commission which tried him committed many errors of sufficient gravity to warrant correction
on appeal. The commission's first and most serious error was
trying him at all. Under the United States Constitution, a
military tribunal cannot try a civilian resident of a free state
when the civil courts are functioning normally. That martial
law may be in force makes no difference. Nor may the law of
war justify military jurisdiction over a civilian resident of a
loyal state. The military commission which tried Dr. Mudd
had no power to do so.
Trial by military commission cost Dr. Mudd his rights
under the Constitution to action by a grand jury, trial by a
petit jury, and trial in an appropriate venue. These rights may
not be denied a civilian resident of a free state by the unilateral
action of the government. The attempt to do so in this case
warrants reversal of Dr. Mudd's conviction and dismissal of
the charge against him.
The charge against Dr. Mudd was so vague as to prevent
the fashioning of a specific reply. By proceeding on such a
defective charge, the government denied Dr. Mudd's right to
due process. By arraigning him and demanding his plea
before allowing him to seek counsel, the government denied
Dr. Mudd's right to due process. By refusing him the opportunity to elicit testimony beyond the scope of the government's
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case in chief, the government denied Dr. Mudd's right to due
process. By excluding his wife's testimony, the government
denied Dr. Mudd's right to due process. By refusing his
request for a separate trial, the government denied Dr. Mudd's
right to due process. Any of these violations of rights recognized by the Constitution as applicable to criminal trials
generally, and by military law as applicable to trial by military commission, warrants reversal of Dr. Mudd's conviction
and dismissal of the charge against him.
Finally, the government completely failed to prove Dr.
Mudd even knew of the conspiracy to kill the President or of
Booth's commission of the crime. This failure of proof of
criminal intent on the part of the defendant warrants reversal
of Dr. Mudd's conviction and dismissal of the charge against
him.
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On April14, 1865, Abraham Lincoln, the sixteenth President of the United States and the Commander in Chief of their
armies was assassinated at Washington, D.C. Elsewhere in
the capital that night, William H. Seward, the Secretary of
State, was assaulted with a knife. It would later be learned
that simultaneous attacks were planned for the Vice President, Secretary of War, and General Grant.
The President was struck down in his box at Ford's Theater, by the bullet of an assassin who was observed by a
horrified audience as he escaped across the stage. Eyewitnesses had no trouble identifying the killer as the actor
John Wilkes Booth. He left the scene on horseback.
In the early morning hours of the next day, two riders, one
of them Booth, visited Samuel A. Mudd at his farm outside
Bryantown, Maryland. Mudd, a physician, treated Booth for
a broken leg, sheltering him and his companion until later in
the day, when Mudd led the pair to a secret path through the
nearby swamp. Meanwhile, numerous federal officers and
agents were conducting an active manhunt for the President's
assassin, issuing the hue and cry for Booth in Bryantown;
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indeed, across the breadth of Charles County. Mudd visited
Bryantown in the afternoon after the assassination, and there
discussed it with others, but concealed his visitors from the
authorities.
Eventually, federal officers interviewed Mudd. His answers and those of his wife, as well as the discovery of Booth's
damaged riding boot in Mudd's home, led to Mudd's arrest.
While he was in custody, additional evidence came to light of
his clandestine meetings with Booth and John Surratt, a known
Confederate agent, in the period preceding the assassination.
In addition, witnesses reported other acts by Mudd revealing
his sympathy for the rebels. Consequently, President Johnson
ordered Mudd to appear on charges related to the assassination before a military commission in Washington in May 1865.
During a lengthy trial, two experienced counsel represented
Mudd and sixty-four different witnesses took the stand in his
defense. Nevertheless, the nine senior officers comprising the
commission found him guilty and sentenced him to prison for
life. He remains incarcerated at Fort Jackson in the Florida
Keys.
Counsel for Mudd petitioned this honorable court for
review of his conviction, claiming that the military commission lacked jurisdiction to try Mudd, that it had denied him a
variety of procedural rights, and that the government had
failed to carry its burden of proof. The court granted Mudd's
Petition for Review by an order dated October 21, 1866.
For the murder of our nation's supreme military commander, Mudd was lawfully- and fairly- tried in time of
war by the military commission in Washington. To petitioner's
numerous claims of error, the government replies with greater
specificity in what follows.
PART ONE: JURISDICTION
A military commission, convened on May 8, 1865, could
try Mudd for conspiring to murder the nation's Commander
in Chief. According to international law to which the United
States subscribes, a military commission has jurisdiction in
time of martial law to try offenses against jus belli, the law of
war.
As we all know only too well, at the times of both the
assassination and the trial, civil war raged in the United
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States. This bloody conflict arose from the attempt to secede
by several states, including one whose borders touched both
the District of Columbia and Charles County, Maryland. The
war took the lives of hundreds of thousands, and destroyed
the lives of countless more. Although Lee had surrendered
his forces on April9, and Johnston his on April26, other rebel
armies fought on. The rebel leader, Jefferson Davis, was not
apprehended until two days after Mudd's trial began, and the
rebels prevailed in battle at San Jacinto on the very day the
prosecution opened its case. Rebel warships continued to
attack Union vessels as late as November, long after Mudd's
sentence had been approved. The city of Washington, seat of
government and national headquarters of its armed forces,
for four years faced the constant threat of rebel attack. During
Mudd's trial, the city remained the fortified center for directing military operations against the rebels. As they had since
1862, soldiers guarded the city's gateways and policed its
streets. The Commander in Chief was thus killed within his
own camp. These are undisputed facts of common knowledge, and are properly considered by this court in its review.
They are more than sufficient to support a finding by the
commission that a state of war existed and thatthe zone of war
embraced the place of the crime, the place of the petitioner's
arrest, and the place of his trial.
Like courts martial, military commissions are quasi-judicial military tribunals. Courts martial try persons of the
armed forces; military commissions try civilians accused of
criminal acts during wartime. In England, from whence our
law, military and civil, has come, the authority of military
commissions has been recognized since the twelfth century.
According to Hale, the Court of the Constable and Marshal
was established at that time for control over the King's army,
for appeals of death for murder committed out of the country,
and for determination of prisoners' rights: 1 General Washington ordered the earliest trial in the United States by a military
commission, that of the spy John Andre in September 1780. A
military commission tried Arbuthnot and Ambrister in Florida
in 1818 for inciting the Indians to war against the United
States 2 General Scott convened military commissions to try
offenses against the law of war by civilians during the Mexican War of 1847. On September 24, 1862, the Commander in
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Chief ordered that "all rebels ... be subject to martial law and
liable to trial and punishment by a court martial or military
commission." Congress ratified this Presidential proclamation by the third Act of March 3, 1863.
Application of the law of war (or martial law) to displace
or supplement civil law depends upon the condition of war.
According to Professor Parker,
Martial law is that military rule and authority which
exists in time of war, and is conferred by the laws of
war, in relation to persons and things under and within
the scope of active military operations in carrying on
the war, and which extinguishes or suspends civil
rights, and the remedies founded upon them ....
Founded on the necessities of war, and limited by
those necessities, its existence does not necessarily
suspend all civil proceedings.'
In his Instructions for the Government of Armies of the
United States in the Field, later promulgated by Presidential
direction as Union Army General Orders No. 100, Professor
Lieber wrote, "Martial law is simply military authority exercised in accordance with the laws and usages of war." Whiting has written that the laws of war are the laws that the
Constitution expressly authorizes and requires to be enforced
when martial law has been declared.' Captain Benet observed
that, "Many offenses which in time of peace are civil offenses,
become in time of war military offenses and are to be tried by
a military tribunal, even in places where civil tribunals exist."' That the recent war was not international but internecine
does not bar the authorization of military commissions by
martial law. As the Supreme Court observed in The Prize
Cases, "It is very evident that the common laws of war ought
to be observed by both parties in every civil war." 6
Mudd was accused of conspiring to assassinate the Commander in Chief of the armed forces of the Union, his immediate Constitutional successors in the chain of command, the
Vice President, the Secretaries of State and War, and the
general officer in charge of the Union armies in the field.
Mudd was thus accused of plotting, in effect, the destruction
of the national command authorities of the Union, as effec-
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tively as if he had shelled the headquarters tent where they
gathered in pre-battle council. Although it has not been
shown that Mudd ever donned a uniform of the insurgent
forces, or took a place in the ranks of its field armies, he
nevertheless became a combatant by plotting against such a
military target in time of war. As the Attorney General
recently advised the President in his opinion on the power of
a military commission to try those who conspired to kill the
Commander in Chief," An Army has a right to protect its own
existence by the means and mode usual among civilized
nations when at war."' Adopted by the President, who
ordered military trial for the conspirators, this expression of
the inherent power of the army in time of war ought to be
afforded great weight.
The decision of the United States Supreme Court in Ex
parte Milligan' is not to the contrary. In that case, it was
conceded that Indianapolis, the seat of both the military
district and the military commission, had never been seriously threatened by insurgent armies. Indiana was properly
regarded more as a military staging area for support of Union
forces than as a military target threatened by rebel attack. No
such concession is offered here regarding Washington, where
the taking of the national capital was always a rebel military
objective and rebel armies came distressingly close on several
occasions. Only the valiant defense of Fort Stevens blunted
General Early's invasion of the District of Columbia less than
a year before the trial of this case. The District and the State
of Maryland were truly war zones in the recent conflict. In
both, the constant threat of attack amounted to a serious
military emergency. The late President, by our Constitution
both chief executive and supreme military commander, concluded such conditions warranted imposition of martial law,
establishment of military commissions, and suspension of the
writ of habeas corpus. Congress soon ratified these decisions
by legislation, and the Supreme Court has acquiesced. The
decision of his successor regarding the trial of this particular
case ought to be treated with the same respect.
The Constitution does not prohibit either application of
the law of war or trial by military commission. Surely, it is
beyond peradventure after The Prize Cases that the law of war,
as part of the law of nations, is also part of the law of the
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United States. The Framers of the Constitution left administration of the law of war to Congress, not to the federal
judiciary. Article I, section 8, clause 10 authorizes Congress
"to define and punish offenses ... against the law of nations."
That Congress may have reassigned, from time to time, some
of that power to civil courts does not mean that Congress is
foreclosed from assigning it also, or instead, to other tribunals, including military commissions.
Congressional authorization of trial by military commission for offenses under the law of war no more intrudes upon
the grant of federal judicial power in Article III than does
Congressional authorization of trial by court martial, a practice uninterrupted since promulgation of the Articles of War
by the First Congress. In the Act of July 17, 1862, Congress
referred approvingly to trials by military commissions, and in
the Act of March 18, 1863, Congress explicitly authorized trial
by military commission of" any person" for spying, an offense
against the law of war.
The law of war and its customary tribunals precede the
Constitution. To the extent that the Constitution might be
said to limit preexisting customary law regarding the power
of the Commander in Chief to employ military commissions,
the Constitution implicates the Congress, not the judiciary.
Congress has lent its approval to trial by military commission
of civilians for violations of the laws of war. No further
approval from the federal courts is required. As Justice Story
wrote in his Commentaries on the Constitution of the United
States,
in measures exclusively of a political, legislative, or
executive character, it is plain, that as the supreme
authority, as to these questions, belongs to the
legislative and executive departments, they cannot be
reexamined elsewhere. 9
Careful assessment of the allocation of federal powers in the
Constitution leads to the conclusion that petitioner's trial by
military commission comported with·the supreme law of the
land.
Nothing in the Bill of Rights alters this conclusion. The
assassination of the Commander in Chief by Booth and the

Brief for the United States in Reply

39

assault on the second in succession to that office by his
henchman were attacks on military commanders and therefore offenses againstthe laws of war. So, also, were the related
conspiracy and subsequent acts aiding and abetting the perpetrators. As the Attorney General pointed out to the President, infractions of the laws of nations are offenses, to be
distinguished from crimes. In Article I, the Constitution
refers to offenses against the laws of nations, whereas in
Article III and in the Fifth and Sixth Amendments, the Constitution refers to crimes and criminal trials. Mudd was charged
with offenses against the laws of war; he was not charged with
crimes in violation of Federal law. His trial was therefore
beyond the scope of Article III and the Fifth and Sixth Amendments. Justice Story cautioned that the construction of a
power conferred in the Constitu lion ought
not be enlarged beyond the fair scope of its terms,
merely because the restriction is inconvenient,
impolitic, or even mischievous. If it be mischievous,
the power of redressing the evil lies with the people by
an exercise of the power of amendment. If they do not
choose to apply the remedy it may fairly be presumed,
that the mischief is less than what would arise from a
further extension of the power; or that it is the least of
two evils. 10
The same principle ought to govern judicial construction
of procedural entitlements in the Bill of Rights. Just as the
guarantee of a jury in the Seventh Amendment has been held
by the Supreme Court in Shields v. Thomas" to apply only to
those cases that arise from common law, as the text of that
Amendment specifically provides, and not from equity, so,
too, should the guarantee of a jury in the Sixth Amendment be
held to apply to cases arising from common law crimes, and
not from offenses against the law of nations.
The law of war applies in this case even though the United
States never formally recognized the late confederacy as a
belligerent state. First, belligerency is the prerequisite not for
a sovereign's assertion of power under jus belli, but for any
assertion of legal limits to that power. Second, belligerency
applies only to civilized and separate sovereignties at war
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with each other, not to one sovereign beset by civil war.
Finally, even if mutual recognition of belligerency were held
to be prerequisite to the application of the law of war in a
domestic insurrection, it would not lead to a finding of error
in this case, for only legitimate combatants may assert the
rights of a belligerent.
With the legal state of belligerency is associated restrictions on the savage power of a sovereign at war. Wheaton, in
his Elements of International Law, illustrates the point when
he discusses prisoners of war:
According to the law of war, as still practised by
savage nations, prisoners taken in war are put to
death. Among the more polished nations of antiquity,
this practice gradually gave way .... The present usage
of exchanging prisoners was not firmly established in
Europe until sometime in the course of the seventeenth
century. 12
As this passage makes clear, the mutual consent of European sovereigns has produced limits on the customary or
natural law of war. Without that mutual consent, such limits
do not apply. In internal war, "the government must decide
whether the municipal or the international code, in whole or
in part, shall be adopted. " 13 As President Woolsey of Yale has
put it, "There is a difference between belligerents and belligerent states, which has been too much overlooked." 14 Petitioner is correct in asserting that the record is devoid of any
formal act of the United States sufficient to communicate
recognition of the confederacy as a belligerent state. Petitioner is also correct in asserting that the government's discretionary resort to certain customs of prisoner parole and exchange is insufficient to establish a state of belligerency between the Union and the confederacy for other purposes
when it was not so intended by the United States. Absent a
state of belligerency, the law of war still applies, but the
limitations for belligerent states do not.
Belligerency's limits on the law of war have been withheld, again by the mutual consent of sovereigns, from murderous persons not enrolled in the armed forces of a consenting sovereign. Citing Vattel and Kluber, Wheaton noted:
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The horrors of war would indeed be greatly aggravated,
if every individual of the belligerent states was allowed
to plunder and slay indiscriminately the enemy's
subjects without being in any manner accountable for
his conduct. Hence it is, in land wars, irregular bands
of marauders are liable to be treated as lawless banditti,
not entitled to the mitigated usages of war as practiced
by civilized nations. 15
In his essay "Guerrilla Parties Considered with Reference
to the Laws and Usages of War," Professor Lieber referred to
recent European military law and history when he refined the
point made by Wheaton. Lieber distinguished various armed
bands, including brigands, freebooters, and bushwhackers.
None are entitled, as would be the captured soldier of the
conventional army of a belligerent, to the privileges of the law
of war, but only to its force.
According to Professor Lieber,
the armed prowler, the so-called bushwhacker, is a
simple assassin, and will thus always be considered by
soldier and citizen; and ... the armed bands that arise
in a district fairly occupied by military forces, or in the
rear of an army, are universally considered, if captured,
brigands, and not prisoners of war. 16
From Wheaton and Lieber, therefore, it may be concluded
that, by international law, a bushwhacker is subject to the full
force of the law of war, unmitigated by the actions of sovereigns mutually respecting their armies as belligerents.
As charged before the commission, Mudd and his codefendants constituted an armed band of bushwhackers. The
record shows that they were recruited and led by Booth, who
held no commission from the confederacy. Forsaking uniforms and identifying badges, they operated secretly in the
rear of the Union army to murder its most senior officers.
Against such a band, as against spies, the law of war operates
unmitigated by privileges associated with the status of belligerency. So, even if a state of belligerency was necessary to
mitigate for regular soldiers the full force of the law of war, its
absence has no bearing on the decision in this case.
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PART TWO: PROCEDURE
Petitioner had ample opportunity to request a more definite statement of the charge and specifications before trial
began. Now that his counsel have presented an extensive, if
ultimately unsuccessful, defense, his claim that the vagueness
of the charge and specifications left him unable to defend
should fall on deaf ears. The record shows that petitioner
made no objection to the charge and specification at his
arraignment, and only requested a restatement near the end
of the government's case in chief. Nevertheless, petitioner
now argues that the charge and specification were so vague as
to prevent him from making an adequate defense. The government readily concedes that an accused should be apprised
of the extent and degree of guilt with which he stands charged,
and of the particular facts on which the prosecutor plans to
base the evidence against him. The government also agrees
that, as Captain Benet observed, if a charge is found to be so
defective in all legal respects that it is impossible to confirm a
finding of guilt thereon, no sentence of punishment could be
properly adjudged or enforced. 17 The issue here, however, is
whether, considering petitioner's failure to object earlier, he
really was forestalled as he now claims. If Mudd did not
understand the charge, he could have called upon the prosecution to specify the particular facts, a request that, Captain
De Hart noted, the commission could not refuse. 18 Since
neither Mudd nor his counsel requested a clearer statement
until the government's case was nearly complete, this court is
entitled to assume that, at the time, Mudd understood well
enough the charges under which he was indicted. Even if his
failure to make a timely objection is excusable, the court ought
to find that such an objection is nevertheless meritless, because the charge and specifications left no doubt as to the
persons accused and the crimes in question.
As presented at petitioner's arraignment, the charge and
specifications were sufficiently clear as a matter of law. According to General Macomb and Captain Benet, the charge
and specification are too vague only when they fail to point to
any specific crime. 19 Captain De Hart has noted that, while in
framing charges of military offenses, precision and conciseness should be observed, it is not necessary to follow technical
strictness. De Hart has concluded that a requirement for
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technical strictness would encumber the proceedings of military courts to an inconvenient extent without any substantial
benefits and make necessary a body of lawyers to provide
guidance and administration of military justice, 20 All that
should be necessary to satisfy basic fairness is enough precision and certainty in the description so that the defendant
may know the nature of the crime charged,
The specifications to the charge must be brief, clear, and
explicit Captain Benet wrote that, in general, they must give
the facts, circumstances, and intent in specific terms, 21 In
particular, when conspiracy is charged, the accused must be
named and informed of the offense, as well as the time and
place of its commission, In this case, the general conspiracy
specification reported that petitioner, with Booth and John
Surratt, on or before March 6, 1865, and from then to April15,
1865, did "combine, confederate, and conspire together ,,
unlawfully, maliciously, and traitorously to kill and murder
within the Military Department of Washington, and within
the fortified and entrenched lines thereof" Abraham Lincoln
and other named officers, The specification then described
the assassination in detail, including the time, place, and
circumstances, An additional paragraph recounted the individual involvement of the petitioner, stating that he did
"advise, encourage, receive, entertain, harbor, and conceal,
aid, and assist" certain listed people with "knowledge of the
murderous and traitorous conspiracy aforesaid,,," Thus, the
charge and specifications presented the case against petitioner in sufficient detail as to leave no question in a reasonable mind about what he was called upon to answer.
When petitioner's counsel finally did request that the
charge and specification be stated more clearly, the government fully complied, The record shows that, although the
Judge Advocate replied that the charge and specification
could not be stated "with more certainty, or with more appropriateness or terseness of language, than has been already
employed," he did reiterate that the general allegation was
conspiracy and that the applicable law would be the common
law, When defense counsel continued to ask whether the
accused were charged with conspiracy, both the Judge Advocate and Assistant Judge Advocate Bingham answered affirmatively, In particular, Bingham stated that they were in-

44

Dr. Mudd and the Lincoln Assassination

dieted for a conspiracy and would be held accountable for as
many overt acts in the execution of that conspiracy as they
were guilty of.
It strains credulity that petitioner's counsel did not understand the charge and specification, when he proceeded without clarification for much of the government's case. Any
complaint as to the charge and specification should properly
have been made at arraignment or as the trial began, yet
petitioner made no motion to quash, offered no plea in abatement, and never presented a demurrer.
However, assuming for the sake of argument that there
were ambiguities in the charge, the explanations given by the
Judge Advocate and the Assistant Judge Advocate should
have eliminated any remaining uncertainty. From the charge
and specification introduced at arraignment, as well as from
amplifying responses by the Judge Advocates, petitioner
should have learned all he needed to know and all that the law
required the government to inform him. No error sufficient to
justify reversing the judgment of the commission ought to
attach to the communication made by the charge and specification.
The commission's refusal to sever petitioner's trial from
that of his co-defendants denied him neither a procedural
right nor an adequate opportunity to defend himself. Where
several persons are jointly indicted, the common law is clear
that the accused have no right to insist upon separate trials. If
the court, in its discretion, chooses not to separate the trials, it
commits no error. United States v. Marchant" stands as authority for the applicability of this rule in federal courts. Other
precedents supporting its universality at common law includeMaton v. People, 23 Whitehead v. State,'' and State v. Soper. 25
Bishop 26 and Starkie 27 concur in their works on criminal law.
The same rule applies in military law. General Macomb
and Captain Benet distinguish between cases in which the
defendants are named in a common charge and those in which
they are named in separate charges. 28 According to both
learned commentators, where defendants are named in a
common charge, they are tried together. In this case, petitioner was named in the same charge and general specification as his co-defendants. The commission therefore adhered
to customary practice when it tried the eight together, and it
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did not abuse its discretion when it denied petitioner's request to be tried separately.
The factthat Mudd's wife did not testify on his behalf does
not support the claim that he was denied an adequate chance
to defend. His counsel never called Mrs. Mudd to testify. The
defense's failure to call a witness cannot later be deemed an
error by the tribunal. By not even attempting to call Mrs.
Mudd, the defense waived whatever right it might have to her
testimony.
Had the defense called Mrs. Mudd to testify, the commission would have been well justified in refusing to admit her
testimony. Neither common law nor military law admits
husbands and wives as witnesses for or against each other, in
any trial where one of them may be a party. Roscoe and
Greenleaf, in their treatises on evidence, both present as the
common law the rule here stated. 29 General Macomb, Captain
De Hart, and Captain Benet in their treatises on military law,
present as the customary law of military tribunals the same
rule 30 The United States Supreme Court confirmed the rule's
applicability in federal court in Stein v. Bowman 31 It has not
seen fit to revisit the matter since.
Any argument for admission of the testimony of a spouse
can therefore be based on no more than wishful thinking. As
Greenleaf notes, the identity of interest between husband and
wife makes a wife's testimony as vulnerable to claims of
improper interest as the testimony of the defendant himself.
Petitioner fails to point to anything that might justify reassessing the policy balance of public and private life that has
long persuaded the courts to adhere to such a rule.

PART THREE: EVIDENCE
The prosecution furnished more than enough evidence to
sustain Mudd's conviction. The charge against him was
proven sufficiently to satisfy the understanding and conscience of the commission. The government recognizes the
long-settled principle that the obligation of proving any fact
lies upon the party who asserts the affirmative of that fact, and
accepts that this principle applies to trials by military tribunals. According to Captain De Hart, in military courts, "He
who makes the charge is bound to prove it." 32 "Proof,"
however, is nothing more than, as De Hart puts it, the legal
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credence that the law gives to evidence. The government
readily concedes, therefore, that it bore the burden of proof at
petitioner's trial. Thus the dispute here is not about which
party bore the burden of proof but about how heavy a burden
it had to be. Petitioner is really calling on this court to
determine the minimum amount of credible evidence necessary for his conviction.
Petitioner makes the novel but misguided assertion that
the prosecution had to furnish proof sufficient to meet the
common law standard of "reasonable doubt." On this point,
military law does not follow the common law, as the lack of
citation to military authorities for this point in petitioner's
brief makes clear. Moreover, as Captain Benet notes in his
treatise, military law does not even require the same proof
standard for a military commission as for a court martial. 33
The commission that tried petitioner was free to set for itself
the standard of proof. Its findings should not be set aside for
failure to follow procedures appropriate to other tribunals.
The prosecution need on! y have provided enough evidence so
that petitioner's guilt was a certainty in the understanding
and conscience of the commission members.
To assert that the prosecution was not bound to prove
petitioner guilty beyond reasonable doubt is not to concede
that the government's case fell short of that strictest of standards. The commission heard evidence more than sufficient
by any proof measure to find petitioner guilty of conspiracy
to murder the President and other officers in the chain of
command.
This case presents no issue as to the nature of criminal
conspiracy. The government and the petitioner concede that
military law ought to define the crime of conspiracy in the
same manner as does the common law. Maltby, Benet, and De
Hart agree that, in the absence of specific rules found in
military law, common law provides a· source for principles to
guide military trials. 34 It is black letter law that a conspiracy
is a confederacy of two or more persons to accomplish some
unlawful object, and that the object of the conspiracy need not
be accomplished for the crime to be· perfected. The confederacy itself constitutes the crime. No further overt act other
than the agreement need be proven. The crime is complete
when the conspirators enter the agreement. Thus, in this case,
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the prosecution had only to prove that petitioner agreed with
at least one other that one of them would commit a crime.
Whether petitioner intended to personally take part in
attacking the President and the others is irrelevant; the issue
is whether Mudd agreed with someone else that the attacks
should be carried out. Conspiracy, like any other controverted fact, can be proven by circumstances. As the court
noted in United States v. Donau, 35 the fact finder need only find
that the circumstances have been satisfactorily proven as
facts. The commission, therefore, could infer petitioner's agreement to Booth's plot from the evidence of petitioner's own
words and actions.
Two long-settled principles, originating in the common
law and adopted by military law, guide proof of intent. The
first, set forth by Captain Benet, is a presumption that a
person intends to do what he does, and intends the natural,
necessary and probable consequences of his actions. 36 The
second, which follows from the first, is that a person's intent
can be inferred from his actions. The commission could
properly rely on these principles to find that the evidence
supported petitioner's conviction for conspiracy.
Petitioner's statement to Daniel J. Thomas that the President, his cabinet, and other Union men would soon be dead
surely permitted the inferrence of petitioner's knowing involvement in a plot by those with whom he was repeatedly in
contact during the period leading up to their attacks on such
officers. Several witnesses testified of petitioner's meetings
with the assassin Wilkes Booth, the Confederate agent John
Surratt, and other conspirators. Louis Weichmann testified
that, on January 15, 1865, he met Mudd and Booth on a
Washington street, after Mudd had called out to John Surratt,
and that the foursome repaired to the National Hotel for
conference. According to Weichmann, Mudd had private
conversations at the hotel with Booth and Surratt, during
which Booth appeared to draw a diagram. William A. Evans,
a minister, testified that he saw Mudd going into Mary Surratt's
Washington home in early March. Marcus P. Norton placed
Mudd at the National Hotel on March 3, when the doctor
entered Norton's room looking for Booth. From this evidence
of petitioner's repeated, furtive meetings with Booth and
other conspirators, the commission could infer Mudd's will-
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ing participation in the planning of the attacks.
Evidence that petitioner was an active and spirited adherent to the cause of secession goes to the purpose of petitioner's
meetings with Booth and others implicated in the attacks.
Such evidence warrants the commission's finding that petitioner met repeatedly with Booth and the other plotters during the life of the plot to discuss the plot, and not unrelated
matters. Witnesses testified that Mudd entertained gatherings of Confederate sympathizers at his horne. Several of his
former slaves testified of secret gatherings of men, many in
Confederate uniform, in the woods surrounding petitioner's
home. They told of his instructing servants to provide the
men with bedding and food, tend their horses, and serve as
look-outs. The record also shows that the Confederate agent,
now fugitive, John Surratt was a frequent guest in the Mudd
horne.
In addition to this circumstantial evidence of petitioner's
support for the secessionists, the record contained petitioner's
own treasonous utterances. These, too, tend to prove
petitioner's felonious purpose in meeting with Booth and his
gang in the months and weeks immediately before the assassination. Melvina Washington recalled petitioner telling her,
"Lincoln would not be in office for long" and cursing the
President as a "son of a bitch" who ought to have been dead
a long time ago. Walter Marshall had earlier heard petitioner
praise the rebel General Jackson, stating that he had no objection if the General were to "burn Lincoln up in his house."
Petitioner was rightly ajudged Booth's co-conspirator.
Evidence of the actions and surrounding circumstances of
other conspirators supports the commission's conclusion that
Mudd was a party to an agreement to murder the President.
The crime of conspiracy requires that an agreement between
two or more persons to commit an unlawful act be proven.
However, there is no authority stating that the agreement be
formal. Indeed, as Federal courts have ruled in United States
v. Hertz 37 and United States v. Wilson, 38 the acts and words of
the defendant's co-conspirators can prove a common conspiracy. As the court noted in United States v. Cole, 39 this
includes their acts both before and after the commission of the
object of the conspiracy. The most telling act by petitioner's
co-conspirators was the visit by Booth and Herold at the

Brief.for the United States in Reply

49

Mudd home during their flight to avoid capture. From that
visit, the commission could infer that petitioner had previously offered his home as a safe house in Charles County and
that this contribution explained his several meetings with
Booth and other conspirators.
Petitioner's inaction following Booth's stopover also suggests his willing participation in the plot. Informed of the
manhunt for the President's assassin, Mudd kept silent about
Booth's visit until he and Herold gained a vital head start
toward Richmond. As the Indiana Supreme Court said in
McGregor v. State, 40 when circumstantial evidence is relied on
for a conviction, the totality of the evidence must be so
conclusive that a reasonable man would believe in the existence of the offense even in view of the most important concerns of life and liberty. In this case, the commission considered the circumstances presented among the totality of the
evidence to reach the reasonable conclusion of Mudd's complicity. Thus, the commission permissibly and correctly found
that petitioner was party to the agreement to attack the Commander in Chief and the Secretary of State.
That petitioner's witnesses presented a different interpretation of his words and actions does not warrant setting aside
the judgment against him. It is black letter law that the
credibility of witnesses is the province of the fact finder. As
the court noted in Dickenson v. The Gore,' 1 assessment of the
witnesses' demeanor is essential to determining their credibility and assigning weight to their testimony. For this
reason, appellate courts, with resort only to written transcripts, have traditionally eschewed overruling a trial court's
findings of fact based on the credibility of witnesses offering
conflicting versions of the facts. Nothing in this appellate
court's organic law suggests that Congress intended this
court to proceed otherwise. This court, therefore, ought to
defer to the commission's tacit judgment that the government's
witnesses were more believable than the petitioner's.
CONCLUSION
Petitioner's several claims of error by the commission are
groundless. Because the law of war would have empowered
the commission to try Booth, a bushwhacker who killed the
Commander in Chief and attempted to kill his successors in
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the chain of command, the law of war empowered the commission to try that bushwhacker's confederates, including
Samuel Mudd. The U.S. Constitution, which recognizes and
incorporates the law of war by reference, does not prohibit
petitioner's trial by military commission, nor does it require
the substitution of a civil court or a common law jury. That the
Union denied secessionist state governments formal recognition as belligerent sovereigns does not dictate a contrary
conclusion.
Petitioner got the trial to which the law entitled him. He
did not deserve a jury. No error resulted from the commission's
refusal to try him apart from his co-conspirators, or from the
omission of his wife's testimony.
The totality of the evidence presented by the prosecution
was sufficient for even the highest burden of proof. For all
these reasons, the United States respectfully pray that this
court affirm the commission's conviction of Samuel A. Mudd.
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counsel ready for the appellant? As I understand it, the
time will be divided between the two counsel for appellant?
MS. STEEL: That's correct, Your Honor. I will have fifteen
minutes and [co ]counsel will have twenty minutes, and I
would like to reserve ten minutes for rebuttal, if we may.
JUDGE EVERETT: Is counsel prepared to proceed for the
appellee?
DEAN DOUGLASS: Yes, Your Honor.
JUDGE EVERETT: We'll hear argument.
MS. STEEL: Good afternoon. May it please the court. My
name is Candida Ewing Steel and, with Mr. F. Lee Bailey,
I represent Dr. Samuel Mudd who was tried by the Hunter
Commission of acts related to the assassination of President Abraham Lincoln. As the Court will recall, John
Wilkes Booth stopped and received medical treatment
from this Maryland country doctor. General Thomas
Ewing Jr., who was trial counsel below, is unable, for
personal and professional reasons, to prosecute this appeal, and I thank the Court for allowing me, as his granddaughter, to appear in his stead. I will be addressing the
question of jurisdiction (in this case) for the Hunter Commission to try Dr. Mudd, and my co-counsel, Mr. F. Lee
Bailey, will be addressing the violations of procedural
rights guaranteed to Dr. Mudd under the Constitution
and military law traversed by the Hunter Commission.
It is now nearly two years after the cessation of hostilities
between the states and the tragic assassination of our
beloved President Lincoln. On the birthday of this President who will be forever honored for preserving the
Union, it is appropriate to ponder the Constitutional foundation of the Union and its relation to the circumstances
which have brought Dr. Mudd before the Court. Mr.
Bailey will be addressing the direct impact on Dr. Mudd of
the decision to convene a military commission. I will, with
the Court's permission, address the larger question of the
jurisdiction of the military over citizens as it applies to all
citizens in this nation.
Your Honors, the petitioner submits that the military commission did not have jurisdiction under the Constitution
to try a civilian in the circumstances of this case and the
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decision to impanel the commission was an unwarranted
and unconstitutional usurpation of power by the presidency.
Petitioner Samuel Mudd was a citizen of the United States and
lived in the Union State of Maryland, a simple physician
and farmer, not belonging to the Army or Navy, and he
was not in the public service. He was in the same shoes as
any other citizen who might fall under suspicion - any
judge, lawyer, or clergyman of the State of Maryland. His
guilt or innocence does not affect the question of the
competence of the tribunal by which he was judged. Mr.
Bailey will address the questions of guilt or innocence, but
for the purpose of my argument, the court must determine
jurisdiction without regard to whether or not Dr. Mudd
may have been innocent or guilty of the charges that were
made against him. The military commission depended
entirely on the executive will for its creation and its court.
Had the President, in the time of war, by his own mere will
and judgment of the emergency, the power to bring before
the military any man or woman to be tried and punished
whether for life or to be sentenced to death? If the President had this power, it must come from the Constitution,
since the President has no power which the citizens have
not granted him through the Constitution that they have
specifically authorized. The President is given the executive power, the execution of those laws enacted by Congress, and the authority to direct the operations of the
military which Congress caused to be raised. If it were
otherwise, Your Honors, in wartime, either foreign or
domestic, the President would become a dictator. The
theory on which the Government rests its argument is that
the Commander in Chief may do whatever is necessary to
promote the success of his armies, and that he is the sole
judge of the necessity. Congress and.the courts would be
just as subject to the whim and will of the Executive as Dr.
Mudd and any other citizen that might be taken before a
military court. The essential point, as I am certain Your
Honors are aware, of the Magna Carta, which was the
foundation of the English system which has become the
common law of our country, was to reduce the regal to a
legal power when imprisonment was involved, and the
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Magna Carta was treasured and imitated by our founding
fathers and the exemption from military rule for all but the
military and trial by jury were very carefully preserved
and retained.
JUDGE EVERETT: Hasn't there been a traditional basis of
jurisdiction under the law of war with respect even to
civilians if, for example, they are spies or working for an
enemy nation; and doesn't that basis of jurisdiction apply
here?
MS. STEEL: There is, under the law of war, certainly someone
acting as a spy, a citizen of a foreign jurisdiction or foreign
country- there is authority under the law of war and we
do not ask that the court disturb that authority to try that
person in the military court. In this case, however, Dr.
Mudd was not in the employ of a foreign nation, was not
in the employ of a belligerent nation. There is not sufficient proof to show that he was acting as a spy; and even
if that were to be true, because he is a citizen of the United
States and of the State of Maryland, as the Supreme Court
has stated this past December in Ex parte Milligan, the
citizen has a right to be tried before a civil court, even
without regard to whether or not he was engaged in
rebellious activities. Milligan was a case involving very
much the same circumstances.
JUDGE EVERETT: Milligan, I believe, was a case involving
martial law, and the law of war is something different. If
you had a situation where Dr. Mudd was clearly established to have been working, let's say, as a spy for the
insurgents- the Southern forces- wouldn't he be subject to trial by military commission?
MS. STEEL: Your Honor, we would submit that he would not
for the very reason that he is a citizen, as the Supreme
Court stated in Milligan. In that case, Lambdin Milligan
was viewed as a spy. He in fact entered an arsenal in the
Union State of Indiana and relieved not only prisoners of
war but arms from this arsenal to carry secretly across the
Indiana state line, and certainly was acting in the interest
of the rebel side in this case. He was, in the Supreme
Court's opinion, very clearly entitled to, and should have
undergone, a civil trial, and that is what we ask for Dr.
Mudd.
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JUDGE RE: Ms. Steel, is there any allegation or any proof that
at any time Dr. Mudd served in any capacity as a spy?
MS. STEEL: No sir, and there is no proof in any way that he
served as a member of any military or army or navalforces
either.
JUDGE RE: You would therefore conclude that whatever
military powers would exist over a spy would not apply to
Dr. Mudd.
MS. STEEL: That's correct, Your Honor. With regard to the
statement that I have just made, about the citizenship and
requirements of Dr. Mudd, that argument was made in
fact on December- I mean on May 10, 1865, on the same
day that the trial opened in the Mudd case- the Hunter
Commission trial opened. That argument was made however by Mr. Field on behalf of Mr. Milligan, and we would
submit that our argument is entirely parallel to that of Mr.
Milligan; and the court in Milligan stated that the military
commission did not and would not have jurisdiction over
Mr. Milligan. There is argument or suggestion from the
Government that necessity overrides the right of a citizen
to be tried by a civil court, and we would submit that, the
courts in Indiana, as well as in Maryland and the District
of Columbia being open, fully operational, (and, in fact, as
Attorney General Speed conceded, the courts were open
and operating in the District of Columbia) there was, in
fact, no military necessity for overtaking the right of the
civil court to try Dr. Mudd or any other person charged
with similar crimes.
JUDGE COX: Was there any effort by Dr. Mudd or Mr. Ewing
to enjoin this prosecution, relying on Milligan -to these
courts that were open and in business?
MS. STEEL: I would urge the court to read both the arguments
of Thomas Ewing and of Senator Reverdy Johnson, very
thorough and very learned arguments on the jurisdictional question, which were made at the outset of the
commission and again at the close of the commission
before the decision was rendered, and they were ...
JUDGE COX: Was a habeas corpus petition brought in the
United States District Court for the District of Columbia or
in the original jurisdiction of the United States Supreme
Court to release him?
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MS. STEEL: Your Honor, I'm not certain- there may have
already been a habeas petition filed but I'm not sure that a
decision has been issued or if it has, if it can be locatedon behalf of Dr. Mudd.
JUDGE COX: I didn't mean ... I'm aware of one that may have
been filed subsequent to the trial, but I'm talking contemporaneous with the trial.
MS. STEEL: No, I don't believe so. There were, I believe, with
regard to other parties and ...
JUDGE COX: Doesn't that belie your argument that the courts
were open and in business if Dr. Mudd did not attempt to
take advantage of these open courts to give him some
relief?
MS. STEEL: Your Honor, there was an attempt made by other
parties before the court who declined to do so based on
President Lincoln's suspension of the writ, and, as the
courtis aware, in 1863 Congress ratified President Lincoln's
authority to suspend the writ of habeas corpus.
JUDGE COX: But hadn't that suspension been declared
illegal by another federal court in the Merryman case or
some other cases of that era?
MS. STEEL: Whether or not it had been declared illegal, the
court, Your Honor, was not able to enforce a writ if it were
to be issued. The court can issue a writ and it not be
returned.
JUDGE COX: That clearly would be an issue for us ...
MS. STEEL: Right.
JUDGE COX: If one had been issued and they disobeyed it.
MS. STEEL: Right- right.
JUDGE RE: Ms. Steel, would it have not hurt whether or not
he took advantage of the civil courts if the commission
that tried and convicted Dr. Mudd had no jurisdiction in
fact over the subject matter?
MS. STEEL: No. We would submit that it does not and that
this court has authority at any time to take a look at the
jurisdiction of this commission -jurisdiction is the perennial question that we hope the court will look at now.
JUDGE COX: You urged us to read some material- what
might be extremely helpful, I'm sure that you've read,
would be the Petition of Mr. David Dudley Field, whose
petition I think could have practically been used here.
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MS. STEEL: Your Honor, I had just transposed a good portion
of that argument before the questions began. Five of those
paragraphs were in fact from Mr. Field's argument, because they were so clearly in support of Dr. Mudd.
As stated by Mr. Ewing- in fact in his argument on the plea
to the jurisdiction as well, he stated that:
The Judge Advocate has been unable in the cases of
Arnold and Mudd to present any evidence remotely
approaching that prescribed by the Constitution and
the laws as a condition of conviction. And yet I am led
to infer that he will claim a conviction of one or both of
them on the proof presented. What is the profession
on this and the other side of the Atlantic to think of
such administration of criminal jurisprudence? For
this, the first of our state trials, will be read with
avidity everywhere. I ask the officers of the government
to think of this carefully now, lest two or three years
hence they may not like to hear it named.
We would submit that we are now two or three years hence
from the trial of Dr. Mudd. The court can look back and
see that the circumstances which applied at the close of the
war - the war, which it is our position, was over at the
time of Dr. Mudd's trial- in fact, if there was a danger in
Washington, D.C., it was from the Union troops gathering
in Washington, D.C. to celebrate the close of war, not a
threat from the South. As the Milligan court stated, the
threat must be immediate and imminent to justify any
necessity for taking over from the courts. As the court said
in Milligan: If Society is disturbed by civil commotion, if
the passions of men are aroused and the restraints of law
weakened, if not disregarded, these safeguards need and
should receive the watchful care of those entrusted with
the guardianship of the Constitution and laws. In no other
way can we transmit to posterity unimpaired the blessings of liberty, consecrated by the sacrifices of the Revolution.
And we would submit, Your Honors, that the fundamental
principles upon which our nation was founded are set
forth in the Declaration of Independence. Among the
insufferable abuses and and usurpations of the King which
required the dissolution of the historical band with En-
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gland the founders set forth the following: [the King] has
obstructed the Administration of Justice, by refusing his
Assent to Laws for establishing Judiciary Powers; he has
made Judges dependent on his Will alone ... and he has
affected to render the Military independent of and superior to the Civil Power.
As stated by our late President, ours is "a government of the
people, by the people and for the people;" to replace that
principle with the unprincipled doctrine of military necessity would be to abandon our liberties, rendering the
deaths of our countrymen in our great civil war truly in
vain. And, Your Honor, we would ask that the court
uphold the Constitution that was so carefully and painfully and strugglingly achieved, defended in the Revolution, and surviving the Civil War and ask that the court
show that this country can maintain a Constitutional
government which has a balance of power, the tension
between those powers providing the life to that Constitution and protecting the interests and the rights of the
citizens of that country.
Thank you very much.
MR. BAILEY: If it please the court, despite the able argument
of my distinguished colleague on the vital question of
jurisdiction, we would not have it thought that Dr. Mudd
seeks to escape conviction on some technicality; because
what flowed from the perversion that was involved in
abridging the Constitution and using a military commission is one sledge-hammer after another of corruption of
the very things the Constitution was intended to protect,
and it produced an unjust and inaccurate result. And I
shall cover those points. Before doing so, I should like to
point out respectfully to Judge Cox that the great writthe great protector - was totally flaccid in these times.
Indeed Mary Surratt's last act before she was hanged was
to invoke the great writ only to be told through the court
that it was suspended and could not come to her aid. Now,
in order to find out what Dr. Mudd confronted because of
the course taken by President Johnson (which indeed
would have offended President Lincoln very gravely as he
was a great lawyer), start with the final argument of that
most distinguished counsel who at the age of 34, not only
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was a brilliant advocate and a general, but a former supreme court justice of the Territory of Kansas. He began
by saying to the Commission: I don't know what I'm on
trial here for. All I can do is argue the contingencies: If you
are trying me for treason you lack two witnesses or an
open court confession. If you are trying me for murder I
was in Maryland, six hours away. If you are trying me for
accessory before the fact, there isn't enough evidence to
hang a titmouse on, and if you are trying me for accessory
after the fact (obviously they weren't in view of the punishment), you don't have enough there.
John Wilkes Booth could not have known, if it please the
court, that he was going to catch his boot and his spur in
a flag as he jumped from the box to the stage and break his
leg, and therefore had no reason to line up a coconspiritorial doctor in the State of Maryland to whom he
could flee for assistance. The hard evidence in this case
shows and shows only that Dr. Mudd was a physician who
knew Booth because he had met him once before and to
whom he went for help before the news of the assassination or the identity of the perpetrator could possibly have
reached Charles County; indeed, so relaxed was Booth
about that aspect of his protection, lacking the fast communications which I'm sure some day this country will
enjoy, that he even stayed on for a period of hours after
being treated.
Now, when defense counsel makes his appearance one day
before the evidence starts, there should be a great deal of
suspicion in the mind of any appellate court about due
process. Or if, as the prosecution seeks to persuade this
court, due process does not apply, and reasonable doubt
doesn't apply, they at least concede that some degree of
fundamental fairness has its place, even in a military
commission constituted of subordinates of the much-beloved victim who has just been brutally and senselessly
assassinated and who are anything but a fair and impartial tribunal.
What in the world was the Government thinking of when it
decided to bypass the judiciary in its zeal to quickly bring
someone to the bridge of punishment in order to satisfy an
outraged public? To impanel this group in the habit of
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obedience to the Commander in Chief, whose marching
orders were written everywhere but on the paper in front
of him to render a fair and impartial judgment and to give
the defendants an even shot to defend themselves made
no sense at all. The only good that flowed from the use of
this military commission, when there was no emergency
and no exigency, a condition which must always exist if
military commissions are to be used instead of juries, the
only good to flow from that was the satisfaction of the
monumental embarrassment for the lack of security of the
President ofthe United States that allowed him to be killed
by an amateur, and the ineptitude of the Army and the
setting of his leg by my client.
JUDGE RE: Mr. Bailey.
MR. BAILEY: Yes?
JUDGE RE: Since you have referred to the exigency which is
very important ...
MR. BAILEY: Yes, sir.
JUDGE RE: To what extent would you say that this tribunal
owes a deference to the determination of the military that
says there is a necessity notwithstanding the cessation of
hostilities, notwithstanding the fact that the war is physically over- do we owe a deference or may we look into
that fact independently, as a matter of standard ofreview?
MR. BAILEY: Deference must be carefully given from one
branch to another; when the judiciary will allow the executive to take over its functions on some ground they
boot-strap is ever a danger. So if they can prove with
evidence a real exigency why then you can at least undo
what they did in haste if it were done unjustly. But I do not
believe that my distinguished colleagues have enough to
satisfy you that they could not have tried Samuel Mudd
before a jury, as, I hasten to point out, John Surratt (captured last November in Europe) is- going to be tried by a
jury. Would it not look rather terrible, distinguished
judges, if in a civilian court the prosecution is unable to
convict John Surratt who certainly has evidence allayed
against him far more deadly than that looked at for Dr.
Mudd? I predict that that is exactly what will happen and
any affirmance of these convictions will hold the military
tribunal in even lower esteem in this country- something
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we do not need. This case has rubbed so much lustre from
the fledgling jurisprudence of this great country that it
needs to be dismantled and put to rest and never used as
precedent for anything in the future.
JUDGE EVERETT: You know, in your catalogue of offenses
ranging from treason through accessory after the fact,
there was one it seemed to me that you omitted, and that's
conspiracy. Doesn't the evidence persuasively tie together to show, even using a reasonable doubt standard,
that there was a conspiracy and that Dr. Mudd, as one of
the co-conspirators, is responsible for the consequencesall of the consequences?
MR. BAILEY: Once again, in a civilian court, had the same
result obtained, based on the evidence submitted, one
might have confidence that a dispassionate judgment was
made. But when the prosecution will bring forward
witnesses of the calibre of one Thomas (against the duty of
bringing the truth to the court), when twenty of his neighbors testified he's a congenital liar, when his stories were
inconsistent, and use that as evidence to convict Dr. Mudd,
then I say the evils of the Commission have visited themselves on the procedure and you cannot trust the findings
of fact.
JUDGE EVERETT: I want to see if I understand you correctly
then. You're conceding basically- I gather- the evidence would be sufficient if presented before a civilian
jury, the jury chose to disbelieve the twenty-seven witnesses in favor of the one, they would be empowered to do
that and that an appellate court could properly affirm.
You're saying that the evidence is insufficient because it is
before a military tribunal, is that the position?
MR. BAILEY: No. I'm saying that the military tribunal was
too insensitive to perjured testimony because it wanted to
reach a certain result no jury would. ever accept of that
witness and, even if they had, this court, on the totality of
the evidence, would have concluded that reasonable men
could not have found beyond a reasonable doubt that that
evidence was sufficient to support a conspiracy conviction with a sentence of life hanging from it. And reasonable doubt, if it please the court, is the Achilles heel of my
opponent. Nowhere is it shown that that standard was
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applied and yet it is universal in criminal cases in this
country and can never, never be abridged.
JUDGE RE: Mr. Bailey, even if the proof were to be conclu·
sive, that would in no way justify or make legal- or am
I wrong in my belief- the conclusion that would inevitably follow if your co-counsel's point is correct: that there
was no jurisdiction to try him, and there was no jurisdic·
tion, regardless of the crime, regardless of the nature of the
offense, regardless of the proof. It would be non coram
judice. Forgive the Latin, but I use that because reference
was made to Magna Carta, which is also the Latin phrase
there, "Per Legem Terrae," which means the law of the
land, and under the law of the land, if this tribunal had no
jurisdiction over Dr. Mudd -he was to be tried by the
civil courts where the offense was allegedly committed.
MR. BAILEY: I certainly concede the fact thatthe argument of
my co-counsel should have mooted mine by now; however, I think it fair to point out that this is a real evil that
flows from the use of these commissions and not a techni·
cal evil of which we are trying to take advantage. This was
a hurry-up, slam-dunk proceeding. Dr. Mudd should
have stood trial alone. Had he done so, even this commis·
sion might have not had the temerity to find him guilty. I
say they were ...
JUDGE RE: Mr. Bailey, you'll have to forgive me. The only
reason I take this view is because - a view that I must
admit that I have arrived at that would have absolutely
nothing to do with the total integrity and faith and loyalty
of the officers and the others that presided. My question
really would in no way cast any aspersion upon either
motives or the genuine contribution made by military
officers who believe they are carrying out their duty. Isn't
that why we have the independent judiciary to which Ms.
Steel refers? It's interesting. She referred to the Declaration of Independence because that did nothing more than
bring to the United States something that had happened in
Great Britain in 1701 with the Act of Settlement that made
the British judges independent~ something that we find
enshrined in Article III of our Constitution.
MR. BAILEY: Yes, sir. No attack whatsoever of an ad hominem
nature is visited upon any member of the commission or
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the prosecutors. It is the institutional evil that I attack and
that is giving the executive the power to seek retribution
for an insult to the executive. That's what tripartite
government is all about: the safeguards, such as you three
gentlemen on the bench who say, "Hold on here. Have you
overacted? Have you too swiftly exacted your punishment when this is to be a cool, calm, dispassionate and
balanced procedure before we deprive a citizen of life or
liberty?"- both of which have occurred here. This was
the wrong road to take and, in retrospect, I think there are
few arguments that can countervail that notion.
JUDGE COX: Mr. Bailey, if I could return to the morning of
April the 15th, l believe it was, when Dr. Mudd treated Mr.
Booth. Had there been evidence of record that he knew of
the assassination, and that- not because he treated him,
but because it is alleged and evidence is there he showed
him a secret route out of the swamp, or something of that
nature- wouldn't a reasonable inference be drawn that
he was aiding and abetting after the fact?
MR. BAILEY: I would say that that would satisfy ...
JUDGE COX: Had he expressed an opinion earlier that he
wanted - that he had no problems with the President
being killed and so forth, and knew Mr. Booth, and now
knew of the assassination?
MR. BAILEY: We overlooked the fact, perhaps historically,
that not everyone loved President Lincoln. And he wasn't
required to, as long as he didn't take action against him.
Now your specific question is, of course, right on the
money. If he knew that he was dealing with an assassinit didn't have to be of a President ...
JUDGE COX: But isn't it reasonable to infer, based upon
his prior conversations with Booth, his familiarity with
the Surratts, and the fact that Booth was there for some
time, that Booth would have revealed to him exactly what
he had done?
MR. BAILEY: No, it isn't reasonable, Your Honor, because
Booth continued to wear his beard throughout the encounter, and if they were in league together, he hardly
needed to try to disguise himself from his confederate. I
think the evidence is that this doctor was awakened at four
in the morning, confronted by an injured man with a
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broken leg - there is no suggestion that assassination is
the reason for this injury; this was no gunshot wound and he obeyed his Hippocratic oath, and that is what he
has maintained ever since that event. He only learned
after Booth was on his way- of course with his assistance
- that the President was dead, and the name of the
suspected assassin. You will recall from the record it is
clear that it was first thought that an assassin, a professional named Boyle, had done the deed, and that was the
talk in Bryantown initially and that's what Mudd would
have heard.
JUDGE RE: Mr. Bailey, one thing about that, though, gives me
concern. The doctor wakes up at 4:00a.m. He takes care
of the patient pursuant to the Hippocratic oath; but then
the patient says, "Can you show me a secret route?" That's
not the ordinary patient-physician relationship. What
sort of inference can be drawn from that- a secret route
through a swamp?
MR. BAILEY: I most respectfully, Your Honor, must nitpick
your choice of one word. David Herold, not Booth, said,
"Can you show me a short route"- not a secret route; and
in the days before we had faster transportation, short
routes were always to be coveted. So I think that, in and
of itself, would not be enough to tip a man into the state of
mens rea necessary to the conviction of a crime.
Now, in summary, many criminal cases that look like they
have some substance to them and, if you believe all the
witnesses that the prosecution rousted up, despite the
many more witnesses that said they were not believable at
all and despite the inconsistencies in their stories, you
might be suspicious that Samuel Mudd was something
more than a friend of the cause of the South. Indeed,
history shows that he attended Georgetown as did many
Confederates; in those days it was· handy to hang people
just for going to Georgetown. But, the fabric of any
criminal proceeding is that which deserves the overview
-the calm, deliberate, combined wisdom in the overview
of an appellate court. This is simply a safeguard which the
military has finally learned, that, when there is no need for
immediate action- there is no battlefield requirement for
a firing squad to stop a wave of desertions (not present
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here) that if, in scrutiny, there is doubt on the part of the
court that the system has been played to the melody rather
than discord, the price is simple. The re-trial of Samuel
Mudd before his jury, as his colleague- John Surratt- is
about to be tried, will not disrupt the United States, bring
it to the brink of war, or bankrupt its coffers. And if he is
re-convicted on some definable charge, having had the
opportunity to know the charge, prepare his case, and
confront the charge before what this country was formed
for - a jury of his peers - then, should the case go to
another appellate court, they may, with somewhat greater
comfort than I think anyone here should feel, say maybe
indeed there is enough and Samuel Mudd is a criminal. If
he is a criminal, the life sentence he has received- and I
don't concede that for a minute- the life sentence he has
received is totally disproportionate to that which was
shown, and that is that he fixed the leg of the most
notorious and vile assassin in the history of this country.
If you find that he knew, or should have known- and this is
a dangerous standard to use in criminal cases, but it
occasionally creeps into our law -knew or should have
known because he cannot be an ostrich- that this was an
assassin- he gave him aid and comfort- he fulfills the
common law elements of accessory after the fact and that
is what he should be tried for and nothing more. I
respectfully suggest that this record will not support such
a conclusion and that, even if it would, the numerous
abridgements of the very rights that the Constitution
sought to safeguard such as trial for treason - bear in
mind those who wrote the Constitution were very mindful about that offense because they expected they might be
tried for it, if we lost the war, and so they carefully cracked
it out- an elaborate set of safeguards. That was their
state of mind. If we're to give all of those up because in
reaction to an angry populus, a successor and not terribly
popular President and Attorney General decide to move
swiftly in a definitive way to assure that justice will have
someone to fry, then we have simply given up a large
chunk of what the Revolutionary War was all about.
Thank you.
JUDGE EVERETT: We will pause for a moment before hear-
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ing from Appellee.
JUDGE EVERETT: We'll hear now from the Government.
COLONEL DOUGLASS: May it please the court. I'm Colonel
Douglass, and I am representing the Government as a
respondent and will be assisted by Admiral Jenkins in part
of the argument.
On April 2, 1865, the valiant men of the Army of Northern
Virginia withdrew from the fortifications around this city
in which we now sit. And a few days later, on April 9th,
their gallant leader, Robert E. Lee, surrendered his army at
Appomattox Court House. General Lee and his army
were treated with the honor they deserved for their courageous and chivalrous struggle during the years of war.
There remained other armies in the field. At that same
moment, a sinister and despicable group of men and
women, who scorned to fight in uniform, were clandestinely and secretly plotting and planning to continue the
war, not as honorable soldiers, but as assassins and kidnappers who strike in the night. Their plans were long
considered. And their purpose was not to seek victory on
the battlefield but rather to achieve their goals by treachery, deceit, kidnapping and murder. Their plans were
more than a reversal of the loss suffered by General Lee
and his troops but were schemes for revenge. They conspired to destroy the very fabric of government and to
create chaos and disorder. The conspirators acted not
with the gallantry, the integrity, and the honor and the
courage of Robert E. Lee and his generals, but as assassins.
Who were these who plotted to destroy the structure? Who
were these despicable characters who designed a blueprint to murder the Commander in Chief? Who were these
who schemed to kill all of those in the line of succession?
Who were these who planned the death of the very military commander who had granted the Army of Northern
Virginia surrender terms with honor? Who were these
who conspired to betray and besmirch the reputation and
respect of the soldiers? These conspirators were John
Wilkes Booth, Mary Surratt, John Surratt, David Herold,
George Atzerodt, Lewis Payne, and Dr. Samuel Mudd.
They committed no ordinary crime as it is defined in the
brief. They instead conspired and committed an offense

Appellate Argument

69

decried by every civilized nation on the earth. They
planned and committed an offense which placed them
under the jurisdiction of a military commission, like thousands of others who had committed similar offenses in
violation of the law of war during the terrible years of
conflict.
The petitioner in his arguments to this honorable court would
lead the court down not one but several rabbit trails in
arguing against jurisdiction of the military commission.
Petitioner has asserted the accused were charged with
treason, and therefore the Constitution changes the venue
of jurisdiction. Petitioner asserts that there was no state of
war to authorize the establishment of the commission, and
to the contrary then argues that the war had been concluded. Petitioner asserts that as a citizen of Maryland,
the petitioner could not be tried in the city of Washington.
Petitioner argues that no overt act of the conspiracy was
committed in Maryland and thereby separated him from
the other conspirators. Let us not be misled. The issues
are clear. The commission was an Article One court. This
court before whom we stand today is an Article One court.
The petitioner was charged with conspiracy to kill the
Commander in Chief, his successor Vice President, the
Secretary of State, and the General-in-Chief of the Army.
The petitioner was tried before a military commission
which liberally granted him rights: the right to counsel, to
an open and speedy trial, with the right to bring competent witnesses before the tribunal, and the right to argument by counsel. And, finally, the petitioner was tried by
a tribunal recognized by the Constitution, by the Congress, by the executive and by the courts of the United
States as the appropriate and proper tribunal for violations of the law of war committed by one not in military
service.
Let us begin by reminding the court that petitioner was
charged with conspiracy. A reading of the charges and
specifications is clear and unambiguous. In a colloquy
between counsel for defendant and the Judge Advocate,
the Judge Advocate was unequivocal that this was a
charge of conspiracy. Significantly, General Ewing did
not seek an explanation of the charge against which he
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must defend until after he had presented his case in the
defense of Dr. Mudd. Were General Ewing and the defendant confused, surely they would have made this inquiry
before presenting the case to the Commission. The petitioner in his brief seeks to define the charge by extrapolating from the words "treacherously" and "traitorously" to
change the charge to treason. Making this incredible leap,
he would then insist that there are Constitutional provisions for the trial of treason which are required for the trial
of this petitioner. Manipulating the words does not change
the charge, nor change the jurisdiction. When a conspiracy has been created, each of the conspirators is bound
by the acts, declarations and crimes of each other member
done or made in furtherance of that criminal agreement.
The conspirators sought to destroy the leadership of the
Union government by destroying the effectiveness of the
Presidency and the Commander in Chief. And it was
against that agency that the conspiracy was directed.
JUDGE EVERETT: Let me ask you this, however. Was there
any showing or any allegation that any of these alleged
conspirators were acting in behalf of the rebel forces of the
South-- the erstwhile insurgent government in the South
-was there any allegation of a connection?
COLONEL DOUGLASS: There was an allegation, yes, that
they were acting in conjunction with numerous members
of the government of the Confederacy.
JUDGE EVERETT: So is it your contention they were in the
same position as a spy would be? Is there any evidence of
that, as for example, Major Andre who was acting in
behalf of the British government in Revolutionary times?
I think you cited his case as a precedent.
COLONEL DOUGLASS: I would point out that there were
two thousand cases tried by military commissions during
the late war. They were tried for all sorts of violations of
the laws of war, whether it was spying or whatever the
violation of the law of war, when they were non-combatants, as were these conspirators. They fit, therefore, in the
jurisdiction of a military commission.
JUDGE RE: Dean Douglass, you have to forgive me. I listened
most attentively to what you have said as to the importance of facts and the period of history. Suppose, for
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purpose of my question, I were to concede that what you
say as to the nature of the charges- am I not correct that
there was a surrender on April 9th - you have made
reference to that very significant day in the history of our
country. Is it not also true that on April 29th the President
revoked the proclamation dealing with a blockade? Now
that would seem to be some evidence that perhaps the war
was over, and therefore I return to the question that was
asked previously: What was the basis of the military trial?
COLONEL DOUGLASS: The war, Sir, had not been completed. Hostilities had not ceased. During the ... the
leadership of the Confederacy had not yet at this time ever
conceded the surrender. It was only the surrender of the
Army of Northern Virginia. General Kirby Smith remained
with an army; General Hood remained with an army ...
JUDGE RE: Excuse me then- because this to me is tremendously important, and even more important than I had
imagined when you tell me that this happened to two
thousand others. That really requires that we read andreread the opinion in Ex parte Milligan as to the proper
division of authority between the military and the civilian
courts. What was there that you wished to bring to our
attention that would indicate that it was not possible to
have granted Dr. Mudd a proper trial as required by the
Constitution before a jury at the place where the crime was
allegedly committed - because that goes back to the
question of the applicability of Ex parte Milligan? And you
will forgive me for that if it is going to be covered by
Admiral Jenkins, I do not know, however. That to me is
the question.
COLONEL DOUGLASS: There is no question that this commission was convened by the highest authority of the
Union Army- the commander in chief of that army. And
so the jurisdiction was not limited to the city of Washington but included all the theater of operations.
Let me talk for a moment about Ex parte Milligan. Ex parte
Milligan was a case brought on a habeas corpus as you well
know. The question was asked by your colleague as to
why this was not done in the case of Dr. Mudd. It should
be pointed out that in Ex parte Milligan the court presented
two prongs as denying the authority of a military commis-
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sion. One, that the civil courts were open; but the other
prong was that it not be a locale of war. Certainly the area,
the city of Washington, even in the days of April and May
and June of 1865 continued to be a locale of war. The very
purpose of this conspiracy was to continue the war; to
make it possible for the Confederacy to continue to seek
the separation that they desired; to continue the operation
to break up the Union. There were armies still in operation. There were sea battles still being fought as late as a
year later. There were still fights. There were still conflicts. There were still battles in Texas well after the end of
this trial.
JUDGE RE: I'm not familiar with the situation in Texas. I
should like to ask what were the battles and where were
they being fought on June 28, 1865 when Dr. Mudd, a
civilian, I would gather not a spy, not an insurgent, yet, a
sympathizer of different point of view, was convicted and
found guilty of charges that sound pretty much like treason although you are absolutely right, it was a conspiracy.
What can you tell us as a factual matter that would warrant a disruption and dislocation of the ordinary procedure, namely the civil courts within the meaning and
express language of Ex parte Milligan ? Were the courts
operating in Washington, D.C. and in Maryland where the
offense allegedly ...
COLONEL DOUGLASS: The courts were operating in the
city of Washington and had operated throughout the
period of the war. As a matter of fact, they had tried, as is
pointed out in the brief of Dr. Mudd, that these courts
were trying "ordinary crimes" during all this entire period. Hostilities had not ceased throughout. There was a
surrender of the Army of Northern Virginia, butthere was
not a surrender of the army of General Hood; there was
not a surrender of the army of General Johnston; there was
not a surrender of the army of General Kirby Smith.
JUDGE RE: Are you telling this court that the surrender by
General Lee did not effectively represent a surrender of
the insurgent forces, if I may use that phrase?
COLONEL DOUGLASS: It did not end the insurrection. It
did not end the establishment of the Confederacy. Yes, sir,
I am telling you that it did not end the hostilities which
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were between the South and the North in the period from
1861 to 1865.
JUDGE EVERETT: Would it be correct, Colonel Douglass,
after the Confederate government left Richmond, they
went to Greensboro, there were still operating forces in
the Carolinas and elsewhere at that point. Was that true as
of the time of the attempted assassination?
COLONEL DOUGLASS: Yes. And there were battles fought
by Union and Southern forces well into the period after
the conclusion of this trial.
JUDGE RE: In Maryland?
COLONEL DOUGLASS: Not in Maryland.
JUDGE RE: In the District of Columbia?
COLONEL DOUGLASS: Nor in the District of Columbia. But
there was no evidence that there would not be an attempt
by Southern forces to attack one of the sixty forts surrounding the State of Maryland. And you read the Ex parte
Milligan, they make clear that there was never a locale of
war in Indiana. This is not true of Maryland. This is not
of the city of Washington. It was not a situation that
involved ... it was not the same situation as in Ex parte
Milligan and this particular military commission which
tried these conspirators.
JUDGE COX: Dean Douglass, one concern I have had throughout this. None of the authorities that I've seen cited, or
none of the argument, has focused on the fact that we're
talking about a rebellion within the territory of one country.
COLONEL DOUGLASS: Yes, sir.
JUDGE COX: We're not talking about one recognized sovereign at war with another recognized sovereign.
COLONEL DOUGLASS: Yes, sir.
JUDGE COX: It would seem that these principles that we're
grappling today would be equally applicable for a civilian
insurrection in the city of Washington where- or anywhere- where there was no civil law functioning.
COLONEL DOUGLASS: That's correct, sir.
JUDGE COX: The leader could declare martial law.
COLONEL DOUGLASS: Let me make that clear, sir.
JUDGE COX: If that were the case, it seems that your best
argument is that within the boundaries of what was then
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the United States of America, the civil authorities had not
yet been settled.
COLONEL DOUGLASS: That's correct.
JUDGE COX: And while you might have a court in the District
of Columbia, throughout the nation as a nation, civil
obedience still had not been restored. We were still ... and
therefore the military commission still had a constitutional place.
COLONEL DOUGLASS: The danger still existed for the
people, for the Union and its continuance during this
period. The troops of the South had not totally surrendered; there was not a capitulation by all of those involved.
JUDGE EVERETT: What if the assassination had occurred,
let's say, in July of 1865, at a time when all the effective
opposition from Southern forces had ceased, even General
Smith down in Texas, and there were only a few privateers
or vessels sailing around. Would you still maintain that
there was jurisdiction ... of a military tribunal at that
point?
COLONEL DOUGLASS: You present to me a hypothetical
situation, Your Honor, that I am unprepared really to
determine, not knowing the situation which had developed that had convinced these particular conspirators to
continue their operation and to seek to continue the hostilities. What they were seeking to do was make certain
that those Southern forces could be rejuvenated and continue the battle. This was the whole idea of the destruction
of and the killing of the President and the Vice President.
They were seeking not merely revenge. They weren't
doing this for some purpose of merely killing the President. They were seeking to do this in order to continue the
war ... and to continue the battles, and to continue the
hostilities, so that their side - the side which they supported - could be continued in office.
JUDGE EVERETT: So you would concede then, that, under
your law of war approach, there would have to be some
relationship of this particular activity to organized Southern resistance in an attempt to overthrow the Union government.
COLONEL DOUGLASS: I don't think there's any question
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that there has to be a continuation of the possibility of
hostilities which would create the necessity for a continuation of military service and military forces to protect the
Union.
JUDGE EVERETT: So the fact that President Johnson did not
terminate martial law until some months later would
really be irrelevant. It would be the question of how the
defendants, the alleged conspirators, viewed themselves
as participating in an effort to continue hostilities.
COLONEL DOUGLASS: Correct.
JUDGE RE: This would be quite independent of the honorable
surrender by General Lee. In the minds of some this would
cast some serious doubt as to the nature and the honor of
the surrender. You mean, notwithstanding the surrender,
there were still pockets that were going to keep fighting?
COLONEL DOUGLASS: That is correct.
JUDGE RE: You surely would not have us infer with the
consent and approval of General Lee that ...
COLONEL DOUGLASS: There's no question that General
Lee had surrendered the Army of Northern Virginia, but
he had no authority to surrender the armies of other
commanders. He had no authority to give up the government of the Confederacy which escaped from Richmond
and did not continue with him, but evacuated to the
South.
JUDGE RE: Let me ask you this factual question, since you
obviously know more about it than I do: As of the time of
the trial, and as of the date of conviction of Dr. Mudd, what
was the state ofthe public danger, as that phrase is known,
in either Washington, D.C. or Maryland? What was the
public danger that warranted the supplanting of the normal usual civil authority by the military forces, bringing
about what is in fact, what might be properly called, a
dictatorship by the military ... warranted because of the
necessity?
COLONEL DOUGLASS: We have a tendency to walk down
another rabbit trail when we become concerned about
"dictatorship of the military." It was the civilian President
of the United States who ordered this military commission. It was not a military commander who ordered this.
It was ... Under the Constitution, it was provided that the
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Commander in Chief is a civilian and is the President.
Now, to get back to your question, your original question
was what was the danger of hostilities? There was considerable danger that- those people in charge (the military
forces) were concerned that- still there remained a viable
and possible Confederate force which might attack any
place across the country. Granted that it was not close to
Washington at this point, but it had not been close to
Washington when they surrounded ... two years before
when they came up behind and attacked Gettysburg,
which is far to the north.
JUDGE RE: You speak of potential, my question was: What
was there that warranted depriving this citizen, this resident of a state loyal to the Union, the rights guaranteed to
him by the Constitution- including trial by jury?
COLONEL DOUGLASS: Well, that, if I may say so, tends to
beg the question, because first of all we have to decide
whether he is being ... he is subject to trial by a military
commission and then we have the question ...
JUDGE RE: On whom does that burden fall, Colonel Douglass?
COLONEL DOUGLASS: Pardon, Sir?
JUDGE RE: On whom does that burden fall? Need he prove
that there is no jurisdiction or may the Government prove
that there is jurisdiction to try a civilian- not a spy, not
any of the other things- by a military commission?
COLONEL DOUGLASS: There's no question that he was a
civilian. There's no question that he was a non-combatant.
There is no question that he was charged with a conspiracy to violate the law of war. No one can argue these
points. It seems clear. Based thereon, he is then subject to
trial before a military commission in a time in which there
is still a danger to the continuation of the government of
the United States. And there was that danger because this
was the very purpose of the conspiracy.
JUDGE RE: I hate to repeat my question- and I do not wish
to belabor the point, but we are used to dealing with
burdens of proof. Need I prove myself innocent or must
you prove me guilty? Then we go to the next question of
by what standard? What is the case that can be made by
the government that he could have been lawfully tried by
a military commission, at that time and at that place?
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COLONEL DOUGLASS: There remained an insurrection;
there remained the fact that he was charged with a violation of the law of war; there remained the fact that hew as
a non-combatant who sought to continue the war and to
continue it with the aim of supporting those in insurrection.
JUDGE RE: You say the necessity continued?
COLONEL DOUGLASS: Yes, Sir.
JUDGE COX: Don't the very facts of this case prove your
point?
COLONEL DOUGLASS: I thought l was saying that ...
JUDGE COX: The military was viewing that there were
pockets of conspirators still out to destroy the government.
COLONEL DOUGLASS: Yes, Sir.
JUDGE COX: And therefore they founded their jurisdiction
on that public danger?
COLONEL DOUGLASS: Yes, Sir.
JUDGE COX: Let me ask you a question. You made a very
eloquent opening argument about the despicable nature
of the conspirator and so forth. What evidence could a
rational fact-finder in this case pin his or her hat on?
COLONEL DOUGLASS: Pardon me, I'm sorry.
JUDGE COX: What evidence could a rational fact-finder in
this case say shows that Dr. Mudd was participating in a
despicable conspiracy? Is there anyone who says he was
there at the planning? Any evidence?
COLONEL DOUGLASS: We know that the law of conspiracy
can be proved by circumstantial evidence.
JUDGE COX: Granted.
COLONEL DOUGLASS: Those who commit a conspiracy do
not do it in the open and provide us with the kind of open
evidence- so we have to go on circumstantial evidence.
We know that Dr. Mudd met with John Wilkes Booth on
more than one occasion in Maryland.
JUDGE COX: That was a year or so before the ...
COLONEL DOUGLASS: No, it was only several months
before, Sir.
JUDGE COX: Okay.
COLONEL DOUGLASS: Ah, if I may- Dr. Mudd talked to
Mr. John Wilkes Booth in his own home. Booth came to
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Maryland on some flimsy excuse of buying real estate for
doing some oil exploration- the kind of thing that people
talk about when they're seeking to hide their real purpose.
Or. Mudd met with Mr. Booth and introduced him to John
Surratt, another member of the conspiracy, in the city of
Washington.
Dr. Mudd's home, which was pointed out, is off the main
road, was found by John Wilkes Booth and Mr. Herold at
four o'clock in the morning as they rode through, trying to
escape. Does one find a doctor that he never has heard of
or met before, has no relationship to, at that time of day off
the main road? Does one take a patient and put him
upstairs in his upstairs bedroom and take care of him over
night and into the next day? Does one who does not have
any relationship with a patient point out that he should go
across a swamp, tear down a fence, in order to move to the
next safe haven? I say that these facts all show the
relationship of John Wilkes Booth and the other conspirators with Dr. Mudd. I think it is plainly obvious from these
relationships that he was a part of the conspiracy.
JUDGE COX: But if you're using circumstantial evidence and
there is a contrary inference of innocence, to what extent
can we use that circumstantial evidence? Where there is
no direct evidence to corroborate any of this- there's no
statement by Mudd that he was aware of the assassination, there's no evidence at all to tie it all back together.
COLONEL DOUGLASS: We need no direct evidence to prove
the conspiracy because the law provides that we may do
this by circumstantial evidence, and it seems abundantly
clear that there's much circumstantial evidence to tie Or.
Mudd to the conspiracy.
JUDGE EVERETT: Now, apropos the conspiracy, I gather from
your earlier remarks, your earlier argument, that the purpose of the conspiracy is material in establishing jurisdiction. It has to be more than a conspiracy to exact vengeance; there has to be a conspiracy to interfere with the
government and the military operations of the United
States government.
COLONEL DOUGLASS: Sir.
JUDGE EVERETT: All right. And that something would have
to be established as a jurisdictional fact at trial. Would
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that be true?
COLONEL DOUGLASS: Yes, Sir.
JUDGE EVERETT: Now, what is there that shows that this
was a conspiracy for that particular purpose, as distinguished from mere vengeance?
COLONEL DOUGLASS: They sought to kill the President of
the United States. The conspirators attacked the Secretary
of State in his bed. Another conspirator stalked the Vice
President of the United States, and there was a plan clearly
by one of the members to kill the General-in-Chief of the
Armies, General Grant. This was the top leadership of the
entire Union government in the executive branch. It was
not simply vengeance against Abraham Lincoln. It was an
attempt to kill President Lincoln, the Vice President, the
Secretary of State, and the General-in-Chief of the Armies
-all of those who could bring order out of chaos should
only the President have been killed.
JUDGE COX: And your contention is that Dr. Mudd's role in
the conspiracy was to provide a safe haven for the conspirators? They certainly, as Mr. Bailey argues, could not
foresee that he would break his leg. I mean, did they say:
"If anybody gets injured, Dr. Mudd, then you will agree to
treat him?" Is that what he did in the conspiracy?
COLONEL DOUGLASS: No. Obviously that was fortuitous.
He could well have agreed. I don't know all of his
participation, but once one joins a conspiracy, then he
becomes responsible for all of the acts of any of the conspirators. We don't need an overt act, but, here, this case
abounds in overt acts committed by the various conspirators. And he is responsible therefore for whatever took
place under that conspiracy.
JUDGE COX: I agree with you that it abounds with overt acts,
but where in the record can we point to with some comfort, much less beyond reasonable doubt, as to what Dr.
Mudd's participation and agreement was in the conspiracy.
What did he agree to do? What did he agree to contribute?
COLONEL DOUGLASS: Dr. Mudd was one station on the
route from Washington to Surrattsville to Bryantown to
Port Tobacco to Virginia, at which place ...
JUDGE COX: Because he was a safe haven?
COLONEL DOUGLASS: He was a safe haven. And one that
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was easily found, apparently, by [Mr. Booth] and Mr.
Herold as they escaped at four o'clock in the morning off
the main road.
JUDGE COX: What testimony proves this?
COLONEL DOUGLASS: This again is proven by the very fact
that Booth and Herold were able to find this safe haven in
the middle of the night when they were escaping down
through Maryland into Virginia, and that's the way they
were going. We know that during this whole period of the
war this part of southern Maryland was the highway for
those spies and for contraband from Washington into
Virginia and into Richmond.
JUDGE EVERETT: No indication that Dr. Mudd was involved
in any of that, was there? With that particular route?
COLONEL DOUGLASS: There is no indication ... there is
nothing in this record of trial which presents Mr. Mudd as
a part of that route or participating in it.
Thank you, gentlemen.
ADMIRAL JENKINS: May it please the court. I am Rear
Admiral John Jenkins, and I appear with my friend, Colonel Douglass, on behalf of the United States. I wonder if
it might be helpful for the court if, in view of some of the
questions that have been asked, we fall back just one step
or two and look at the issue as I see it presented to us. We
have talked, we have answered questions on both sides
with respect to the appropriateness, if you will, of an
Article I military commission having heard this case as
compared to an Article III civil court operating normally.
I would call the court's attention to the language first of
Section 8 of Article I of the Constitution, which provides
that there be rules made for the government of the land
and naval forces. It also provides in Section 8 a reference
to the law of nations. Article I stands for the proposition
that the executive can create a system of courts, tribunals,
commissions- call them what you will- when Article I
is applicable with respect to, for instance, a situation
involving martial law.
JUDGE EVERETT: Let's just pause for a second, Admiral
Jenkins. That Article I, Section 8 provision requires, as I
recall, an action by Congress, doesn't it? And what is the
Congressional action that would be the basis for this
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particular court, and to whatever extent you are invoking
law of war jurisdiction?
ADMIRAL JENKINS: In this case, and I think the authors and
the treatises in the early 30s and 40s - 1830 - 1840 would stand for this proposition. Indeed Congress did
enact the Articles for the Government of the Navy and the
Articles of War, but there is a common law of military law
which applies here. And if the court will look back, for
instance, to the British tradition, the British court martial
system came from the Crown as the Commander in Chief.
The British judicial system came from the Crown as the
fount of grace and mercy. So there were two tracks, even
in the British system. One, the military track, the sovereign as commander-in-chief. The other, the track to the
courts, as the fount of grace and mercy. And that applies
in our situation here.
JUDGE EVERETT: There is no federal common law of crime,
at least in the Article III courts, is that correct?
ADMIRAL JENKINS: I would agree with that.
JUDGE EVERETT: So you're contending that even though in
Article I, Section 8, clause 10, there's a provision for
Congress to make provision for offenses against the law of
nations, and even though I gather there's no specific
reference thereto in either the Articles of War or the
Articles for the Government of the Navy, you're saying
that, in some way, there exists this common law for which
there is no provision in the U.S. Constitution which gives
jurisdiction to a military court. Is that the argument?
ADMIRAL JENKINS: I am suggesting to the court that, in
addition to the statutory law, there is a common law of
military tradition which supports the proposition that
there be commissions and indeed expands the law in the
area of martial law. The court will note that martial law
can be declared in the event, for instance, of a hurricane,
or a major flood. It doesn't necessarily require a state of
war. So martial law, the law of nations, and military law
all merge together to provide a basis under Article I of our
Constitution for something such as the military commission.
JUDGE EVERETT: Well, I think we need to separate these out.
The military law would apply only to a military person,
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which this defendant was not. Martial law, as I understand the Milligan case, is a law of necessity. And to
establish that, wouldn't you have to show that the civilian
courts were not functioning - that it was necessary to
proceed in this way?
ADMIRAL JENKINS: Not totally, Your Honor. There is
language in Milligan which suggests that, for ordinary
crimes, we look to the issue of the functioning of civilian
courts. We submit, for the matter concerned here, we're
not dealing with an ordinary crime. We know that during
the entire period of hostilities between the states, the civil
courts in the District of Columbia were functioning for
certain purposes. We also know that during that entire
time, there was modified martial law in the District of
Columbia. So I submit that it is not solely a question of one
or the other, but there are situations where both can apply
at the same time.
JUDGE EVERETT: Well, let me ask you this, then. Martial law
can mean many things. It can mean the authority to take
people into custody, but maybe would not require their
being tried. Were there trials of civilians going on under
martial law in the District of Columbia during the recent
war?
ADMIRAL JENKINS: There were, as we have heard from cocounsel, over two thousand trials by military commission.
JUDGE EVERETT: Not in the District of Columbia though?
Let me be more specific. Was there a single trial that you're
aware of in the District of Columbia predicated on martial
law or the rule of necessity?
ADMIRAL JENKINS: History tells me yes. There were some
simple trials with respect to drunkenness, and disrespect,
which were based on martial law.
JUDGE RE: And those persons were deprived of the Constitutional protections set forth in the Constitution?
ADMIRAL JENKINS: They were tried by Article I institutions
to which the panoply of protections with respect to Article
III do not necessarily apply.
JUDGE RE: So Article I, Section 8, which sets forth the powers
of the Congress were used to deprive ... You're telling us
that that provision of the Constitution was used to deprive
American citizens, civilians, of Constitutionally protected
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rights, such as a trial by jury, civilian courts with all the
protections that were ...
ADMIRAL JENKINS: ... opinion of the Attorney General of
the United States with respect to these Article I courts.
They are simply an instrumentality for the more efficient
execution of the war powers. Congress has generally left
it to the President and the military commanders to employ
the commission for investigation and punishments of the
law of war.
JUDGE RE: Well, you know the opinion of Milligan also says
that the Constitution applies in time of war as well, and
you merely indicate how important this case is, so, if it is
part of the war powers, I ask again the question I asked
before: What was the war going on in Maryland and in
Washington, D.C. at that time?
ADMIRAL JENKINS: I submit that it was a question offact for
the tribunal to establish jurisdiction by ascertaining, as a
matter of fact, those indicia which support the Article I
military commission having jurisdiction over the case,
and I submit on the record that the tribunal did consider
enough matters to conclude that it had appropriate Article
I jurisdiction. We know, for instance, that there were still
naval actions taking place.
JUDGE RE: Where?
ADMIRAL JENKINS: Throughout the Atlantic, there were ...
JUDGE RE: Dr. Mudd was not tried throughout the Atlantic.
ADMIRAL JENKINS: For the purpose of the commission
determining that it had jurisdiction, its jurisdiction flowing from the law of nations and the law of war, it is not
unreasonable for the commission to consider the fact that
there are still naval elements deployed at sea; that there
are still Union army elements deployed in battle formation against the insurrectionists, and therefore the commission could conclude under the law of nations and the
law of war that there were the kinds of facts available to
them to support the conclusion of jurisdiction.
JUDGE RE: Well, Admiral Jenkins, it was precisely for that
reason that I asked earlier upon whpm is the burden of
proof as to the question of necessity which would warrant
-and we admit that the necessity exists, no one questions
the existence of the power to declare martial law, and we
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also concede the applicability of the law of nations and the
laws of war- the question is, did that apply here, or were
there, in this case, what in the Milligan case are called
distractions, such as the emotions of the moment, the
clamor of the moment, and for that reason the Constitution guarantees to civilians the safe haven of independent
judiciary?
ADMIRAL JENKINS: I would say to the court that any
tribunal does have the responsibility of making a conclusion with respect to the application of its jurisdiction and
I would submit to the court that the tribunal below did
make such a conclusion.
JUDGE RE: And what is the standard of review? Because that
of course was my first question. The second inevitably
flows, what is the standard of proof? To what extent do we
defer is the question I asked.
ADMIRAL JENKINS: Let me first address His Honor's question with respect to the standard of review. Again, I think
we can look to the collection of Anglo-American common
law on this issue, as we question the standard of review in
a case such as this. I will borrow His Honor's Latin, and
say that we might look at a court's approach, admittedly
in the civil side, to a judgment non obstante veredicto. What
would a trial judge do with respect to examining a verdict
and changing that verdict? The test seems to be that we
would ask ourselves whether any rational jury can come
up with the finding. And I submit that that is the test that
ought to be applied on appeal of the Article I commission
to this Article I appeal court.
JUDGE RE: Admiral Jenkins, you would apply that on the
question of jurisdiction?
ADMIRAL JENKINS: I would apply that on your review of
the finding of the law.
JUDGE RE: But our review of whether there was jurisdiction
... could, since you use Latin, I'd like to have you tell me
whether or not this standard ought not to be de novo?
ADMIRAL JENKINS: No, it should not.
JUDGE RE: And whether there was a basis for the exercise of
the jurisdiction by a military commission over a civilian at
the time and place in question.
ADMIRAL JENKINS: It should not, Your Honor, because the
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court below had to find sufficient facts to conclude it has
jurisdiction. I think it is inappropriate for this court of
appeals to evaluate those facts ...
JUDGE RE: There ought to be a deference?
ADMIRAL JENKINS: There ought to be a deference.
JUDGE EVERETT: Admiral Jenkins, I am disturbed about one
distinction you seem to draw. You seem to distinguish
Milligan with the ordinary crimes and then some category
of extraordinary crimes. Wasn't Milligan a fairly extraordinary case itself? They gave him a death sentence, as I
recall.
ADMIRAL JENKINS: I think Milligan was extraordinary in
terms of the death sentence, but I don't think the crime in
Milligan can be compared to the crime here in terms of the
parties involved -that is, the Commander in Chief, the
Vice President, the Secretary of State, and the General of
the Armies- and indeed I don't think in Milligan you had
the potential for the continuation of hostilities and the
disruption of the state of the Union if the four parties
involved in this conspiracy had been killed. So, I use
ordinary crime in the sense of the crime qua crime and not
the punishment, as compared to the extraordinary crime,
conspiracy to kill the Commander in Chief, the Vice President, and the other parties involved.
JUDGE EVERETT: So you think of extraordinary consequences for the national security, then?
ADMIRAL JENKINS: Yes, Sir.
JUDGE EVERETT: I see.
ADMIRAL JENKINS: And I think thatthat is the kind ofthing
that has to be taken into consideration as a decision is
made with respect to the appropriateness of a military
commission as compared to the appropriateness of trial in
an Article III court. All of those things combined to
provide the commission with jurisdiction and the extraordinary nature of the crime in this case is of some significance.

JUDGE EVERETT: Proceed.
ADMIRAL JENKINS: I thank the court.

•••
JUDGE EVERETT: Ms. Steel.
MS. STEEL: Thank you. Your Honor, first of all, I would state
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to Judge Re that I think it certainly must be review de novo.
Jurisdiction must be raised or can be raised at any point in
the proceedings and for such an essential and elementary
function of a court, the court should have the full range of
ability to review the question; and for specific reference
for Your Honor, Matter of Egan addresses the question of
the burden of proof of the necessity that must be shown by
the military if it chooses to take jurisdiction over this kind
of a crime, and, as the court there stated, "this necessity
must be shown affirmatively by the party assuming to
exercise this extraordinary and irregular power over the
lives, liberty and property of the citizens whenever called
into question."
JUDGE EVERETT: Let me ask you this, though. President
Johnson, the President of the United States, was the one
that established this court by his proclamation. Isn't there
some presumption of correctness? Isn't there some deference that has to be given to the determination of the
President of the United States that such a military tribunal
should be assembled? Wouldn't it be inappropriate on
our part to make a de novo determination as to the necessity for this type of tribunal, given the determination by
President Johnson?
MS. STEEL: Your Honor, the President is elected and serves
to execute the laws of Congress. He is not placed as Regent
or King to determine the law or the effects on the citizenry
itself. The President has a specific range of obligations
and responsibilities, and it is our position that he has
overstepped that bound by impaneling [the Hunter Commission]. His Attorney General recommended that he do
so, and I would think that the argument presented by
Attorney General Speed, particularly in the Milligan case,
is quite shocking to legal scholars of the establishment of
the Constitution in this country. The President has limits.
If he did not, we would have a despot for president, and as
my co-counsel has stated, we presume that President
Lincoln would have been horrified at the action taken by
President Johnson.
JUDGE EVERETT: Well, President Lincoln suspended the
writ of habeas corpus on his own initiative, before Congress gave approval. Do you really think he would have
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been shocked by an attempt to establish a tribunal to
provide swift justice to a group of conspirators who had
tried to overturn the national war effort- who had tried
to, in effect, continue a disastrous war of rebellion that had
gone on for four dismal years? Do you think President
Lincoln would have been shocked by that, Ms. Steel?
MS. STEEL: Your Honor, yes, in light of the fact that the war,
in fact, was now over; that we had accepted the surrender
of Lee; that the blockade had been lifted by Andrew
Johnson. There was no longer a war. In fact, there had not
been a war declared and this was argued with regard to
the law of war that belligerent rights have ascribed in this
case and therefore the law of war would apply.
JUDGE EVERETT: WhatwasthedatewhenPresidentJohnson
issued the proclamation establishing the court?
MS. STEEL: I believe it was sometime the end of April or the
first week of May; the end of April -and within a week
or so -May 1st.
JUDGE EVERETT: So we have to look at the situation as of
that time, don't we?
MS. STEEL: Your Honor, I believe he was at that moment
preparing to bring Union troops into Washington for
celebration.
JUDGE EVERETT: And yet, on the other hand, wasn't there
a large Southern force still operating under General Smith
in Texas, to the west of the Mississippi?
MS. STEEL: Which I imagine would have taken many, many
days to get from Texas to the city of Washington, D.C. in
1865.
JUDGE EVERETT: But don't we still have to consider the fact
that there was this continuing effort, that President Johnson
took this into account when he established the [commission]?
MS. STEEL: I'm certain that he took it into account, Your
Honor. It's our position that he was wrong in doing so.
With regard to belligerent rights, I just want to quickly
answer the issue of whether or not, under the laws of war,
Dr. Mudd could be tried. Belligerent status is not applicable in this case. There has never been a declaration that
there was war by the Congress in this instance.
JUDGE EVERETT: But didn't, in 1862, our Supreme Court say
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in The Prize Cases that there is the phenomenon of imperfect war, that you do not have to have a declared war? For
example, for seizures?
MS. STEEL: We would submit that this case is quite distin·
guishable from The Prize Cases. In The Prize Cases, there
was property at stake, and the courts have held quite
differently in cases such as this where lives are stake, Your
Honor, and I would like to give time now to my co-counsel
to complete this rebuttal.
JUDGE COX: May I just ask one question?
MS. STEEL: Certainly.
JUDGE COX: In a rebellion, as opposed to dealing with a
recognized foreign nation, is there any difference between
the rebel soldier who is wearing the uniform, and the rebel
civilian who is on his own adventure?
MS. STEEL: Yes, Your Honor. And the court has said ...
JUDGE COX: How could that be? If we don't recognize the
rights of rebellion to begin with? We don't recognize him
as a soldier, do we?
MS. STEEL: Belligerent rights are ascribed for the purpose of
decency in war.
JUDGE COX: If you say it's one who's carrying a gun and
shooting, then John Wilkes Booth fit that definition.
MS. STEEL: Yes, but Dr. Mudd was not carrying a gun nor
shooting, and he was a victim and not a rebel. Your
Honors, I would simply finish with saying that the court
stated that the laws of war cannot be applied to citizens in
states which have upheld the authority of the government
and the State of Maryland as a Union state.
Thank you, Your Honors.
JUDGE EVERETT: Mr. Bailey.
MR. BAILEY: If it please the court, I should like to most
respectfully suggest that the court give deep thought to
giving deference to a President who claims jurisdiction
and thereby satisfies his burden. We are greatly disturbed
about the fact that a President might, by using the power
of pardon, shut down the investigation to protect himself.
Should we not be much more disturbed about the notion
of a President granting jurisdiction in order to get the
result he desires? Now, ...
JUDGE EVERETT: We are concerned there, too, but yet he is
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the premier magistrate of the country. We have to give
respect to him.
MR. BAILEY: Give him a little respect, but make him prove
he's got the jurisdiction. When a towering tower of advocacy like my distinguished colleague Douglass is in heavy
weather on the central question, I find great comfort; and
the central question is, once you go by jurisdiction, and
you cannot go by it but you can look at the other aspects
of the case, what was it that should uphold this conviction
of conspiracy to commit murder?
The decision to commit murder by the testimony of the
prosecution witness Chester on May 12, the second day of
trial, was made on Friday, April 7th. The decision prior to
that was to kidnap the President and swap him for prisoners in gray uniforms. Dr. Mudd was never in contact with
any ofthe alleged conspirators between April 7th and 14th
on any of the evidence. And he can at best have known
nothing about a plan to kill the President until it was done
-he cannot be guilty of that conspiracy. Furthermore, it
is suggested that the oil deal was a scam; and yet the
prosecution's own witness said, "Booth backed off the oil
deal because his colleagues lost interest." It was a very
real deal. Same witness, Mr. Chester. Mr. Ewing said to
that tribunal, "You say you are trying this person under
the common law of war." There is no common law of war.
I have looked for it in the books- it's not there. We all
know it's not there. What you're saying is, the law is what
you say it is even though you won't tell me so I can
disprove the allegations. That flaw in this case is so telling
and so penetrating that it cannot and should not survive.
JUDGE EVERETT: Mr. Bailey, I have one question I want to
ask you.
MR. BAILEY: Yes.
JUDGE EVERETT: Suppose John Wilkes Booth had himself
been seized and had been brought before a military tribunal for trial after the assassination of President Lincoln.
Would you be here making the same argument to us?
MR. BAILEY: Absolutely. Because absent the exigency ...
absent the exigency, the only thing that can ever justify
transferring judicial power to the executive, John Wilkes
Booth should have been tried and would have been con-
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victed and hung by a jury of his peers .
Thank you.
JUDGE EVERETT: The court's going to take this matter under
advisement, since it deals with a number of very serious
issues with great implications. We do, however, plan to
render our opinions today and make a decision, so if
counsel are willing, we would request that they stand by
and we will attempt to announce our decision in the
immediate future.

•••
CLERK OF THE COURT: The United States Special Court of
Military Appeal is back in session.
JUDGE EVERETT: Each of the judges has a brief opinion.
Before we announce the d ecision, I'm going to call first on
Judge Re to express his opinion on the merits of this case.
JUDGE RE: I should like to make an informal statement at this
time, and a formal opinion w ill follow, and I know it will
become part of the proceedin gs of this case. Before I do so,
I should like to state the tremendous privilege of sitting
w ith a dear friend and colleague of many, many years,
Judge Everett, and Judge Cox, and I should like to set forth
my great admiration for the remarkable argument that has
been made by all counsel. I deemed it a great p rivilege to
have heard the wonderful arguments, the splendid argum ents that have been made.
I explain a t the outset that the facts were known and need not
be recited, and proceeding to the power of this court, I
have no difficulty in saying that we have the power to not
only look into the guilt or innocence, but also the question
of jurisdiction. It' s true that we have been appointed by
the President, but clearly our manda te is to do justice,
however swift, and, therefore, if doing that justice brings
us to a conclusion that the court that tried Dr. Mudd had
no jurisdiction, it is our duty to say so. And there is no
deference to be sh own under circumstances where the
Government has not and cannot succeed in showin g the
necessity which would warrant a displacement of the civil
court and the civil authorities under the circumstances of
the case of Dr. Mudd .
Proceeding to the actual merits of the jurisdictional question,
it is my fir m opinion that the military commission had no
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jurisdiction to try a civilian at the time and place that he
was tried. Therefore, I would hold that all of the proceedings of the commission were a nullity. And this would be
regardless of the nature of the offense. And the reason is
because we start with a fundamental postulate that the
Constitution is the supreme law of the land. Article VI
says so expressly, and the importance of the Constitution
being paramount was set forth in the tremendously important opinion- the seminal opinion- of Chief Justice
Marshall in Marbury v. Madison. So in the words of
Madison, the fundamental and paramount rule of the nation is our Constitution.
Commencing with that I must express that our determination
really is determined by what is said in the holding of Ex
parte Milligan. Ex parte Milligan, were we to read it with the
care that it deserves, is a great landmark for the expansion
of human freedom and liberties in our nation. It shows
that, unless there is the necessity that warrants a declaration of martial law, martial law is extraordinary, and
cannot be applied. During the able argument, reference
was made to the fact that President Lincoln declared
martial law and that it applied in Indiana- it's true. But
Ex parte Milligan said thatitwas a nullity and that the writ
of habeas corpus freed Milligan. The petitions in that case
could very well have been used here, because whether or
not a military commission could have tried a conspirator
or anyone else in Texas or anyone else was not before this
court. The question was, could Dr. Mudd, a civilian, not
a spy, not coming within any of the categories over whom
the military courts would have had jurisdiction, could he
have been tried in Maryland, where the alleged offense
took place, because as I understand the basic facts of this
case, it all stems from some services he rendered as a
physician -he set the leg of a patient.
Whether he was a conspirator or not really is not the question
that I should like to address. The question is, did you have
jurisdiction to try the individual? If there is no jurisdiction, again, you are not a court. The Latin phrase, non
coram judice- you are not a judge - and indeed if there
is no jurisdiction there's a very serious question as to
whether these judges themselves have any judicial immu-
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nity. So l find that the Milligan case determines the
outcome of this case and, on jurisdictional grounds, l
would hold that the proceedings below were a nullity. I
do not address the guilt or innocence of the individual
because, regardless of the nature of the offense, the Constitutional provisions say that he is entitled to a trial by
jury and there are other protections set forth in our amendments, all of which ... and the authorities for my statements will be set forth in an opinion that I will submit in
due course.
Having determined that there wasn't jurisdiction, it follows
that Dr. Mudd should be released forthwith, which was
the order issued by Chief Justice Chase on May 3rd, 1865
in the Milligan case, and you remember that, in that case,
the opinion followed on December 17, 1865. The reasons
were set forth much later. So having said that, it would be
dicta for me to comment on all of the evidentary questions
that have been raised. Nonetheless, I cannot resist the
temptation of saying that I have serious doubts as to
whether an impartial mind, removed from what in the
Milligan case I refer to as distractions of the moment tempers ... feelings ... emotions ... clamor - whether on
the evidence presented, and I say this with great deference
because I could not help but be moved indeed by the
remarkable argument by Colonel Douglass and Admiral
Jenkins. This still is a very tenuous reed to do away with
all of the civil rights that flow from that great document
which attempted to give legal status to the ideals of our
Declaration of Independence. It is all but forgotten that in
our Declaration of Independence we speak of such lofty
ideals but they did not become principles of law until our
Constitution was enacted. And that speaks of we the
people who want to form a more perfect union. It is more
relevant for us today to say that the next two words are
"establish justice." So I considered my mandate not only
to hear this case but also to do justice because I assume that
is precisely what the President would wish. So, in dicta,
I would say that applying an appropriate standard of
proof and in view of the nature of the charges, I would
have no hesitation in venturing the additional dicta that
there would have to be guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.
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For that not to be so, we would be doing an injustice to the
thousands of courts martial and military commissions
that have properly exercised their jurisdiction and have
performed valuable service. However, if the necessity
doesn't exist, if the public danger doesn't exist, our system
requires that, when the courts are open and functioning,
trials should be before the civil courts, with trial by jury,
and with all of the protections guaranteed by the Constitution.
JUDGE EVERETT: Judge Re, thank you. Judge Cox, would
you lend us your opinion?
JUDGE COX: Thank you, Chief Judge Everett.
I do not concur in the opinion, albeit the scholarly opinion, of
my brother, Judge Re, that Ex parte Milligan is dispositive
of this case. You know, one of the great ironies of this case
is that the war that was going on at this time in our history
was being fought, as I understand it, to preserve and
protect the very Constitution of the United States that we
are now dealing with. It was armed resurrection throughout the land, pitting brother against brother and sister
against sister, and so on and so forth, and as I understand
the law and believe it to be, that one must look at the state
of insurrection, the state of war, because we were not at
war with a foreign power. We were at war among ourselves. And given that state of insurrection, which was
going on throughout the South, and indeed if the facts of
this case as they have been argued by the Government are
like they are, it was still being continued by conspirators
in the State of Maryland and throughout the District of
Columbia. And given that state of affairs, I do not believe
that it was an unreasonable exercise of the powers of the
President to call in to [being] a military commission to hear
the evidence and decide the case before us. Therefore I
would not set aside this case for a lack of jurisdiction.
Which leads me inevitably to the next question, and that is
whether the Government has maintained its burden of
proof.
Now, what is the standard of review that this court should
apply to the facts of this case? I believe that this court must
give every reasonable inference that can be drawn from
the evidence on behalf of the Government to the Govern-
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ment. I likewise, like Judge Re, agree that fundamental
norms of due process in this country, whether it be a
Constitutional court such as the Article III courts, or
whether it be a military tribunal, such as this Commission,
the standard of proof should be beyond a reasonable
doubt. I think that is the fundamental underpinning of
due process in this country. So therefore I look to the
charge in this case to try to determine what it was that the
Government was required to prove beyond a reasonable
doubt.
Now Mr. Bailey, in his argument, suggested, and I believe that
I agree with him, that the charge, at the outset at any rate,
suggested the possibility that Dr. Mudd was guilty of
treason; that Dr. Mudd was guilty of becoming an accessory before the fact to the homicide of President Lincoln;
that Dr. Mudd was indeed the killer of President Lincoln;
or that Dr. Mudd became an accessory after the fact and
gave aid and comfort knowing that Booth had been the
assassin; and lastly, as the Government argues, that this
was a sinister conspiracy among Dr. Mudd and the other
defendants to wipe out the leadership of the United States
at that time.
Having said that, though, I turn to the evidence and say what
evidence is here to prove what Dr. Mudd did in furtherance of this awesome conspiracy that Colonel Douglass
has painted for the court? And I find from the evidence
taken in light most favorable to the Government suggests
the following: That Dr. Mudd was acquainted - acquainted is the word I believe best describes it - with
John Wilkes Booth at some time prior to the night in
question. I find that, in light most favorable to the Government, that at the time Dr. Mudd treated John Wilkes Booth
he knew who he was, notwithstanding his disguise, and
notwithstanding some hearsay evidence denying that.
However, I must say that I find nothing in this evidence
which suggests that Dr. Samuel Mudd agreed, participated in, or aided and comforted in the assassination of
President Lincoln. I just don't find that proof in the
record. As the Government suggests, perhaps you could
find that he was providing a safe haven along a spy route.
But were that the case, I think he nevertheless would have
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to understand that he was providing a safe haven for an
assassin of President Lincoln to be found guilty of that
conspiracy, and I can't find that in the record. Accordingly, I would reverse this case and order a new trial. I do
think that, as a matter of law, on this day the necessity is
over, that a reasonable tribunal could not find military
necessity and so any trial would have to be in a civilian
tribunal. That's what I would hold. Again, an opinion will
be rendered in due course.
JUDGE EVERETT: I have focused on the jurisdictional issue
because, if in fact there was no jurisdiction on the part of
the military commission, then the disposition of the case is
rather obvious in light of the view taken by Judge Re.
It seems to me clearly to be the fact that there was no jurisdiction predicated on a theory of martial law. Martial law is
a doctrine of necessity as the Supreme Court has recently
reiterated in the Milligan case and there really was no
necessity to use a military tribunal under these circumstances. There was opportunity to try Dr. Mudd in a
civilian court.
There is, however, another rationale for jurisdiction which
deserves attention. I think this was the one that was being
expounded with particular vigor and conviction by Colonel Douglass. And that is the jurisdiction predicated on
the law of war. This is a doctrine that has been affirmed
over the years by our jurisprudence. It goes back, for
example, to the trial of Major Andre and admittedly that
was prior to the Constitution. But nevertheless, it evolves
as principle that a spy or certain other types of individuals, be they of foreign nationality or American, be they
military or civilian, can be tried by military tribunal. That
ground of jurisdiction was used by our courts, by American authorities, during the Mexican war. It has apparently
been used in some two thousand cases, I infer from what
Colonel Douglass said, and have little doubt it would
sustain the trials in those two thousand cases.
However, given the circumstances of this particular case, it
seems that the law of war rationale ,was not sufficiently
articulated in the pleadings nor sufficiently established by
proof, and that it is too tenuous a basis on that theory.
Given the time, the circumstances, I'm really not con-
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cerned by the fact that hostilities were concluded because
I think it would be true that u nder certain circumstances
jurisdiction can be exercised by a military tribunal, even
though hostilities have come to an end. But looking at all
the circumstances it seems to me that here that basis of
jurisdiction also fails and therefore I coine to the same
conclusion that Judge Redid - namely, that jurisdiction
of the military commission was lacking. That being the
case, there is no need for me to deal with the issues of
sufficiency of the evidence that Judge Cox discussed. I
think dearly the standard would be one of proof beyond
reasonable doubt, whether a military tribunal is involved
or a civilian tribunal. That's certainly a well-accepted,
well-established premise of American jurisprudence. I
think the law of conspiracy has many aspects and it can be
persuasively argt1~d that even if Dr. Mudd did not know
all the purposes of the conspiracy, if he engaged in the
conspiracy and if a particular act was a reasonably foreseeable consequence of the conspiracy, then he would be
responsible for that act. So I think there is at least very
substantial basis for the argument that was presented by
Colonel Douglass. But, as I indicated, I need not make a
determination in that regard because I do conclude that
the military tribunal had no jurisdiction.
That being the case, although two of us have one rationale and
one has a third, the members of the court have unanimously come to the conviction that Dr. Mudd's conviction
by the mibtary tribunal must be set aside and the corollary
of that is that an order must be entered at this time that he
forthwith be discharged from custody.
There being no other matter to come before the court today,
the court is now adjourned.
CLERK OF THE COURT: All rise.

The Judgment and
Opinions by the Court

OPINION
EDWARD D. RE, Judge:*
At the outset I should like to note the great pleasure of
sitting with a dear friend and colleague of many years, Judge
Robinson 0. Everett, and with my esteemed colleague, Judge
Walter T. Cox. I should like also to express my appreciation
and admiration for the extremely helpful arguments that
have been made by the distinguished and able counsel who
represented Dr. Mudd and the Government. I deem it a great
privilege to have heard the splendid arguments that have
been made in the course of this appeal.
The salient facts surrounding this case are well known,
and need not be recited at length. Before this court, Samuel A.
Mudd of Charles County, Maryland appeals his conviction by
a military commission of conspiracy to murder the President
of the United States, the Vice President, the Secretaries of
State and War, and the General commanding the Union Army.
Although John Wilkes Booth, the person said to have shot
President Lincoln, died resisting arrest, Mudd and seven
others were apprehended. On May 1, 1865, President Johnson
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ordered their trial by a military commission. The trial began
on May 9 and ended on June 30. Mudd was sentenced to life
imprisonment, and that sentence was approved by the President on July 5. Before this court, Dr. Mudd challenges both
the military commission's jurisdiction to try him and the
sufficiency of the Army's evidence against him.
I commence by stating that I have no difficulty in finding
that we have the power not only to look into the soundness of
the commission's findings regarding the appellant's guilt or
innocence, but also into the question of the commission's
jurisdiction. It is true that we are not an Article III court, but
an Article I court, having been appointed by the President at
the direction of the Congress. Clearly, however, our mandate
is to do justice. What else could we presume the President and
Congress to have wished or intended in establishing this
court? If doing justice brings us to a firm conclusion that the
Army tribunal that tried Dr. Mudd had no jurisdiction, it is
our duty to so declare, and to order the error corrected.
Moreover, the question of a tribunal's jurisdiction is one of
law, in this case, Constitutional Law. Hence, as to such a
question, we need pay no deference to either the prior decision of the tribunal, or to the present opinion of the United
States as appellee.
Proceeding to the actual merits of the jurisdictional question, it is my firm opinion that the military commission had no
jurisdiction to try a civilian like Mudd at the time and place
that he was tried. Because I conclude that there was no
military jurisdiction over the defendant, I need not address
appellant's other constitutional objections.
At trial, Dr. Mudd's counsel objected to a trial by a military
commission because his client was a civilian resident of a free
state, over whom a military tribunal could not exercise jurisdiction without violating the Constitution. Counsel for Dr.
Mudd renew that objection before this court. There is evidence in the record, introduced by the United States, which
shows that Mudd was a physician and a planter, residing
outside Bryantown in Charles County, Maryland. On the
other hand, there is no evidence that Dr. Mudd enlisted in the
armed forces of the insurgent states, or that he otherwise took
up arms against the Union. On such a record, the issue is
whether the Army may try a civilian resident of a loyal state
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for the offenses of which Dr. Mudd was accused.
On the record before us, I hold that all of the proceedings
of the commission were a nullity, and this conclusion would
apply regardless of the nature of the offense or offenses. I start
with the fundamental postulate that the Constitution is the
supreme law of the land. Article VI says so expressly, and the
paramount importance and supremacy of the Constitution
was subsequently confirmed in the tremendously significant
opinion- the seminal opinion- of Chief Justice Marshall in

Marbury v. Madison. 1
In the words of the great Chief Justice for a unanimous
Court in Marbury, "those who have framed written constitutions contemplate them as forming the fundamental and
paramount law of the nation,"' and the "constitution is to be
considered, in court, as a paramount law." 3 Therefore, I must
reject any assertion or contention that a rule or principle
derived from international law, or, more precisely, the law of
war, could disturb the legal order established by the Constitution. What remains for us to determine is the extent or limits
of military jurisdiction over civilians that is permitted by the
Constitution.
In the basic document, the Framers were silent as to the
propriety of military jurisdiction over persons or crimes. In
Art. I, Sec. 8, Cl. 10, Congress is authorized to define and
punish offenses against the law of nations. This provision
may reasonably be interpreted as authorization to define and
punish offenses against that subdivision of the law of nations
called the law of war. Appellant, however, has not called into
question Congress' power to define and punish but, rather,
has challenged the Army's power to adjudicate. On the power
to adjudicate, the Constitutional provisions are found in
Article III which declares that the judicial power of the United
States is vested in the Supreme Court and in such inferior
courts as Congress may from time to time ordain and establish. This article also provides that the judges, both of the
Supreme Court and the inferior courts, shall hold their offices
during good behavior.
In this case, the appellant was tried by a military commission known as the Hunter Commission. The commission was
established by order of the Commander in Chief, not by Act of
the Congress, and the commission's members, general and
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field grade officers on active service with the Army, did not
hold their offices as commission members during good behavior, but only pro ilia vice ("for that turn"). As these
commissioners cannot be said to have held their offices in
accordance with Article III, they may not be regarded as
having had jurisdiction described in Article III.
The Bill of Rights reveals that the First Congress contemplated different adjudicative treatment for crimes of a military nature, but it falls far short of validating military jurisdiction over a civilian as in this case. The Fifth Amendment
guarantees that no person may be held to answer for a capital
or otherwise infamous crime, unless upon presentment or
indictment of a grand jury, "except in cases arising in the land or
naval forces, or in the Militia, when in actual service in time of war
or public danger ... . " 4 Thus, the Fifth Amendment permits a
criminal conviction without the involvement of a Grand Jury
only for crimes arising in the armed forces. Here, the specific
exception of the Fifth Amendment cannot apply, for, as the
government must concede, Mudd was neither a soldier nor a
militiaman.
In the face of the one exception for military crimes explicitly set forth in the Fifth Amendment, I am loathe to assume
that the Constitution contains or permits any other exception
which its Framers failed to articulate. On this point I am
guided by a firmly established tradition of interpretation
summarized in the canon inclusio unius est exclusio alterius.
Hence, no implicit exception ought to be read into either the
federal jurisdiction set forth in Article III, or the guarantee of
a jury of the state and district wherein the crime shall have
been committed, as provided in Article III and in the Sixth
Amendment of the Constitution.
This brings me to the recent decision of the United States
Supreme Court in Ex parte Milligan.' In light of the overwhelming persuasiveness of that decision, I have no doubt
regarding its proper influence in this case. Indeed, I believe
our decision today is really determined by the reasoning and
holding of that case. I venture to add that if Ex parte Milligan
were to be read with the care it deserves, it would be viewed
as a great landmark for the expansion of human freedom and
liberties in our nation. Even though that decision admits that
the military, in exceptional circumstances, may adjudicate
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offenses by civilians, it limits the exercise of that power to
cases arising out of true and absolute national necessity, and
not merely for the Army's convenience.
Ex parte Milligan indicates clearly that, unless there exists
that "public danger" or necessity that warrants a declaration
of martial law, martial law can neither be declared nor applied to empower a military commission to judge civilians. Ex
parte Milligan also teaches that a finding by the executive of
the prerequisites for imposing martial law is not controlling
upon the judiciary in determining whether the necessity warranted the exercise of military jurisdiction over civilians.
Whether a military commission could have tried one of
these conspirators, or anyone else, within the territory of a
secessionist state is not before this court. The events which
led to the trial of Dr. Mudd and his co-defendants occurred in
the District of Columbia and in the State of Maryland, areas
which stayed with the Union and remained loyal to its lawful
government.
During the oral argument before us, able counsel for the
government noted that President Lincoln declared martial
law and that it applied in Indiana, the state in which Lambdin
Milligan resided and in which his offenses were committed;
that much is true. But Ex parte Milligan held that the declaration by the President was a nullity, and that the writ of habeas
corpus was available to free Milligan, a civilian resident of a
loyal state. The Supreme Court concluded that, as long as the
courts of the State of Indiana were open and operating, the
military courts of the United States Army could not usurp
their jurisdiction over civilian defendants.
Consequently, as long as the courts of Maryland were
open and operating, the Hunter Commission could not try
Samuel A. Mudd, a civilian.
While the record of the Hunter Commission, completed
before Ex parte Milligan was decided, is justifiably barren of
evidence on this essential matter, I find sufficient proof in the
Maryland Reports that the courts of that state were open and
operating at the time of Dr. Mudd's arrest. Indeed, I find
particularly compelling evidence that Maryland's courts were
capable of hearing and properly deciding his case in the
reported decision in Anderson v. Baker, 6 heard and decided by
the Court of Appeals during its October Term in 1865. In that
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case, Maryland's highest court affirmed a judgment of the
Circuit Court of Montgomery County denying a petition for a
writ of mandamus which had been requested by persons
refused registration as voters in accordance with Maryland's
registration law because they had been in "armed hostility to
the United States." 7 Clearly, the courts of Maryland were
open, operating, and loyal to the Union.
The specific question presented is whether the Hunter
Commission had jurisdiction to try the appellant. If there was
no jurisdiction, the commission was not properly a court, and
could not try the appellant. The Latin phrase coram non judice,
before one not a judge, expresses the principle and signals the
consequence - that any decision such a simulacrum may
render is null and void. Indeed, if there is no jurisdiction,
there is a very serious question as to whether the judges
themselves enjoy any judicial immunity. I have concluded
that the Milligan case determines the outcome of this case and,
on jurisdictional grounds, I hold that the proceedings below
were a nullity. It follows that Dr. Mudd should be released
forthwith, which was the order issued by Chief Justice Chase,
on April3, 1866, in the Milligan case.
As I understand the crucial facts of this case, the charges
against Dr. Mudd stem from services that he rendered as a
physician- when he set the leg of a patient. Whether he was
a co-conspirator in the assassination is not a question that
needs to be addressed. Having concluded that the military
commission over which this court has supervisory authority
acted without jurisdiction in passing on the appellant's guilt,
I need not pass on what persuaded the commission in its
judgment. Nonetheless, from a study of the entire record, I
have serious doubts as to whether an impartial mind, removed from what might be called the distractions of the
moment (i.e., the tempers, feelings, emotions, and clamor
surrounding this case), applying an appropriate standard of
proof as to the evidence presented, and in view of the nature
of the charges, could conclude that there was guilt beyond a
reasonable doubt.
It is my decision that the military commission that tried
Dr. Samuel A. Mudd had no jurisdiction to try him, that the
proceedings before that commission were a nullity, and that
Dr. Mudd should be released forthwith.
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ROBINSON 0. EVERETT, Chief Judge** (concurring):
If it were necessary for me to decide as to the sufficiency
of the evidence, I might be persuaded by the incisive arguments and briefs on behalf of the Government that Samuel
Mudd's guilt of some crime had been established. Even if
Booth's slaying of the President were outside the scope of any
plot in which Mudd might have been involved, there is
evidence suggesting that he was an accessory after the fact.
However, I need not reach the issue of evidentiary sufficiency
because - for the reasons ably set out by my esteemed
brother Judge Edward D. Re-I also am convinced that the
military commission lacked jurisdiction to try Dr. Mudd.
Three bases of military jurisdiction are consistent with the
Constitution. The first is derived from Art. I, Sec. 8, which
authorizes Congress to "make rules for the Government and
Regulation of the land and naval Forces." Clearly this provision of the Constitution- under which Congress has enacted
the Articles of War- is inapplicable. In no sense can Samuel
Mudd be considered a member of the "land and naval Forces."
A second possible basis for military jurisdiction is martial
law, which was unsuccessfully relied upon by the Government in Ex parte Milligan 8 As the principal opinion in that
case makes clear, martial law- which is nowhere specifically
mentioned in the Constitution- is predicated on necessity.
Absent necessity, no basis exists in martial law for trying a
civilian by a military commission or other military tribunal.
Because the civil courts were open in Indiana where Milligan
was tried, the Supreme Court ruled that the military commission there lacked jurisdiction to try him and to impose a death
sentence. Even though martial law still applied in Washington when President Lincoln was assassinated and later when
the Hunter Commission tried Dr. Mudd, it seems undeniable
that the civil courts were open and that, if Federal authorities
had been so inclined, Dr. Mudd could have been tried in a civil
court by a jury upon an indictment rendered by a grand jury.
Any argument for military jurisdiction based on martial
law would be stronger if the trial of Samuel Mudd by a
military commission had been specifically authorized by

** Senior Judge (ret.) and former Chief Judge of the U.S. Court of Military
Appeals; Professor of Law, Duke University School of Law.

104

Dr. Mudd and the Lincoln Assassination

Congress- just as the Congress has created our Special Court
and authorized it to review Mudd's conviction. However, in
my view, even a legislative mandate would not be sufficient
to establish military jurisdiction based on martial law.
That leaves only an argument based on Art. I, Sec. 8, Cl. 10,
which confers on Congress the power to "define and punish
... Offenses against the law of nations." In my view, neither
the accessibility of civil courts nor Mudd's American citizenship is decisive as to the legality of any exercise of military
jurisdiction pursuant to Clause 10. However, because trial by
a military tribunal deprives an accused of many safeguards,
such as indictment by grand jury and trial by petit jury,
Clause 10 should not be given a novel or extraordinarily
broad construction. Moreover, I am troubled because it is
unclear that Congress has attempted to exercise the power
granted it by Art. I, Sec. 8, Cl. 10. Nonetheless, I shall proceed
on the premise that, in some way, Congress did authorize
military authorities to utilize whatever power might stem
from this clause.
A question also may be raised as to whether the law of war
- within the "law of nations" - justifies trial by military
commission for acts which took place in Maryland on April
14, 1865. The Army of Northern Virginia had surrendered on
April 10, 1865. General Johnston was about to surrender to
General Sherman in North Carolina. However, a sufficient
residue of military operations at the time of the assassination
permits the law of war to punish Mudd and the other alleged
conspirators. Moreover, as to conduct punishable by a military tribunal under the authority of Art. I, Sec. 8, it probably
makes no difference whether hostilities abate after the offense
is committed and prior to trial or the execution of a sentence.
Even so, I conclude that the military commission lacked
jurisdiction. Had the conduct of Mudd and the other alleged
co-conspirators occurred in one of the States which had attempted to secede and join the Confederacy, a different result
might be called for. The use of military tribunals to maintain
order in occupied countries appears to be well-accepted' and
I would draw no distinction between the power of American
military commanders to establish courts in the occupied territory of a foreign government- such as Mexico two decades
ago - and their power to establish military commissions to
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administer justice in the occupied territory ofrebellious States.
Admittedly, at the outset of the recent conflict, Maryland,
where Samuel Mudd resided, exhibited secessionist tendencies. However, even though some military operations took
place within the State, its constituted authorities never undertook to withdraw from the Union. Washington, where the
assassination was carried out, always remained under Federal control. Furthermore, no evidence has been offered that
the assassination plot was encouraged, organized, or condoned by the persons in charge of military operations for the
secessionist States.
No one can minimize the gravity of the crimes committed
by those who were responsible in any way for the slaying of
President Lincoln and thereafter for shielding the assassin.
Indeed, those involved may have been guilty of treason.
However, even that most aggravated of offenses is not subject
to summary trial by a military tribunal; to the contrary, the
Constitution at Art. III, Sec. 3 provides special safeguards to
assure that a person accused of treason is protected against
conviction on the basis of hearsay and innuendo. With this in
mind, I cannot subscribe to the proposition that the exigencies
of the situation created by the assassination of the President
authorized trial in a forum where the usual safeguards for
trial of a civilian would be absent 10
The conclusion I have reached seems most consistent with
the language and spirit of our Constitution. Moreover, it
precludes a rush to judgment before a tribunal whose unfamiliar procedures and rules of evidence will inevitably result
later in claims of arbitrariness, bias, and hysteria. Thus I join
Judge Re in holding that the military commission sitting in
Washington lacked jurisdiction to try Dr. Samuel Mudd - a
citizen of Maryland, a State which remained with the Union
- for any misconduct on his part in connection with the
assassination of President Lincoln or with the harboring and
assisting of those who perpetrated this dastardly crime.
WALTER T. COX, III, Judge' (concurring in the judgment):
My learned colleagues make compelling arguments that
t Judge of the U.S. Court of Military Appeals; former Judge of the lOth Judicial
Circuit of South Carolina.
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the military commission was without jurisdiction to try Dr.
Samuel Mudd for the crimes arising out of the assassination of
President Abraham Lincoln and the assault on Secretary of
State William H. Seward, rei ying on the Supreme Court's
recent decision in Ex parte Milligan. 11 I respectfully disagree.
However, for the reasons set forth, I agree that the judgment
of guilty must be reversed.
In reaching these conclusions, I first ask whether Milligan
stands for the proposition that a civilian may never be tried by
a military commission- or does that case merely establish
those essential elements which must be present in order for a
military tribunal to require a civilian to answer to criminal
charges before such a body? I read Milligan as permitting
jurisdiction over civilians under certain circumstances. I do
not read it as an absolute bar to jurisdiction.
It is true that no civilian may be tried by a military tribunal
absent extraordinary and compelling circumstances. Milligan
makes it clear that a civilian cannot be tried for ordinary
offenses arising out of state or federal laws if the civil government is functioning and in control, and if the civil courts are
open and capable of doing justice. Likewise, Milligan makes
it clear that the exercise of jurisdiction by a military tribunal
is a corollary to martial law. Furthermore, martial law must
exist out of "necessity actual and present, the invasion real,
such as actually closes down the courts and deposes the civil
administration. " 12
These are seductive words which, if taken literally, belie
the truth. I view our duty as an appellate court in a much
broader sense than one which merely asks if the doors to the
local courthouse are physically open. We must look beyond
that simple fact to the true state of affairs. We, as an appellate
tribunal, must resolve the question of jurisdiction, as we must
in every case, as a question of law- certainly one mixed with
facts, but nevertheless a question of law.
When we examine the jurisdiction of a military tribunal,
we are not hidebound to the traditional questions of criminal
jurisdiction, albeit they remain important. In addition to the
traditional questions - Did the tribunal have jurisdiction
over the subject matter? Did the tribunal have jurisdiction
over the person? Where was the situs of the crime?- we must
also examine the time, place, and circumstances pertaining to
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the alleged offenses. We must likewise look at the offenses to
determine if they are against military order and discipline or
against the common citizenry. In other words, necessity is a
much broader concept than an open civil courthouse.
This broader view of jurisdiction is alien to our normal
view thereof. Normally, all we ask is: (a) Whether the crime
occurred in the county or district? (b) Do the charges allege an
offense? (c) Was the defendant properly before the court by
information or arraignment? and (d) Was the indictment
returned a true bill by the grand jury? These questions are
fairly routine and easy to answer. Necessity as an element of
jurisdiction presents quite another question.
In my view, when we peel away the constitutional platitudes surrounding the debate over the issue of jurisdiction in
this case, resolution of the question boils down to consideration of the time, place, and circumstances surrounding the
crime and trial.
Unlike my colleagues, I find that an examination of the
record of the proceedings supports a finding of jurisdiction.
As recited in the Charge and Specification, Washington was a
city "fortified and intrenched." The offense occurred on the
night of Apri114, 1865. The intended victims were Abraham
Lincoln, President of the United States and Commander in
Chief of the military forces of the United States; Andrew
Johnson, Vice President of the United States; William H.
Seward, Secretary of State; and Lieutenant General Ulysses S.
Grant, then in command of the Armies of the United States.
Martial law had been previously declared in the city of Washington, D.C. Habeas corpus, which had been suspended, was
not restored until February 1867, long after the trial in question.
A very important fact supporting jurisdiction is that the
war between the Union and the Confederacy was not over. It
is true, as Petitioners argue, that GenerarRobert E. Lee had
surrendered the Army of Northern Virginia in early April
1865, but hostilities continued throughout the South. Rebellious renegade groups flourished and Jefferson Davis, President of the Confederate States of America, was eluding capture. Indeed, he was not captured until May 10, 1865, the day
after this trial commenced.
The most important factor demonstrating the appropri-
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ateness of this military commission can be found in the very
facts of the case. The offenses themselves demonstrate the
very grand and immediate danger to the military leadership
in the District of Columbia. Prompt investigation of the
charges, swift trial of those believed to be involved, and
speedy rendering of punishment were unquestionably necessary to convince the local populace of the avowed determination of the military to instill discipline and control in the
community. That is the purpose of martial law and military
tribunals, to maintain control and order when the civilian
populace is in disarray.
It is easy to look backward to find some evidence that the
courts of Maryland or the District of Columbia were open.
However, given the time, place, and circumstances of this
case, it is my view that the exercise of jurisdiction by the
military commission was justified and proper, in order to
ensure the safety of the military leadership and peace and
harmony within the District of Columbia and, indeed, the
nation. A military force must, as a matter of common sense
and necessity, be capable of protecting itself and its leaders
from such heinous crimes against it. In my judgment, that is
the necessity required by Ex parte Milligan and the Constitution in order for a military tribunal to exercise jurisdiction
over civilians. Accordingly, I am ofthe opinion that Dr. Mudd
was subject to the jurisdiction of the commission.
Whether or not the verdict of guilty against Dr. Mudd, for
conspiring to murder the President and others, should stand
is quite another question. Petitioner questions whether the
evidence against him supports a finding of guilty as charged.
I conclude that the evidence is insufficient, and, therefore, I
would reverse his conviction on this basis.
I agree with the Petitioner as to the burden of proof. It is
a fundamental principle in Anglo-American jurisprudence
that no man shall be punished for a crime unless the state (or,
in this case, the United States) shall prove the defendant
guilty by legal and competent evidence which shall prove
each and every element of the criminal offense beyond any
reasonable doubt.
The legal test is, the sufficiency of the evidence to
satisfy the understanding and conscience of the jury.
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On the one hand, absolute, metaphysical and
demonstrative certainty, is not essential to proof by
circumstances. It is sufficient if they produce moral
certainty, to the exclusion of every reasonable doubt. Even
direct and positive evidence does not afford grounds
of belief of a higher or superior nature. The rule, even
in a capital case is, that should circumstances be
sufficient to convince the mind and remove every rational
doubt, the jury is bound to place as much reliance in
such circumstances as on direct and positive proof. 13
Thus, an appellate tribunal reviewing a record of trial
regarding a claim of insufficient evidence must ask itself two
questions:
1. Is the evidence of record legal and competent? Evidence erroneously admitted into the trial cannot be considered.
2. Does the evidence of record, if true, offer proof of each
and every element of the charged offense?
Of course, an appellate court must view the evidence in a
light most favorable to the Government, unless the appellate
court is convinced that no reasonable juror would do so. After
all, even appellate courts are not bound by absurd, arbitrary,
or capricious views of evidence. Furthermore, unlike historians and even legal scholars, an appellate court is bound by the
record of trial before it and the laws and precedents pertaining to the case; it may not consider evidence developed
outside the record.
My starting point for review of this record is, therefore,
the charge against Petitioner. It is clear from the Charge and
Specification that the prosecution's theory regarding Dr.
Mudd's role in the case was two-fold. First, Dr. Mudd was an
active conspirator in the plot to assassinate the President, Vice
President, Secretary of State, and Lieutenant General Grant.
Second, in support of that murderous compact, Dr. Mudd
gave aid, safe harbor, and comfort to the injured assassin,
John Wilkes Booth; and he assisted Booth and his colleague to
escape from Maryland into Virginia.
It is certainly an inescapable conclusion that Dr. Mudd did
indeed aid, comfort, and assist John Wilkes Booth in his flight
from Washington, D.C., to Virginia. Such conduct may well
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have constituted some offense against the United States, in
the same manner as providing food and shelter to retreating
Confederate soldiers or escaped prisoners of war. But such is
not the nature of the crime for which Dr. Mudd stands convicted.
Rather, he stands convicted for willfully, knowingly agreeing to kill and murder the President of the United States, for
assaulting the Secretary of State, and for knowingly providing aid and comfort to the President's actual killer. In my
view, the record is entirely void of any evidence from which
a finder of fact, honestly seeking the truth, could conclude
that Dr. Samuel Mudd conspired to murder the President.
Viewing the evidence presented to the military commission in May 1865, in a light most favorable to the prosecution,
I find the following:
1. Dr. Mudd knew the assassin, John Wilkes Booth, prior
to April15, 1865, and recognized him on the morning that he
treated his leg.
2. Between November 1864, and March 1865, John Wilkes
Booth and others conspired to kidnap President Lincoln, Vice
President Johnson, Secretary of State Seward, and Lieutenant
General Grant.
3. In early March 1865, Booth and certain of his fellow
conspirators modified the plot and decided, instead, to assassinate the victims.
4. The witness Weichmann observed Dr. Mudd meeting
with Booth and others in a Washington hotel on January 15,
1865, and he saw them discussing a map.
5. Dr. Mudd was seen in Washington on March 3, 1865,
looking for Booth.
6. Dr. Mudd was sympathetic to the cause of the Confederate States of America, and he operated a safe house for antiUnion operatives at his farm in southern Maryland.
7. President Lincoln was killed by John Wilkes Booth on
April14, 1865, and Secretary of State Seward was assaulted on
the same night by a fellow conspirator of Booth.
8. Dr. Mudd provided aid and comfort to Booth and his
companion during the daylight hours of April15, 1865.
9. When Dr. Mudd was given the opportunity to explain
the presence of Booth at his farm to Lieutenant Lovett, a
Union Army officer investigating the case, he denied having
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recognized Booth.
These are powerful items of circumstantial evidence that
Dr. Mudd was involved in a conspiracy, his particular role
being to cover and assist in the escape of the perpetrators to
the South. However, it is the following lack of evidence,
rather than the evidence, direct or circumstantial, that causes
me to conclude that the prosecution failed to meet its legal
burden-that is, to prove every element of the offense charged:
a. Even assuming Dr. Mudd participated in the original
conspiracy to kidnap the President and others, it is clear that
the plot later was fundamentally changed. There is no evidence of record showing that Dr. Mudd agreed to kill the
President and others or to be a part of such a plot.
b. There is als·o no evidence of record to indicate that, at
the time Dr. Mudd aided Booth, he knew that Booth had killed
the President. In fact, there is no evidence that even Booth
knew the President was dead at that point, only that he had
fired a shot at him. Based upon the prosecution's evidence, it
was not established that Dr. Mudd learned of the assassination of the President until April16, 1865, one day after Booth
made his escape.
I know of no rule of law that would hold a conspirator
vicariously liable for crimes which are independently committed by a principal and outside the foreseeable scope of the
conspiracy. For example, if two men conspire to steal a
farmer's horse- one to commit the theft, the other to aid and
abet in the thief's escape- and the thief changes his mind and
decides to rape the farmer's daughter instead of stealing the
horse, the rape is without the conspiracy, and the actor alone
must suffer the punishment. On the other hand, if the farmer
were killed in an attempt to stop the thief from taking his
horse, the co-conspirator would be liable for the homicide.
When two or more persons set out on a criminal enterprise,
each is liable for the acts of the other, for it is true that the
"hand of one is the hand of all." 13
As to aiding and abetting the escape in general, the
Government's case is considerably stronger. Certainly, given
Dr. Mudd's sympathetic views of the Confederacy, his previous acquaintance with Booth, and the fact that Booth was
attempting to go covertly in the middle of the night to the
South, a reasonable, prudent man would realize that he was
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aiding and abetting some endeavor, perhaps even an illicit
one. However, there is still no evidence which proves, directly or indirectly, that Dr. Mudd knew of the murder at the
time he rendered aid.
Be that as it may, Dr. Mudd wasnotcharged with being an
accessory after the fact. His conviction must be based upon
evidence of his knowing participation in the plot to murder
the President, not upon his political views or his willingness
to provide comfort and aid to travelers along the covert route
to the South. The proof fails as to the charged offense.
In retrospect, the complete record before us shows that the
assassination of President Abraham Lincoln was an extraordinary and sensational crime, committed by a well-known
actor and southern sympathizer, John Wilkes Booth. The
murder was obviously part and parcel of a grander scheme,
which included the murder of other important officials of the
United States, a fact well proved by the simultaneous assault
on Secretary of State Seward and the attempts on others.
There was most certainly probable cause to believe that
Dr. Mudd was an active conspirator. Nevertheless, based
upon the evidence presented to the military commission,
stripped of speculation and conjecture rising out of the heat
and passions inflamed by the death of the President, the
prosecution failed to prove that Dr. Mudd ever conspired to
commit the offense charged.
Accordingly, with due respect to the members of the
military commission, I would reverse Petitioner's conviction
and order him released forthwith from his confinement.
The findings of guilty and the
sentence are set aside.
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Part Two

Commentary

His Name Was Mudd
Frederick Bernays Wiener*

INTRODUCTION
At about 9:30p.m. on Good Friday, April 14, 1865, John
Wilkes Booth fatally shot President Abraham Lincoln in the
head. The shooting took place in Ford's Theater, located on
lOth Street, N. W., in Washington, D.C. Jumping out ofthe box
in which the President, Mrs. Lincoln, and two others sat,
Booth caught the spur on his left boot in a decorative flag, with
the result that he broke his left leg as he landed on the theater's
stage.
Early on the next day, Booth and his companion David E.
Herold rode up to the home of Samuel A. Mudd, M.D., near
Bryantown in Charles County, Maryland, some thirty miles
from Washington. Booth had earlier visited Charles County
and had been with Dr. Mudd there and in Washington; Mudd
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would later admit that he recognized Booth when the assassin
appeared at his home on April 15.
Dr. Mudd cut the boot from Booth's broken leg, set the
break, and furnished the injured man with crutches. Mudd
also provided food and shelter for both visitors. The next day,
after trying to find a carriage that would have facilitated
Booth's travel, Mudd directed Booth and Herold across Zekiah
Swamp to the Potomac River and Virginia. He also gave them
a map of Virginia's Northern Neck.
Eleven days later, on the Garrett farm beyond Port Royal,
Virginia, Booth died, whether by his own hand or by that of
one of the Union soldiers who surrounded Garrett's tobacco
barn, still remains unclear to this day.
Mudd and seven others linked with Booth were then
placed on trial before a military commission comprised of
nine field -grade and general officers of which the senior and
president was Major General David Hunter. The eight in the
dock were charged with conspiring to murder President Lincoln, Vice President Johnson, Secretary of State Seward, and
Lieutenant General Grant.
Originally, some time in 1864, Booth had planned only to
abduct the President and to hold him as ransom for the return
of the thousands of Confederate prisoners then in Union
hands, thus making possible a peace on Confederate terms.
But after Lee's surrender, this was no longer possible. Accordingly, Booth turned to a mass killing that would paralyze
the victorious Union government. He would kill the President, George A. Atzerodtwas to do in the Vice President, and
Lewis Payne would kill the Secretary of State, next in succession under the law then in force. General Grant (with his wife
scheduled to be the Lincolns' guests that night at Ford's
Theater) would also be disposed of because he was the highest
ranking officer in the Union Army.
The specification under the general charge that was solely
applicable to Mudd alleged that he advised, encouraged,
received, entertained, harbored and concealed Booth and
aided the other conspirators in escaping from justice.
After a trial that lasted from May 9 to June 30, 1865, and
deliberations for two more days, the Hunter Commission
found Mudd guilty and sentenced him to life imprisonment at
Fort Jefferson in the Dry Tortugas, Florida. While imprisoned
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there, he sought three writs of habeas corpus, all of which were
denied. But, because of his medical assistance to other prisoners during a yellow fever epidemic, Mudd was pardoned by
President Johnson on March 1, 1869, just before the latter's
term came to an end.
Dr. Mudd's oft asserted innocence became a cause that has
been pursued over the years with virtually theological fervor.
Finally, in 1991, a grandson of Dr. Mudd applied to the Army
Board for Correction of Military Records to set aside his
grandfather's conviction. That Board, on January 22, 1992,
recommended that this be done, on the sole ground that the
military commission that convicted Dr. Mudd lacked jurisdiction to try him in the first place. 1
Exactly six months later, however, the Acting Assistant
Secretary of the Army rejected the Board's recommendation
and denied the Mudd family's application, on the ground that
it was not the Board's role to settle historical disputes by
rewriting history, even though the matter might have been
decided differently today. 2 Thereafter, on February 12, 1993,
a three-judge "Special Court of Military Appeal" presided
over a moot court hearing at which were debated the questions deemed by the Secretary to be beyond the reach of the
Board.
I. FUNDAMENTALS FREQUENTLY OVERLOOKED
A. Incompetence of the Accused as Witnesses
Before the Board and again before the Special Court, Dr.
Mudd's family and their counsel attacked the Hunter
Commission's refusal to permit any of the accused to take the
stand in his or her own defense. Indeed, the Board formally
found that "Dr. Mudd and the other defendants were not
permitted to testify in their own behalf,"' as if this constituted
a denial of due process on the part of the Hunter Commission.
Actually this finding reflected simple ignorance on the part of
the Board, because, at the time of Mudd's trial, in May and
June 1865, no one accused of a crime before any tribunal of the
United States, civil or military, was legally entitled to testify.
That disqualification was not removed until1878, when it was
also provided that the accused's "failure to make such request
shall not create any presumption against him."' Some States
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permitted the prosecution to make adverse comments on the
accused's failure to testify, and that course was originally
upheld.' But both decisions were overruled in Malloy v.
Hogan,' decided in 1964 during the rewriting of the Constitution of the United States tempore Warren, C.J-7
Two other preliminary matters also need to be noted.
Reading a record is inadequate to determine which of two
conflicting witnesses is the one to be believed, because "[One]
cannot now recreate his tone of voice or the gloss that personality puts upon speech."'
Second, even uncontradicted testimony must be ignored
when it runs counter to settled rules of law. Thus, when
Herold told Willie Jett, "We are the assassinators of the
President,"' and when Booth immediately afterwards said of
Herold, "I declare before my Maker that this man here is
innocent of any crime whatever," 10 it is plain that Booth knew
nothing either of the law of conspiracy or of the law governing
accessories. Similarly, while it has been suggested that the
shift in Booth's plan from abduction to assassination meant
that there were two separate conspiracies, one to abduct and
the other to kill, 11 this distinction will simply not stand. For it
is the law that, so long as the original objective is unchanged,
there is still only a single conspiracy as long as the purpose of
both plans is to inflict an unlawful deed upon the victim."
B. Strength of Secessionist Sentiment in Maryland
Only good fortune and ruthless action kept Maryland
from joining the Confederacy. Maryland's complete military
subjection by northern troops, not the sentiment of its native
people, kept the state in the Union. Maryland, particularly its
southern counties, was territory hostile to the Lincoln administration and to the Union Army that occupied it.
In the 1860 election, Maryland gave the Republican ticket
of Lincoln and Hamlin less than 3,000 votes, and some counties did not deliver a single vote to that slate." The Democratic party was split in 1860. Stephen A. Douglas and Herschel
V. Johnson, representing the more moderate pro-slavery
group, received 1,376,957 votes in the nation, but received
only twelve in the Electoral College. Vice President John C.
Breckinridge and Senator Joseph Lane of Oregon, representing the more extreme pro-slavery views, received only 849,781
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popular votes, but secured seventy-two electoral votes. The
latter number included Maryland's. 14
When, in April 1861, Fort Sumter was fired on and soon
surrendered, President Lincoln called for 75,000 troops to put
down the insurrection. Among the first regiments to head
south for the defense of the Union was the 6th Massachusetts.
It was cheered in Boston, New York, and Philadelphia, but
received a quite different welcome in Baltimore.
In that city, the railway depot for the track from the north
was one and one half miles away from that for the track to
Washington. Military planners had taken note of the strong
pro-Secessionist feeling in Baltimore. To reduce the disorder
certain to ensue when the regiment moved from one depot to
the other on April19, the troops were carried between the two
depots in horse cars. Nevertheless, an attack was mounted on
the Massachusetts troops which escalated into a city-wide riot
that left sixteen dead: twelve civilian and four military. 15
Maryland's Governor and Baltimore's Mayor both begged
President Lincoln not to send any more troops through the
city, the Mayor saying that while he did not believe in secession, he did believe in the right of revolution on the part of the
oppressed people of the South. Soon, Baltimore effectively
seceded from the Union. All available units of the State militia
were called out, all telegraphic communication with the North
was cut off, and all bridges connecting the city with the North
were destroyed. 16 One of those bridges, connecting the city
with Pennsylvania, was destroyed by members of the Baltimore County Horse Guards, commanded by Lieutenant John
Merryman. 17 We shall hear more of him later.
Obviously, by April 20, the Union was in dire straits.
Washington, the national capital, could not communicate by
wire or by rail with the loyal states. If the secessionists of
Virginia south of the Potomac were joined by those of Maryland north of the river, their troops could easily surround and
conquer the District of Columbia that lay between the two.
Fortunately, this "worst case" contingency never materialized. Union troops reached Annapolis by sea and soon
branched out to occupy the area around Baltimore. Track
repairs were effective, and, by midday April25, "just six days
after the Battle of Baltimore, the first trainloads of troops
reached Washington. The road from the north had been
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reopened." 18 Soon General Winfield Scott formulated a plan
for the capture of Baltimore, which "was no longer that
ferocious tiger that had deliberately baited the Union .... For
Baltimore, in cutting the rail line to Washington, had succeeded only in cutting its own jugular vein." 19
Baltimore rejoined the Union. The militia, after a showy
parade, soon disbanded. The 6th Massachusetts reentered the
city where it had been so violently attacked; vast quantities of
arms were seized by the Union forces; and, by way of summ<~ry, "[a] combination of political, economic and military
factors very quickly wrenched control of Maryland from the
secessionists and turned the state back into the arms of the
Union." 20
We return now to John Merryman, the Baltimore militia
officer who had destroyed the railway bridge between Maryland and Pennsylvania. On April27, the President suspended
the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus along "the military
line ... used between the city of Philadelphia and the city of
Washington." 21 Nearly a month later, at 2:00a.m. on May 25,
in consequence of an order from the commander of the Pennsylvania troops along the railroad line between Harrisburg
and Baltimore, Merryman was arrested and taken from his
home near Cockeysville to Fort McHenry in Baltimore.
He sought his release by applying for a writ of habeas
corpus, an application that came before Chief Justice Roger B.
Taney in the United States Circuit Court in Baltimore. Taney,
then 84, had written the Dred Scott v. Sanford" decision which
had denied Congress authority to outlaw slavery in the territories. He was a strong believer in states' rights and favored
"a peaceful separation" of North and South. 23
Justice Taney issued the writ, requiring General
Cadwalader to produce Merryman in court. When the General politely replied that he had been authorized by the
President to suspend the writ of habeas corpus for the public
safety, the Chief Justice ordered that an attachment issue
against the General for contempt. When the marshal went to
Fort McHenry, he was told that there was no answer. The
Chief Justice then concluded that, since the power refusing
obedience was far superior to any posse the marshal could
summon, the marshal was excused from doing more.
The opinion later filed holds that the President, under the
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Constitution, cannot suspend or authorize suspension of the
writ of habeas corpus, that a military officer has no right to
arrest or detain a person not subject to the Articles of War, and
that if the military authority makes an arrest, it is its duty
immediately to deliver the prisoner to the civil authorities, to
be dealt with according to law. Merryman was therefore
entitled to be set at liberty. 24
The opinion concluded:
I shall, therefore, order all the proceedings in this case,
with my opinion, to be filed and recorded in the circuit
court of the United States for the district of Maryland,
and direct the clerk to transmit a copy, under seal, to
the president of the United States. It will then remain
for that high officer, in fulfillment of his constitutional
obligation to take care that the laws be faithfully
executed, to determine what measures he will take to
cause the civil process of the United States to be
respected and enforced. 25
Inasmuch as the Constitution's provision on habeas corpus
appears in Article I, relating to Congress, rather than in
Article II, dealing with the President, the latter officer lacked
power to effect suspension on his own; it was a legislative
function. Modern views accordingly concur with the Chief
Justice on this point."
More than half a century ago, the late Professor Fairman
noted that "[i]t hasbecome something of an article of liberal
faith to regard this opinion as a great classic of liberty.""
Indeed, Taney's latest biographer has rung the changes on
that theme. 29
But, in fact, the Merryman decision was worse than wrong;
it was wrong-headed, and had it been obeyed it might well
have been calamitous. As was observed by a contemporary
pro-Union commentator, Professor Joel Parker of the Harvard
Law School: "If the marshal had summoned the posse, the
Secessionists would have had a better chance to capture the
fort by volunteering under his banner thi\n they are likely to
have under any military commander." 30
Fortified by a sensible opinion by Attorney General Edward Bates, 31 President Lincoln never admitted that he had
26
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acted unconstitutionally. Indeed, he told the Congress that,
"[T]he whole of the laws which were required to be faithfully
executed were being resisted and failing of execution in
nearly one-third of the States .... Are all the laws but one to go
unexecuted, and the Government itself go to pieces lest that
one be violated?" 32
Following the disastrous defeat of Union forces at Bull
Run in July 1861, secessionist sentiment in Maryland became
stronger, and anti-Union riots and disorders multiplied."
Secretary of State William E. Seward directed widespread
military arrests of those who publicly sympathized with the
South or criticized President Lincoln and his cabinet. 34 Both
houses of the Maryland legislature passed a resolution condemning such actions and then adjourned to meet at Frederick
on September 17, 1861. The President's response was to make
it impossible for such a meeting to take place. Orders went
out to Major General John A. Dix in Baltimore and to Major
General Nathaniel P. Banks in western Maryland to arrest all
non-Union members of the Maryland legislature. There followed the suppression of pro-secession newspapers and the
imprisonment of their editors. Journalists joined lawmakers
as inmates at Fort McHenry. The pro-secession resolutions
earlier passed by the Legislature and multiplied to the extent
of 25,000 copies, were simply burned."
By the time that Generals Dix and Banks had carried out
their orders, virtually all of the leaders of the Peace Party in
Maryland were in prison, the newspapers supporting them
had been suppressed, and their editors were also in captivity.36 More military arrests preceded the regular elections for
members of the Legislature in November 1861. Election
officials were warned by General Dix not to allow the ballot
boxes to be "polluted by treasonable votes." 37 This, of course,
was not a free election, because, in 1861, instead of secret
ballots each party offered a ballot with its own distinctive
color. As a consequence, every legislative seat in Baltimore
was won by the Unionists, and the Unionist candidate for
Governor won the city with a margin of about five to one: 38
It was in Maryland that the orgy of suppression reached
its apex. For here were pitted two irreconcilable forces,
the historically mercurial temperament of a Southern
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city, and the absolute necessity for survival of the
federal government. Temporarily the insurrectionary
audacity of Baltimore had been triumphant, and during
this phase the blockade of Washington had been
complete. But in time, the overwhelming resources
available to the North overcame this lone city and the
ultimate subjugation of Baltimore was as complete as
the blockade had been. As a result, Maryland was to
stand through the war as a symbol of oppression, and
its martyrs were to provide unlimited ammunition to
those who criticized President Lincoln for his 'tyranny'
and his Administration for its abuse of freedom. 39
Finally, President Lincoln's general amnesty in February
1862 brought about the release of most of the Maryland
prisoners who still remained in custody. Some prisoners
refused to accept a parole on the ground that it would imply
their guilt. Indeed, two were not freed until they had served
seventeen months in detention. 40
In short, in Maryland as well as in Kentucky and Missouri,
the one step that kept three slave states from seceding with
their eleven neighbors, was their effective military occupation by the Union Army. 41 As a practical matter, Maryland
was hostile territory, militarily occupied.
C. Strength of Secessionist Sentiment in Charles County

Nowhere in Maryland were secessionist sympathies stronger than in Dr. Mudd's home county. Not by chance did Booth
recruit many of his conspirators from that rural county,
planned his escape across it to the Potomac, and avoided a
massive Union manhunt for nine days through the connivance of Mudd's seditious and disloyal neighbors.
Charles County, Maryland, named for Charles Calvert,
the third Lord Baltimore," was in the middle of the 19th
century an agricultural area with a tobacco economy founded
on slavery. At a meeting in December 1860, those who had
supported the Republican ticket were deemed to have committed an indiscretion, but one individual, Nathan Burnham,
who had been" a Black Republican emissary," was given until
the first of the new year to leave the county, and that in default
thereof a designated committee of four would" expel him viet
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armis from our county. " 43 Some ten thousand to twelve
thousand Union troops were sent into Charles County. At
Port Tobacco, their commander reported that most inhabitants were secessionists and that the post office was the medium through which contact with the South was conducted.
Indeed, at his residence at Pope's Creek, Thomas A. Jones
helped boat loads of people illegally passing to the South. He
was arrested in September 1861 and confined for six months.
However, returning home after his release, he agreed to act as
Chief Signal Agent for the Confederacy north of the Potomac.
After the war, he asserted that he had never lost a letter or a
paper. 44
As is reasonably well known, it was Booth's original plan
to kidnap the President, and to hold him hostage for the
release of all Confederate prisoners of war in Union hands.
He changed his plan to assassination only after Richmond fell
on April 3, 1865, and Lee surrendered on April 9. 45 Indeed,
according to Booth's diary, he did not change his mind until
the very day of the murder. 46
Most of Booth's co-conspirators in both aspects were residents of Charles County. Dr. Mudd lived there, and the
county was Mrs. Surratt's home also. Indeed, what is now
Clinton, Maryland, was known in 1865 as Surrattville. The
tavern in Surrattville was owned by Mrs. Surratt and leased to
John M. Lloyd. The day before the assassination, she left at the
tavern for Booth's future use, a set of field glasses and told
Lloyd to have ready two carbines left in his care previously by
her son, Herold, and Atzerodt. 47
Atzerodt lived at Port Tobacco in Charles County, where
he had often ferried Confederate spies and contraband across
the Potomac to Virginia. He signed a hotel register on April
14 giving his address as Charles County, Maryland 48
After Dr. Mudd set Booth's leg and put him up as a house
guest, he tried to procure a carriage for him. Failing to find
one, he gave Booth a chart of the Zekiah swamp and a map of
Virginia's Northern Neck. Booth and Herold then rode off,
eventually killing their horses lest one should neigh and
disclose their location to patrolling Union soldiers 49 Herold
then found a black man to guide them to the home of Captain
Cox, whose Southern sympathies were well known. 50
Next to Cox's house was that of his brother-in-law, Tho-
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mas A. Jones, who as already indicated was the Confederacy's
Chief Signal Agent. Cox hid the two men in a thicket until he
could arrange for Jones to take them across the Potomac. 50
Actually, although the area wasvirtuallycrawlingwith Union
cavalry, Booth and Herold went undiscovered for some nine

The escape route traveled by John Wilkes
Booth and David Herold.
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days. When Jones went to Port Tobacco, then the county seat,
he heard one detective in the barroom of the Brawner Hotel
say that he would give a $100,000 reward for information
leading to Booth's capture. 52 A week after the assassination,
when new rumors sent the federals hurrying into St. Mary's
County, Jones decided that the time had come to move his
guests. He then led Booth and Herold to a rowboat he had
hidden at Dent's Meadow about a mile north of Pope's Creek
on the Potomac. 53
On the night of April 21, Booth was helped into Jones'
rowboat with Herold at the oars. By morning they had not
reached the Virginia shore. They put in at a creek on the
Maryland side during daylight and when night came they
pushed off again and finally made the Virginia shore. There
they found a guide to the home of Dr. Richard H. Stuart, the
richest man in King George County and a relative of General
Robert E. Lee. However, Dr. Stuart wanted no part of these
visitors. He gave them a meal in the kitchen, "where they ate
in the fashion of a tramp given a handout,"" and then had
them put up for the night in a black man's cabin. Dr. Stuart
declined to attend to Booth's swollen and blackened leg. 55
When the two fugitives reached Port Conway, they learned
that the ferry to Port Royal would not come until the tide rose.
Meanwhile, three young Confederate soldiers rode up, whereupon Herold identified himself and Booth: "We are the
assassinators of the President." 56
Across the Rappahannock, in Port Royal, the two Peyton
sisters at first agreed to take in the fugitives, but then declined
and suggested that Booth and Herold move on to the farm of
Richard Garrett, who might take them in. 57
While Booth and Herold were guests at the Garrett property, Mr. Garrett said at the family's dinner that he did not
believe the assassination story. But a son, just back from
Appomattox, knew the facts from a Richmond paper. "One
hundred thousand dollars reward! That man had better not
come this way, for I would like to make $100,000 just now!" 58
Whereupon his father asked, "Would you do such a thing?
Betray him?""
Sentiment in Caroline County, Virginia was identical with
thatin Charles County, Maryland: no one in either area would
betray the assassin. But the pursuers, Colonel Everton J.
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Conger and a detachment from the 16th New York Cavalry
under the command of Captain Edward Doherty, nevertheless soon acquired information that led them to the Garrett
property. There they found Booth and Herold. Herold was
taken alive; whether the former was shot by himself or by
Sergeant Boston Corbett has never been determined. 60
II. FACTS BEARING ON MUDD'S GUILT
A. The Accusation
The charge against all eight of the alleged conspirators
whose trial commenced on May 9, 1865, was that they conspired with a number of others to kill and murder President
Abraham Lincoln, Vice President Andrew Johnson, Secretary
of State William E. Seward, and Lieutenant General Ulysses S.
Grant within the fortified and entrenched lines of the Military
Department of Washington. 61
The specification pertaining to Mudd alone alleged that
Mudd, at Washington City and within those military lines,
did, between March 6 and April 20, "advise, encourage,
receive, entertain, harbor, and conceal, aid and assist" 62 Booth
and the others 63 with knowledge of the conspiracy and with
the intent to aid, abet, and assist them in the execution thereof,
and in escaping from justice after the murder of the President
in pursuance of said conspiracy."
All the accused pleaded not guilty to both the charge and
the specifications involving them. Afterwards all the accused
moved for a severance, which was properly denied, 65 since it
is fundamentallaw that a single individual cannot be guilty of
being a conspirator. As Mr. Justice Cardozo said for the
Supreme Court in a later case, "It is impossible in the nature
of things for a man to conspire for himself .... In California as
elsewhere conspiracy imports a corrupt agreement between
not less than two with guilty knowledge on the part of each." 66
In the end, Mudd was convicted -except for the allegation of receiving, entertaining, harboring and concealing
Payne, John Surratt, Mrs. Surratt, O'Laughlin, Atzenrodt, and
Arnold. He was sentenced to life imprisonment. 67
B. Mudd's Earlier Relations with Booth and the Surratts
Dr. Mudd first met Booth in November 1864 through one
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Thompson, when Booth was in Charles County ostensibly to
buy land and a horse. He did purchase a horse. 68 Actually,
Booth was touring both to familiarize himself with escape
routes and to find a suitable mount, in connection with his
plan to kidnap President Lincoln.
Mudd and Booth met again, this time in Washington, in
the spring of 1865, although the precise date was disputed. It
was then that, at Booth's request, Mudd introduced him to
John H. Surratt, the professional spy. Booth and Surratt had
many private conversations afterwards." Surratt had frequently visited the Mudds in the summer of 1864, and Confederate soldiers in gray uniforms had frequently been seen
on the Mudd property. 70
As mentioned above, John's mother, Mrs. Mary E. Surratt,
owned a tavern in Surrattsville. After her husband died, she
established a boarding house at H Street, N.W., in Washington and leased the tavern to John M. Lloyd. Five or six weeks
before the assassination, Herold, Atzerodt, and John Surratt
visited the tavern and left two carbines, which Lloyd concealed under the joists of the main building's second floor.' 1
On the Tuesday before the assassination, Mrs. Surratt
came to the tavern and asked about the "shooting irons."
When Lloyd replied that they were hidden, she told him to get
them ready, that they would be needed soon. OnApril14, she
returned to tell Lloyd:
[T]o get those shooting irons ready that night, there
would be some parties who would call for them. She
gave [him] something wrapped in a piece of paper,
which ... [he] found to be a field glass. She told [him]
to get two bottles of whiskey ready, and that those
things were to be called for that night. 72
About midnight on April 14, Herold came to the tavern
and said, "Lloyd, for God's sake, make haste and get those
things."" Lloyd then gave Herold the carbines, whiskey, and
field glass.
Herold arrived at the tavern that night with a man Lloyd
did not know, who remained mounted on a large horse. The
man accepted a bottle of whiskey from Herold but declined
one of the carbines, saying he could not carry it because his leg
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was broken. As they were leaving Herold told Lloyd, "I am
pretty certain that we have assassinated the President and
Secretary Seward."" Herold gave Lloyd a single dollar bill
"which just about paid for the bottle of liquor they had just
pretty nearly drank." 75
C. Mudd's Knowledge of Booth's Identity on April15
When questioned later about the identity of the man
whose leg he had treated on April15, Dr. Mudd's replies were
contradictory and evasive. He seemed frightened, anxious,
uneasy, worried, and very much excited. 76 At first, Mudd told
investigators that his two visitors were strangers. It was only
later, after Mrs. Mudd had produced Booth's initialed boot
that her husband admitted an acquaintance with Booth, but
still he denied recognizing his patient. 77 Other interviews
with Dr. Mudd indicated that he was concealing facts in the
case. 78

After trial, on his way to Fort Jefferson to serve his life
sentence, Dr. Mudd finally admitted
that he knew Booth when he came to his house with
Herold, on the morning after the assassination of the
President; that he had known Booth for some time, but
he was afraid to tell of his having been at his house on
the 15th of April, fearing that his own and the lives of
his family would be endangered thereby. 79
Not a single witness before the Army Board for Correction of
Military Records in 1991, one of whom specifically said that
he was familiar with the Pitman edition of the trial proceedings,'0 ever mentioned that confession.
D. The Irrelevance of Mudd's Duty as a Physician
Much has been made of the assertion that all Mudd did
was perform his duty as a physician when faced with an
injured patient who came for help. The record of trial sets out
the scope of the assistance that Mudd gave Booth. The doctor
set Booth's leg, supplied him with a razor to shave off his
moustache81 (Booth on arrival had also worn a false beard 82 ),
supplied him with food, lodging 83 and a pair of crutches, 84
tried to get him a carriage, 85 showed Booth how to cross the
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swamp, and gave him a map of the Northern Neck of Virginia."
The normal measure of a medical doctor's duty is of
course the Hippocratic Oath. 87 But the text of that commitment does not justify all the steps that Mudd took for Booth's
benefit. Setting his leg, providing him with crutches, and even
seeking to provide a carriage to ease matters for one whose
further travel on horseback would necessarily be painful, can
all be deemed medical obligations. But assisting his caller to
disguise his normal appearance, providing the fugitive with
directions on how to avoid the roads by passing through the
Zekiah swamp, and giving him a map suitable for an illegal
crossing into hostile Virginia, can only be characterized as
aiding and abetting, as being an accessory after the fact, and
as tending to prove participation in the earlier conspiracy to
harm the President.
Moreover, Mudd had, at Booth's request, already introduced him to John Surratt,BB who was known to be a Confederate spy, 89 and who had frequently been a guest at Mudd's
home, 90 in an area much frequented by Confederate deserters.91

Consequently, Mudd's conduct, far from justified by the
Hippocratic Oath, shows he had actually forsworn it. Indeed,
that solemn pledge directs the new physician to "practice
your art in uprightness and honor ... holding yourselves far
aloof from wrong, from corruption.""
Mudd and his partisans have long insisted the doctor did
no more than his profession required for any injured stranger.
That might be true if Mudd had never before seen the man
whose leg was broken; it might also be true if the doctor had
recognized his patient only as John Wilkes Booth, the wellknown actor and not John Wilkes Booth, the hunted assassin.
But why did Mudd lie to questioners, saying that he never
recognized the supplicant? What was there about Booth on
the early morning of AprillS that induced Mudd to prevaricate? The only logical inference is that Mudd lied because he
knew Booth had just assassinated the President. Only Booth's
admission of his acts could have led to Mudd's fear that, if he
admitted knowing Booth's identity, his own and his family's
lives would be in danger.
Mudd's repeated denials prove Mudd knowingly shielded
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the assassin Booth and his henchman Herold from capture.
The only conflict with a physician's oath came therefore from
the physician's own criminal conduct, and the Hippocratic
Oath cannot- even morally- justify Dr. Samuel A. Mudd,
the prevaricator, the accessory, the co-conspirator."
III. CREATION, DEVELOPMENT, AND JURISDICTION
OF THE MILITARY COMMISSION
A. Original Creation During the Mexican War
Shortly after arriving in Mexico as commander of all
American troops then engaged in the war with that country,
Major General Winfield Scott (as he then was) issued his
"Martial Law" order, which had two objectives. First, he
found it necessary to punish the ill-behaved volunteers who
were actually completely out of control once they crossed the
Rio Grande. Second, he recognized the need for protecting his
own forces against offenses committed by the local population. Accordingly, first at Tampico and later at other places,
he created the military commission to deal with both classes
of incidents. 94
Scott had been educated as a lawyer, and practiced his
profession for a few years. 95 But as hostilities with Britain
over the impressment of American seamen loomed ever nearer,
Scott became more interested in a military career, and after a
meeting with President Jefferson, he was commissioned as a
captain of light artillery."
It is therefore safe to conclude that Scott's creation of the
military commission97 reflected, not what he had read and
learned from Professor St. George Tucker at the College of
William and Mary nor in the law office of David Robertson at
Petersburg, but from his experiences and from his wide reading on military matters in his nearly forty years of service as
a commissioned officer in the United States Army. 98
B. Reappearance of the Commission in the Civil War
When the Civil War began, the Army's senior officers
looked for guidance back to their Mexican War experiences
and procedures. Accordingly, on January 1,1862, Major General Henry W. Halleck, commanding the Department of Missouri, declared in General Orders No. 1 of that headquarters
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that the many offenses which, in time of peace, are civil
offenses, became, in time of war, military offenses, and were
to be tried by a military tribunal, even in places where civil
tribunals existed."
General Halleck had been Secretary of State in the military
government established for the Mexican territories that eventually became California. Thus, he was thoroughly familiar
with General Scott's practice, pursuant to which numerous
offenders had been tried by military commissions. Finding
civilians in Missouri quite as obstreperous as the former
Mexican civilians had been, Halleck also concluded that the
courts of Missouri were equally ineffective. Accordingly, he
ordered trial by military commission for any person suspected of aiding the Confederacy. 100
But, when the record of trial by military commission at
General Halleck's direction of Colonel Ebenezer Magoffin,
C.S.A., reached the War Department, it came to the desk of the
Judge Advocate of the Army, Brevet Major John Fitzgerald
Lee, who had been appointed to the office created by Congress in 1849,'01 and he held that military commissions were
without authority and illegal. 102
Obviously this would not do. By July 1862, General Halleck
was ordered to Washington as General-in-Chief, vice the
overly timorous McClellan. Shortly thereafter, Congress legislated Major J.F. Lee out of office by substituting for his
position as Judge Advocate of the Army that of Judge Advocate General of the Army, with rank, pay and allowances of a
colonel of cavalry. 103
C. Judge Advocate General Holt and the Development of
the Military Commission
To the new post the President appointed Joseph Holt of
Kentucky, effective September 3, 1862, and on September 4,
Major John Fitzgerald Lee, a Virginian and 1834 graduate of
the United States Military Academy, resigned from the
Army.Io4
Holt, a Democrat, was sufficiently prominent in his profession and in his party to be thrice appointed to high office by
President Buchanan, first as Commissioner of Patents, next as
Postmaster General, and finally, from January 18 to March 5,
1861, as Secretary of War. Once South Carolina's Ordinance
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of Secession was passed, he became a firm Unionist of inflexible belief in the righteousness of the Union cause. Thus he
was then an all too rare specimen, a convinced War Democrat,
and one who contributed substantially to persuading Kentucky to shift from neutrality to support of the Union. 105
It was Holt who truly developed the military commission
into an instrumentality that enabled military authorities to
arrest, try, convict, and keep confined many persons who
would otherwise have been released by the civil courts.
In the War Department's General Orders No. 100, published on April23, 1863, "Instructions for the Government of
Armies of the United States in the Field" (which were primarily composed by Dr. Francis Lieber), the military commission
was formally recognized as the proper tribunal under the
laws of war to deal with cases that were not covered by the
Articles of War but that were derived from the common law
of war. 106
Holt was legislatively promoted to brigadier general and
to head of the newly established Bureau of Military Justice in
mid-1864 and eventually, on "the bloody 13th of March,
1865," brevetted major general"for faithful, meritorious and
distinguished service in the Bureau of Military Justice during
the war." 107
General Holt not only headed the Bureau of Military
Justice during the Civil War, but also presided at the trial of
Major General Fitz-John Porter, charged with disobedience of
orders at the second Battle of Bull Run, in consequence of
which the accused was cashiered (sentenced never again to
serve in any military capacity). 108 Likewise, Holt was judge
advocate of the military commission that tried the eight conspirators in the Lincoln Assassination, while helped in that
task by two assistant judge advocates. 109
D. Conflicting Contemporary Opinions on the Power of a
Military Commission to try the Lincoln Assassination
Conspirators""
The military commission's trial of the Lincoln assassination conspirators began on May 9, 1865, and concluded on
June 30 of the same year with the announcement of its findings and sentences. 111 On July 5, President Johnson approved
all of them, directing that the four sentenced to hang -
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Atzerodt, Herold, Payne and Mrs. Surratt- be executed on
July 7. 112
Earlier on that last day, there was filed on behalf of Mrs.
Surratt a petition for a writ of habeas corpus, an application that
was denied by a judge of the Supreme Court of the District of
Columbia because of the President's suspension of the writ. 113
Accordingly, the executions were duly carried out as ordered.114
On April 3, 1866, the United States Supreme Court announced the result in Ex parte Milligan, 115 after which, on
December 14, 1866, both the opinions of the Court and that of
the four concurring justices were deliveredY 6
After Booth's co-conspirators had been rounded up, Attorney General James Speed on April 28, 1865, sent this one
sentence opinion to President Johnson: "I am of opinion that
the persons charged with the murder of the President of the
United States can rightfully be tried by a military court." 117
Although containing no reasoningwhatever, and the shortest formal opinion ever written by any Attorney General, 118
this sufficed for President Johnson to direct the trial of the
eight conspirators by military commission. 119
Of course the jurisdiction of the military commission was
questioned at the trial, and, needless to state, was sustained
by that tribunal.!'' Senator Reverdy Johnson of Maryland,
representing Mrs. Surratt at the trial, made one of the arguments attacking jurisdiction, 121 while Thomas Ewing, Jr., representing Dr. Mudd,l 22 made another. 123
Inasmuch as Ewing had, while serving as a brigadier
general in the Union Army, issued the notorious General
Orders No. 11, under which some 20,000 refugees were expelled from four Missouri counties which were said to have
sustained the notorious Confederate guerrilla band commanded by William C. Quantrill,l 24 it was indeed an ironic
touch for him to attack military jurisdiction. This point was
made to the commission by the special judge advocate, John
A. Bingham, Esquire, who delivered the closing argument for
the prosecution. 125
After the four conspirators sentenced to death had been
hanged on July 7, Attorney General Speed produced a second
opinion, dated July 1865 (without mention of any particular
day)Y 6 In that essentially ex post facto expression he said:
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At the time of the assassination the Civil War was
flagrant, the city of Washington was defended by
fortifications regularly and constantly manned, the
principal police of the city was by Federal soldiers,
public offices and property in the city were all guarded
by soldiers, and the President's House and person
were, or should have been, under the guard of soldiers.
Martial law had been declared in the District of
Columbia, but the civil courts were open and transacted
business as in times of peace. 127
Ben Perley Poore wrote, in the introduction to his own
edition of the evidence as given at the trial, words that
reflected the bitter community feelings against the conspirators in language only slightly paraphrasing the Attorney
General's second opinion:
The assassination of Abraham Lincoln was a military
crime. While actually in command of the national
forces, he was killed in a city which was his headquarters, strongly fortified and garrisoned, with a
military governor, and a provost-marshal whose
patrols were abroad day and night arresting all persons
found violating the rules and articles of war. Not only
was the murdered commander-in-chief, to use the
words of the Constitution, 'in actual service in time of
war,' but it was a time of 'public danger,' in which the
assassins were excluded from any right to trial in the
civil courts. 128
There was nothing at all imaginary about the city of
Washington's closeness to the war. Only nine months prior to
the assassination, in mid-July of 1864, a substantial Confederate force under Lieutenant General Jubal A. Early had left the
Shenandoah Valley in Virginia, captured Frederick, Maryland, and reached Fort Stevens, near the Soldiers' Horne and
so far inside the District of Columbia that the Capitol's dome
was visible. 129
But Washington in July of 1864 was vastly different from
the same community in May of 1865. While rebel troops had
penetrated the defenses of the Union capital the year before,
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a Union army now occupied Richmond. Lee had surrendered
at Appomattox, Johnston in North Carolina was about to do
the same, and the end of the Confederate forces west of the
Mississippi was simply a matter of mopping up.
In those changed circumstances the most serious criticisms of Speed's opinions and of the military trial of the
assassin-conspirators came from Speed's predecessor as Attorney General of the United States, Edward Bates. Here are
excerpts from his wartime diary: "[My] successor ... has been
wheedled out of an opinion to the effect that such a trial [by
military commission] is lawful. ... [He] must have known
better. Such a trial is not only unlawful, but it is a great
blunder ofpolicy." 130 And when Mr. Bates saw Speed's July
1865 opinion, he used five and one half pages of print, dated
August 21, for a point-by-point rebuttal of what his predecessor had written. 131
Edward Bates was not alone in entertaining an unfavorable view of Speed's legal talents. Mr. Justice Miller of the
Supreme Court, on the day before the arguments in the
Milligan case (in which Speed was to participate) had begun,
wrote in a private letter about Speed: "[T]he session of the
Court has developed his utter want of ability as a lawyer [h]e is certainly one of the feeblest men who has addressed the
Court this term." 132
Senator Thomas Ewing, Sr. advised President Johnson to
the same effect on March 15, 1866:
It is of the utmost importance that you have a stronger
man in that place- It is due to yourself and also to the

Court, for Mr. Speed is not a competent legal adviser
especially on the present critical condition of affairsI know that the Court does not rely on him. 133
The precise number of trials by military commissions
during the Civil War remains unclear. Winthrop, whose
service as a judge advocate commenced on July 28, 1864,'34
estimated there had been upwards of 2,000 such trials during
that period; a later author, writing nearly a century afterwards, fixed the figure at 4,271, more than half of which took
place in the strife-torn border states of Missouri, Kentucky,
and Maryland. 135 There the matter must rest for the moment.
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IV. THE MILLIGAN CASE
Shortly after the Hunter Commission's trial of the Lincoln
assassination co-conspirators, the United States Supreme Court
was presented an opportunity to pass on the legality of
another well-publicized case in which civilian citizens of a
free state were convicted and condemned to death by a military commission. The Court's stinging rebuke of this use of
military tribunals, coming so quickly on the heels of the
Hunter Commission's verdicts, was, then and since, brandished as another sign of the illegality of Dr. Mudd's trial.
However, a careful look at the Court's opinion in Ex parte
Milligan 136 shows that its bombast outweighs its persuasion.
A. Who Were the Copperheads?
Copperheads were almost exclusively Democrats who
were willing to let the Confederate States leave the Union and
hence sought the end of hostilities. "The stealthiest, most
venomous serpent of the prairies ... lay in hiding, struck
without warning, and his sting was death. The anti-slavery
men and other ardent Unionists employed the title of the
reptile to denounce the enemies they deemed traitors. " 137 But
the men so designated "regarded themselves as lovers of
liberty. They were determined to cut the Liberty head out of
the penny, affix a pin to it, and wear the copper Liberty head
on lapel or shirt as a badge of true respect for the Constitution
and the Union." 138
The military portion of the Copperheads was known as
the Order of American Knights. Its members wished to form
a Northwest Confederacy, to ally itself with that of the South.
They planned to attack all Union installations that held Confederate prisoners of war, and collected arms for that purpose. They were particularly strong in the area of the old
Northwest Territory: Ohio, Illinois, and Indiana. But in that
latter state they encountered Governor Oliver P. Morton, who
was truly the dictator of Indiana. 139
The critical year, according to George Fort Milton, was
1864, and his narrative makes it easy to follow the Northwest
Conspiracy and the means that the procUnion forces used,
first to infiltrate the O.A.K. ranks, and then to nullify their
planned attacks. What Union agents discovered led to the
Indiana treason trials and, ultimately, to Ex parte Milligan
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which freed the three conspirators whom the military commission had sentenced to hang. Those three were Lambdin P.
Milligan, Dr. William A. Bowles, and Stephen Horsey.
B. Trial of Milligan et a!. by Military Commission
The full text of their trial by military commission was
published in 1865 by Benn Pitman, 140 the same who later
reported the trial of the Lincoln Conspirators, and was afterwards reprinted verbatim in Samuel Klaus' The Milligan Case
in 1929. 141 As has been seen, Mr. Milton condensed the
proceedings into narrative form, with considerable emphasis
on the reactions of the accused when a number of their closest
associates, who were actually secret Union agents, suddenly
appeared as vital prosecution witnesses against them. There
were five charges against Milliganet al.: (1) conspiracy against
the government of the United States, four specifications; (2)
affording aid and comfort to rebels against the authority of
the United States, three specifications; (3) inciting insurrection, two specifications; (4) disloyal practices, five specifications; and (5) violations of the laws of war, two specifications.'"
After examining the testimony, Mr. Klaus concluded that
"the men were guilty of the charges made there can be little
room for dispute, nor that there was in fact ground for a civil
indictment for treason." 143
True enough, but the fact that Indiana was up to its neck
in Copperheads meant that, if the accused had been tried in a
civil court, a single individual on a jury could block conviction. And, if any one troubles to read the 1864 case of Griffin
v. Wilcox,'" an opinion emanating from Indiana's Supreme
Court, he will find that Copperhead sentiments were well
reflected among the members of that state's highest judicial
tribunal.
In Indiana, therefore, only a military tribunal, from which
Copperheads were certain to be excluded, would be able to
ascertain objectively the guilt or innocence of this collection of
accused individuals.
Appeals for clemency were discussed with President Lincoln even before any sentences had been adjudged, but after
his assassination, President Johnson approved the three death
sentences and ordered them executed on May 11, 1865. 145
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Meanwhile, counsel for Milligan et al. sought a writ of habeas
corpus from the United States Circuit Court in Indianapolis
and pressed further appeals for clemency to President Johnson.
He was persuaded to commute all three sentences to life
imprisonment. 146
In the circuit court, action on the petitions for the writ
went forward. After the close of the hearing, Justice Davis and
District Judge McDonald certified that they differed in opinion, and this under the law then in force automatically brought
the case to the Supreme Court on writ of error. 147 Here were
the questions presented: First, on the facts set out, viz., the
entire record before the military trial, should the writ be
issued? Second, ought Milligan et a!. be discharged? Third,
did the military commission have jurisdiction legally to try
Milligan and his fellows?
C. The Supreme Court Decision

Here we come to the Supreme Court's ultimate determination, and we see once again the mischief that can result from
wholly unnecessary dicta, some of which were still in every
lawyer's recollection when the Milligan case was filed in the
Supreme Court on December 27, 1865. 148
Every lawyer recollected the notorious Dred Scott case/ 49
which could have been decided solely on the footing that,
since Dred Scott as a Negro could not become a citizen, his suit
was not within the diversity jurisdiction of the circuit court.
Instead, the Supreme Court undertook in that case to settle the
slavery question judicially, affirming the liberty of a slaveowning citizen to bring his slave into any territory of the
United Statesiso
The Milligan case, likewise, could also have been disposed
of without unwarranted excursions into hypothetical areas
had the Court rested its determination on a statute of which
all of its members were fully aware, and which clearly pointed
the way to a result identical with the one actually reached.
Sections two and three of the Habeas Corpus Act of March
3, 1863, 151 provided in substance that, when a citizen of a state
where the courts are open is arrested or confined by order of
the President or of the Secretaries of State or War, those
officers are directed to furnish the United States courts in such
states with lists of the persons held as prisoners because ofthe
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commission of crimes against the United States, and when the
grand juries in such districts have terminated their sessions
without finding an indictment, such persons shall within
twenty days be released from custody upon taking an oath of
allegiance to the government of the United States, and to
support the Constitution thereof, and that he or she will not
hereafter in any way encourage or give aid and comfort to the
present rebellion or to the supporters thereof. 152
Accordingly, deference to the Habeas Corpus Act would
have sufficed to dispose of the cases of Milligan, Bowles, and
Horsey; all else that was said on both sides of the 5-4 decision
was dictum elaborated into emotional stump speeches. That
conclusion is not in any sense a revisionist evaluation formulated a century and a quarter after the event; it represented
contemporary professional opinion of the most thoughtful
character. Indeed, that was the view of the new American Law
Review, edited by John Chipman Gray and John C. Ropes of
Boston. 153
Where the two Supreme Court opinions in the Milligan
case differed was on the issue of whether Congress could ever
authorize trial of crime by military commission. But, as
Professor Fairman wrote, "[I]t was Executive action against
which Milligan sought relief: yet the opinion managed to rule
against Congress in respect of pending matters about which
Congress felt most concerned and most sensitive," 154 namely
the need to protect freedmen against homicide or other violence in the former Confederate state courts and whether the
only foreseeable remedy for the existing situation would be
the enactment of legislation to authorize a full-blown Reconstruction regime.
Justice Davis had consistently opposed military trial of
civilians by military tribunals and their military arrest and the
suppression of newspapers, making those views available to
President Lincoln. 155 Now, however, he had an unlimited
audience, and was able to speak from the very highest seat of
authority:
During the late wicked Rebellion, the temper of the
times did not allow that calmness in deliberation and
discussion so necessary to a correct cone! us ion of a
purely judicial question. Then, considerations of safety
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were mingled with the exercise of power; such feelings
and interests prevailed which are happily terminated.
Now that the public safety is assured, this question, as
well as all others, can be discussed and decided without
passion or the admixture of any element not required
to form a legal judgment. We approach the
investigation of this case, fully sensible of the
magnitude of the inquiry and the necessity of full and
cautious deliberation. 156
In due course, Justice Davis warmed up to his subject, in
language that has been regularly repeated ever since:
The Constitution of the United States is a law for rulers
and people, equally in war and in peace, and covers
with the shield of its protection all classes of men, at all
times, and under all circumstances. No doctrine,
involving more pernicious consequences, was ever
intended by the wit of man than that any of its
provisions can be suspended during any of the great
exigencies of government. Such a doctrine leads
directly to anarchy or despotism, but the theory of
necessity on which it based is false; for the government,
within the Constitution, has all the powers granted to
it, which are necessary to preserve its existence; as has
been happily proved by the result of the great effort to
throw off its just authority. 157
Chief Justice Chase for the minority agreed with the result, but disagreed that Congress lacked power ever to authorize trial by military commission. He said:
We cannot doubt that, in such a time of public danger,
Congress had power, under the Constitution, to
provide for the organization of a military commission,
and for the trial by that commission of persons engaged
in this conspiracy. The fact that the Federal courts
were open was regarded by Congress as a sufficient
reason for not exercising the power; but that fact could
not deprive Congress of the right to exercise it. Those
courts might be open and undisturbed in the execution
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of their functions, and yet wholly incompetent to avert
threatened danger, or to punish, with adequate
prornptihtde and certainty, the guilty conspirators.158

***
We have no apprehension that this power, under our
American system of government, in which all offiCial
authority is derived from the people, and exercised
under direct responsibility to the people, is more likely
to be abused than the power to regulate commerce, or
the power to borrow money. And we are unwilling to
give our assent by silence to expressions of opinion
which seem to us calculated, though not intended, to
cripple the constitutional powers of the government,
and to augment the public dangers in times of invasion
and rebellion. 159
From 1866 to 1940, military-legal opinion differed sharply
on which of the two conflicting sets of dicta correctly expressed the state of the law. Colonel Winthrop was certain
that the better reason lay with the minority.160 His chief, Judge
Advocate General G. Norman Lieber (son of the Dr. Francis
Lieber who framed General Orders No. 100), 161 was equally
positive that only the majority had expressed sound constitutional doctrine. 162 Chief Justice Hughes, in the interim between his two terms of service on the Court, said in 1917,
"Certainly the test should not be a mere physical one, nor
should substance be sacrificed to form." 163 And back in 1940,
the present author published a work that, it is believed ,
correctly set out the state of the law at that time. 164
Seventy years ago, Charles Warren, an earlier historian of
the Supreme Court, called Davis' words an "immortal opinion," "one of the bulwarks of American history," and " the
palladium of the rights of the individual." 165
Fairman himself calls Davis' s tatement" as fine a sentence
as can be found anywhere in the United States Reports ." 166
D. Milligan Does Not Accurately Portray Today's Law
Unhappily Justice Davis' emotional stem-winder about
the Constitution being always the same in war and peace is
demonstrably not the law in the 1990s- nor has it been for
more than three-quarters of a century. It seems appropriate to
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append a list.
1. In the fall of 1916, Congress hastily passed a railroad
eight-hour work law to avert a nationwide railroad strike.
This was at a time when trucks and planes were not yet
available to transport people or products. The Court sustained the act as being within the congressional power to
regulate commerce in Wilson v. New. 167 What is notable about
the decision is that the dissenters quoted David Davis'
dithyramb about the irrelevance of emergencies.
2. The year 1934 brought up the Minnesota mortgage
moratorium law in Home Building and Loan Ass'n v. Blaisde/1.1 68
That legislation was upheld five to four, on the footing that,
"while emergency does not create power, emergency may
furnish the occasion for the exercise of power. " 169 The minority of four who believed that Minnesota lacked the power to
relieve mortgagors quoted the immortal passage from Justice
Davis' Milligan opinion- immortal but quite unavailing.
Indeed, once wartime cases are examined, some from the
First World War but most of them from the Second, it will be
found that much is authorized in time of war that is wholly
impermissible in time of peace, notably in the area of economic regulation.
Here are a baker's dozen of cases that wholly contradict
"as fine a sentence that can be found anywhere in the United
States Reports." 170
(a) Rent and price control. Block v. Hirsh, 256 U.S. 135
(1921); Chastleton Corp. v. Sinclair, 264 U.S. 543 (1924); Yakus v.
United States, 321 U.S. 414 (1944); Bowles v. Willingham, 321
U.S. 503 (1944); Woods v. Cloyd W. Miller Co., 333 U.S. 138
(1948).
(b) Renegotiation of contracts. Lichter v. United States, 334
u.s. 742 (1948).
(c) Wartime prohibition. Hamilton v. Kentucky Distilleries
& Warehouse Co., 251 U.S. 146 (1919); Ruppertv. Caffey, 251 U.S.
264 (1920).
(d) Seizure of enemy property. Miller v. United States, 78
U.S. (11 Wall.) 268 (1870); Stoehr v. Wallace, 255 U.S. 239 (1921);
Central Union Trust Co. v. Garvan, 254 U.S. 554 (1921); Silesian
American Corp. v. Clark, 332 U.S. 469 (1947).
(e) Suppression of houses of ill-fame within the States.
McKinley v. United States, 249 U.S. 397 (1919) (although this
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would impinge on what would otherwise be exclusively the
subject of state police power. Keller v. United States, 213 U.S.
138 (1909)).
Mention has already been made of the German saboteurs'
case, Ex parte Quirin, decided in 1942.'71 There, it should be
noted, what they did was not in violation of any United States
statute for which they could have been indicted by a federal
grand jury. In Quirin, the Supreme Court held Milligan
"inapplicable to the case presented by the present record,"
and specifically overruled a passage therein that it deemed
too exuberant. 172
All ofthe foregoing decisions antedate Mr. King's biography of Justice Davis, which was published in 1960, and which
actually cites Ex parte Quirin. 173
Instead, Mr. King continues his erroneous hagiography of
Ex parte Milligan:
In subsequent wars, the administration has again and
again urged the Supreme Court to repudiate the
Milligan case, but it still stands in all the grandeur of its
original utterance. 174

***
Davis' great contribution to constitutional law was the
Milligan decision that ended military trials of civilians
in theN orth. He maneuvered to get the case before the
Supreme Court and then delivered the opinion that
forever put an end to such trials. 'The Constitution of
the United States is a law for rulers and people, equally
in war and in peace.' Those nineteen words and the
eternal place in history of the friend he made President
must remain the Judge's monument. 175
At this point it should also be noted that even Chief Justice
Chase's minority opinion now requires amendment. 176 He
recited three recognized heads of military jurisdiction:
(a) Military law, the code governing the armed forces
(e.g., Toth v. Quarles, 350 U.S. 11 (1955); Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S.
1 (1957); O'Callahan v. Parker, 395 U.S. 258 (1969); Solorio v.
United States, 483 U.S. 435 (1987)).
(b) Military government, where the military occupant in
time of war supersedes the local government (e.g., United
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States v. Rice, 4 Wheat. 246 (1819), through a host of decisions
arising out of the Mexican, Civil, and Spanish Wars, down to
Madsen v. Kinsella, 343 U.S. 341 (1952), involving occupied
Germany after World War II).
(c) Martial law (or, more accurately, martial rule), involving the temporary suspension of civil rule by military authority when required by necessity (e.g., Ex parte Milligan, 71 U.S.
(4 Wall.) 2 (1866); Duncan v. Kahanamoku, 327 U.S. 304 (1946)).
Now there must be added a fourth head of military jurisdiction- the international law of war -long recognized, but
never considered by American civil courts until during and
after World War Two (e.g., Ex parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1 (1942);
Yamashita v. Styer, 327 U.S. 1 (1946); Homma v. Patterson, 327
U.S. 759 (1946); Johnson v. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763 (1950)).
Contemporaneously, however, Lambdin P. Milligan did
recover when he sued for damages the officer who had appointed the military commission that tried him and sentenced
him to be hanged. He was ultimately successful, but hardly
satisfied: the jury only awarded him five dollars. 177
Perhaps a note should be included here, simply for the
sake of completeness, about the post-Milligan trials by military commission under the Reconstruction Acts. It is estimated that, from the end of April 1866 to January 1, 1869,
another 1,435 trials by military commission took place, tapering off as time passed; in 1869 and 1870, they occurred only in
Texas and Mississippi. 178
When the legality of such military trials under the Reconstruction Acts 179 might have come again before the Supreme
Court for decision/80 adjudication was forestalled, in one
instance by a legislative withdrawal of appellate jurisdiction, lB1 in the other by a release of the petitioner from the
challenged custody. In effect, the second case was settled after
the readmission of Mississippi to representation in Congress. 182
E. Deciding Wartime Cases After Cessation of Hostilities
By 1866, when Ex parte Milligan reached the Supreme
Court, the Civil War was over. At least some of the bitterness
associated with four years of all-out war had diminished, and
the way seemed clear for the highest court in the land to
determine once and for all the powers of military tribunals to
try and to punish persons who were not members of the
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armed forces or individuals accused of spying.
As we have seen, much that was said in both Milligan
opinions has not withstood the test of time. But in Milligan the
government had no choice but to defend what had been done.
It was otherwise in Duncan v. Kahanamoku and its companion
case, White v. Steer, argued on Pearl Harbor Day in 1945, and
decided on February 25, 1946. 183 Both cases involved trials of
civilians by military courts in the territory of Hawaii, which
was under martial law pursuant to the Hawaiian Organic Act
of 1900."4
White was a civilian stockbroker found guilty of that
occupational disease, embezzling a client's funds. He was
tried and convicted by a military provost court on August 25,
1942, and sentenced to five years' imprisonment. Duncan was
a civilian ship-fitter who quarreled with two armed marine
sentries at the gate of the Pearl Harbor Navy Yard. On March
3, 1944, he was brought before a provost court and sentenced
to six months' confinement in the Honolulu County jail for the
offense of assault and battery against military personnel.
The writ of habeas corpus had been suspended on December 7, 1941, by the Territorial governor acting with authority
delegated by Congress in the Organic Act. 185 Believing the
suspension to have been lifted by the governor on February 8,
1943, the district court entertained petitions for the Great Writ
filed on behalfofboth White and Duncan. The court went on
to order both released on the ground that military jurisdiction
over civilians was no longer warranted by the provost court
by the time of their trials. 186 The U.S. Court of Appeals for the
Ninth Circuit reversed, en banc, 187 assuming without deciding that the writ suspension had been lifted, but disagreeing
with the court below over the propriety of military jurisdiction over civilians at the time White and Duncan were brought
to trial.
Before V-J Day could come, marking the end of hostilities,
the Supreme Court granted both White's and Duncan's petitions for writ of certiorari. At this point, the government had
a five judge Ninth Circuit decision in its favor. Had it then
remitted the remaining sentences of the two petitioners, their
contentions would have been moot, as had been Yerger's
contention in 1870. 188 Unhappily, however, the Government's
position was, "We've gotto back up the theater commander." 189
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Result? They backed him right into the rapidly revolving
buzz-saw of a stunning reversal, written by Justice Black for
the Court. Chief Justice Stone concurred in the result, being
of the opinion that, on the facts presented, there was no
adequate showing of necessity to support a military trial.
Justices Burton and Frankfurter dissented 190 Their reasons
were thatthe result would have been wholly differentif on the
days that the two petitioners had been tried, in 1942 and 1944,
the Supreme Court had been asked on proper pleadings to
oust the two military courts of their claimed jurisdiction. 191
V. EFFORTS AFTER 1865 TO SET ASIDE MUDD'S
CONVICTION
A. Habeas Corpus Proceedings
Four of the Lincoln assassination conspirators - Mrs.
Surratt, Atzerodt, Herold, and Payne -were hanged. The
other four - Mudd, O'Laughlin, Spangler and Arnold were sentenced to imprisonment at hard labor: Arnold for six
years, the other three for life, ultimately in the military prison
at Fort Jefferson in the Dry Tortugas, Florida.~'' Those four
were advised of their destination on July 22, 1865. 193
A few days before December 19,1866, after the announcement of the Milligan decision, but before the opinions had
been made public, Mudd, represented by Reverdy Johnson
and the latter's son-in-law, made application for a writ of
habeas corpus to Mr. Justice Wayne, whose circuit included
Florida, the place of confinement. Failing there/" counsel
turned to Chief Justice Chase, whose circuit did not cover that
state. Argument was heard, whereupon the Chief Justice
denied the application, on the view that "he had no power
himself to issue such a writ to be executed outside his own
circuit. " 195
Dr. Mudd accordingly stayed at Fort Jefferson, where
presently he rendered heroic service during an epidemic of
yellow fever that carried off many soldiers and also
O'Laughlin, a co-conspirator, who died on September 23,
1867.196
On July 4, 1868, President Johnson extended amnesty to all
those who had participated in the late rebellion, whereupon
Mudd applied to District Judge Thomas J. Boynton of the
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Southern District of Florida for a writ of habeas corpus. So did
his remaining co-conspirators, Arnold and Spangler. 197
Judge Boynton's opinion, dated September 1868, makes
three substantive points. First, he held Mudd's offense to be
a military one for these reasons:
I do not think that Ex parte Milligan is a case in point
here. There is nothing in the opinion of the Court in
that case, nor in the third article of the Constitution,
nor in the Habeas Corpus Act of 1863, to lead to the
conclusion that if an army had been encamped in the
State of Indiana, (whether in the immediate presence
of the enemy or not), and any person, a resident of
Indiana or any other state (enlisted Soldier or not) had,
not from any private animosity, but from public
reasons, made his way within the Army lines and
assassinated the Commanding General, such a person
could not have been legally tried for his military offense
by a military tribunal and legally convicted and
sentenced.

***
The President was assassinated not from private
animosity nor any other reason than a desire to impair
the effectiveness of military operations and enable the
rebellion to establish itself into a Government; the act
was committed in a fortified city, which had been
invaded during the war, and to the northward as well
as the southward of which battles had many times
been fought, which was the headquarters of all the
armies of the United States, from which daily and
hourly went military orders. The President is the
Commander in Chief of the Army, and the President
who was killed had many times made distinct military
orders under his own hand, without the formality of
employing the Secretary of War or Commanding
General. It was not Mr. Lincoln who was assassinated
but the Commander in Chief of the Army, for military
reasons. I find no difficulty, therefore, in classing the
offense as a military one and with this opinion arrive
at the necessary conclusion that the proper tribunal for
the trial of those engaged in it was a military one. 198
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Actually, the foregoing rationale is far more convincing
than anything ever written by Attorney General Speed. 199
Secondly, Judge Boynton held that the three petitioners
were not comprehended within the President's amnesty and
pardon of July 4, 1868:
[T]hat proclamation plainly excludes all persons
standing in the position of these petitioners, whether
they have been convicted or not. It pardons the crime
of treason; that is, it pardons persons who have levied
war against the United States, or given aid and comfort
to their enemies, within the laws and usages of war;
but it pardons no person who has transgressed the
laws of war, no spy, no assassin, no person who has
been guilty of barbarous treatment of prisoners. Let us
bring out the point by a supposed case. Two soldiers
or officers fight side by side in the same battle; their
forces remain masters of the field. After the battle, one
conducts himself in an unimportant manner, and the
other sabres the wounded or prisoners. They are both
guilty of treason, but one is guilty of treason with an
important plus-sign added. It is the opinion of the
Court that the proclamation of the President reaches
one of these cases and not the other.
***
I think it is clear that the President, wishing no longer
to make other than necessary exceptions, and to pardon
all who were only guilty of participating in the
rebellion, purposely chose this language to effect his
purpose, and no other one. I do not see that under it a
person who transgressed the laws of war, who was
guilty not only of treason but of additional military
crimes, may not still be tried for additional crimes 200
And, finally, Judge Boynton found that the petitioners'
contentions based on insufficiency of evidence were beyond
the scope of any relief available in a habeas corpus proceeding. 2m
Later, on February 9 and 12, 1869, counsel for the three
unsuccessful petitioners before Judge Boynton sought and
obtained leave to file petitions for habeas corpus on the Su-
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preme Court. The Court's order invited argument on the
question whether its jurisdiction in respect of the writ of
habeas corpus was original or appellate. 202
We may pass by both the latter procedural questions fairly
presented when the cases were argued on February 26, 1869,
as well as the substantive question of the military commission's
jurisdiction in the trial of the assassination conspirators, because, in actuality, no decision was ever reached. On March
1, 1869, just before leaving office, President Johnson pardoned all of the petitioners then before the Court. When their
counsel brought this fact to the Court's attention, their petitions were dismissed, as none of them still remained in custody.zo3
B. Application to the Army Board for the Correction of
Military Records
After the Judge Advocate General of the Army and the
Army's General Counsel had both ruled that the Army Board
for Correction of Military Records could entertain an application to correct Dr. Mudd's record by setting aside his conviction, such an application (No. AC91-05511), asking that Dr.
Mudd be declared innocent, was filed in 1991 by a grandson,
Dr. Richard Dyer Mudd, himself a nonagenarian. 204
A hearing before the Board was held on January 22,
1992. 205 In the course of that hearing, the applicant said:
I always think that Dr. Mudd had three strikes against
him, and I might have to be really excused for saying
this. He was first a slave owner. Secondly he was a
Catholic at a time when the Pope was accused of
causing the Lincoln assassination, and three of the
conspirators had attended Georgetown University, a
Catholic school including my grandfather; and of
course, Mrs. Surratt was a Catholic .. And the third
thing is, his name was Mudd. That was the worst. 206
Six months after the conclusion of the hearing, the board
held that, while it was not authorized to consider the guilt or
innocence of Dr. Mudd, it could, looking to Ex parte Milligan,
determine whether the military commission that tried Dr.
Mudd had jurisdiction to do so.
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Nothing in the Board's conclusions indicated the slightest
awareness on its part that the actual Milligan opinion rested
on sections 2 and 3 of the Habeas Corpus Act of March 3,
1863;207 or that what was said about the jurisdiction vel non of
the tribunal was purest dictum; 208 or that what the Court's
opinion had announced in its flowing language was no longer
law in 1992. 209
Again, there is nothing in what counsel told the Board or
in anything that the Board wrote to reflect the slightest familiarity with Judge Boynton's opinion in Ex parte Mudd, the only
judicial opinion directly on point. 210 Nonetheless, the Board
concluded that Dr. Mudd's trial by military commission" constituted such a gross infringement of his constitutionally
protected rights that his conviction should be set aside" and that was its recommendation. 211
Six months later, on July 22, 1992, the Acting Assistant
Secretary of the Army rejected that recommendation, and
denied the application for relief. Said the Secretary:
I note at the outset that the ABCMR did not consider the
guilt or innocence of Dr. Mudd, and that its
recommendation does not speak to the question of his
guilt or innocence.
The ABCMR concluded that the military commission
which tried Dr. Mudd did not have jurisdiction over
civilians and recommended that Dr. Mudd's conviction
be set aside on that basis.
Accordingly, my denial of that recommendation should
not be taken as a determination of either the guilt or the
innocence of Dr. Mudd. It is not the role of ABCMR to
attempt to settle historical disputes. Neither is the
ABCMR an appellate court. The precise issue which
the ABCMR proposes to decide, the jurisdiction of the
military commission over Dr. Mudd, was specifically
addressed at the time in two separate habeas corpus
proceedings, one before the Chief Justice of the United
States, the other before a U.S. District Court. 212 There
also was an opinion by the Attorney General of the
United States.
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The effect of the action recommended by the ABCMR
would be to overrule all those determinations. Even if
the issue might be decided differently today, it is inappropriate for a nonjudicial body, such as the ABCMR,
to declare that the law 127 years ago was contrary to
what was determined contemporaneously by
prominent legal authorities. 213
It should be remembered that, on March 1, 1869, Dr. Mudd
received a full and unconditional presidential pardon. 214 Does
not that act adequately set aside Dr. Mudd's conviction? 215
Or, to ask the same question in somewhat altered phraseology, if an individual has been pardoned during his lifetime, is
he also further entitled as a matter of right to a second,
posthumous pardon more than a century after his death? 216
It was not unti11938 that Congress granted any remedy to
persons erroneously convicted in courts of the United States,
and that enactment provided that a subsequent pardon was
proof of innocence only if the stated ground for the pardon
was innocence and unjust conviction, and even then recovery
was limited to $5,000. Obviously Mudd's pardon did not
meet the statutory condition, and, equally obvious, the 1938
statute cannot be deemed retroactive so as to reach a conviction that took place in 1865. 217

VI. CONCLUSIONS
A. Preservation of the Union
The struggle between Federalists and Anti-Federalists
that marked the debates from 1787 to 1789 over the ratification
of the Constitution did not end on April 30, 1789, when
Washington was inaugurated as our first President; indeed,
those differences led to the Civil War and did not wholly
terminate with Appomattox.
And, although it is surely heresy even to think as much in
the Commonwealth of Virginia, it is a fact that Thomas
Jefferson, a much revered son of the Commonwealth, has
never been a truly qualified guide to the meaning of the
document composed at Independence Hall in Philadelphia
during the summer of 1787.
To begin, he was not there; he was in Paris, serving as
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American Minister to France. 218 And within the first decade of
the new nation's existence under its Constitution, he authored
and/ or influenced the Kentucky and Virginia Resolutions
that supported the power of individual states to override
measures of the general government. 219 Soon afterwards,
elected President himself, Thomas Jefferson declared the following in his first Inaugural on March 4, 1801:
If there be any among us who would wish to dissolve
the Union or to change its republican form, let them
stand undisturbed as monuments of the safety with
which error of opinion may be tolerated where reason
is left free to combat it. 220
It is therefore completely accurate to conclude that the

spiritual godfather of both nullification and secession was the
presently greatly revered Thomas Jefferson.
Indeed, it was not in the South that the first serious
advocacy of secession appeared. That was a consequence of
Jefferson's Louisiana Purchase, a step that led extremist Federalists to propose the secession oft he northeastern portion of
the nation, because the acquisition of that vast tract of transMississippi territory was certain to diminish the national
influence that New England wielded prior to 1803- and also
because the War of 1812 was violently unpopular there. The
high-water mark of this New England secessionist surge was
the infamous Hartford Convention; that sentiment died suddenly, however, when Andrew Jackson overwhelmingly defeated the British at New Orleans on January 8, 1815, and
when, simultaneously, news of the December 24, 1814 Peace
of Ghent reached the United States. 221 At that point there also
died the Federalist Party.
There was relative quiet thereafter until, in the 1830s,
South Carolina undertook to nullify federal revenue legislation. Then the moving spirit was John C. Calhoun. But when
this happened, Andrew Jackson was President. The victor of
New Orleans thundered forth, "The Federal Union shall and
will be preserved," took appropriate steps to that end, and the
result was that South Carolina, Jackson's state of birth, backed
down as best it could. 222
A generation or so later, in 1860, the new Republican Party
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had become home to New England's abolitionists, and the
Democratic Party, supporting slavery, was split only over the
degree of its support of the "peculiar institution." Stephen A.
Douglas led the moderates; Jefferson Davis insisted on the
more extreme view. A third group- the National Constitutional Union- sought a compromise that got nowhere, and
in the end Abraham Lincoln led the Republicans to both
popular and electoral victory 223
South Carolina reacted by formally seceding from the
Union on December 20, 1860, and six other states followed
before March 4, 1861. 224
President James Buchanan, whosetimiditywasaccurately
reflected on his countenance, inquired whether he could
legally use force to return the seceded states to the Union. A
technically competent but equally irresolute Attorney General, Jeremiah S. Black, advised in the negative. 225 Matters
rocked along for six weeks without much except discussion
until April15, 1861, when South Carolina opened fire on Fort
Sumter, forcing the fairly prompt surrender of that unrelieved and unsupplied Union post. When President Lincoln
then called for troops to oppose the rebellion, four more states
seceded, and the Civil War, or the War of the Rebellion, or the
War Between the States, was on. 226
For Lincoln, the sole object of the conflict at its outset was
the restoration of the Union, regardless of what happened to
slavery. It was only later that emancipation became an additional and equally vital objective 227
Nothing whatsoever was permitted to stand in the way of
the primary objective. Arbitrary arrests became commonplace early in the war; anti-administration newspapers were
suppressed and their editors were imprisoned; thousands of
offenders were tried by military commissions; and the Bill of
Rights was jettisoned. Opposition was minimal, as the bulk of
those dissatisfied with these measures were opposed to continuation of the war and perfectly satisfied to let the seceding
States depart in peace.
Lincoln deeply regretted the hardships that such a program necessarily imposed, and he ameliorated them to the
greatest extent possible consistent with his primary objective.
Accordingly, in mid-February 1862, he issued Executive Order No. 1, which declared a general amnesty for political
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prisoners and brought the deliberate policy of repression to a
halt. 228 Thus, as a careful historian has noted, "the North was
spared the omnipresent shadow of Fort Lafayette," 229 that
formidable structure on Governor's Island in New York Harbor, which had housed so many of the disloyal.
Once the war was over, the struggle turned to the need for
a Fourteenth Amendment to effectuate the Thirteenth, and to
the regime of Reconstruction where the opposing viewpoints
were fought out. But secession was dead. 230
Today we are still struggling with the problem of where to
draw the line between violence on the one hand and free
speech on the other, the identical problem with which Abraham
Lincoln had to deal throughout the Civil War. Zeroing in on
that precise issue, we find, just forty-five years back, this
expression in the United States Reports. Unhappily, that
quotation comes from a dissent in a five-to-four case:
This Court has gone far toward accepting the doctrine
that civil liberty means the removal of all restraints
from these crowds and that all local attempts to
maintain order are impairments of the liberty of the
citizen. The choice is not between order and liberty. It
is between liberty with order and anarchy without
either. There is danger that, if the Court does not
temper its doctrinaire logic with a little practical
wisdom, it will convert the constitutional Bill of Rights
into a suicide pact. 231

B. Was the Tribunal that Tried the Assassin Conspirators
Lawfully Constituted?
Judge Advocate General Enoch H. Crowder,'32 whom Justice Frankfurter deemed "one of the best professional brains
I've encountered in life," 233 characterized Colonel William
Winthrop as "the Blackstone of military law." 234
Colonel Winthrop quite properly deserves such an honorific, and his views on the legality of trying the Lincoln assassination conspirators ought to be considered with a deference
withheld from less luminous commentators. The virtue of
applying Winthrop's views on the constitutionality of military trial of civilians in this case is best demonstrated by

158

Frederick Bernays Wiener

recounting the history of two closely related jurisdictional
issues: military trial of civilians for crimes committed in
previous military service and military trial of civilians accompanying the army abroad in peacetime. In both instances,
Winthrop's position that such jurisdiction was unconstitutional was repeatedly rejected. But, while the Solicitor General of the United States said in April 1956 that "the world
about which Colonel Winthrop wrote no longer exists," 235 the
nation would ultimately learn, within a short few years, that
the Blackstone of military law had correctly discerned the
limits that the Constitution of the United States laid down
respecting military jurisdiction.
If Winthrop was right about military jurisdiction over
former service members and civilians with the army overseas,
then he was very likely right about jurisdiction over civilian
fifth columnists in wartime. Having argued against the tide
of popular and legal opinion that jurisdiction could not attach
to the first two classes, no matter what Congress legislated at
the Army's behest, he nevertheless declined, when presented
the opportunity, to fault the assertion of military jurisdiction
by the Hunter Commission.
When Winthrop in 1895 published both volumes of the
second edition of his ultimately classic Military Law and Precedents, he did not believe that any general revision of the
Articles of War, then in force as R.S. § 1342, was either
necessary or desirable. But he did recommend that the last
clause of the Sixtieth Article, making officers and soldiers
amenable to military trial after they had become civilians,
should be deleted. 236
Trials of former military personnel were supported as
constitutional, however, by Professor Edmund M. Morgan, 237
later draftsman of the Uniform Code of Military Justice; by
Colonel L.K. Underhill of the U.S. Army; 238 and, following the
reasoning of his erstwhile teacher and of his subsequent
military superior, by the present author239 - this on the view
that the "cases arising in the land and naval forces" clause of
the Fifth Amendment authorized military jurisdiction over all
such cases regardless of the accused's personal status.
The Articles for the Government of the Navy included no
such continuing jurisdiction clause, with the result that in the
case of a U.S. Naval prisoner of war who had been convicted
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of mistreating fellow prisoners during a previous enlistment,
the Supreme Court held that he could not be tried by courtmartial after re-enlisting: an honorable discharge terminated
all criminal liability for anything done in the prior enlistment.z4o

In order to plug this loophole, Congress provided in
Article 3(a) of the new Uniform Code of Military Justice that,
subject to the applicable statute of limitations,
[A]ny person charged with having committed, while
in a status in which he was subject to this Code,
punishable by confinement of five years or more, and
for which the person cannot be tried in the courts of the
United States or any State or Territory thereof or of the
District of Columbia, shall not be relieved from
amenability to trial by court-martial by reason of the
termination of said status. 241
This new provision would soon be tested in Toth v.
Quarles. 242 Toth, an airman, received an honorable discharge
after service in Korea. Afterward, evidence came to light that
he had participated in the premeditated murder of a Korean
civilian, a murder for which both of his accomplices had
already been tried and punished. 243 The first question in
Toth's case was whether he could be returned to Korea for
trial by a U.S military court.
Undoubtedly, Toth's case was one "arising in the land and
naval forces" within the exception written into the Fifth
Amendment. But it was Winthrop's view that this "Amendment, in the particular indicated, is rather a declaratory recognition and sanction of an existing military jurisdiction rather
than an original proposition initiating such a jurisdiction." 244
(After all, the purpose of the Bill of Rights was to limit the
powers of the newly created general government, not to
enhance them.) Accordingly, Winthrop deemed such a recapture clause "necessarily ... unconstitutional." 245
The Supreme Court disagreed with Professor Morgan and
agreed with Colonel Winthrop, holding that Article3(a) of the
Uniform Code was indeed unconstitutional. 246
At this point it is necessary to backtrack and to re-examine
the 1919 controversy over the Army's court-martial system,
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which unfortunately degenerated into an ugly personal dispute between former Brigadier General Samuel T. Ansell,
Acting Judge Advocate General during most of World War I
and that officer's sponsor and benefactor, Major General
Crowder, who as Provost Marshal General operated the draft,
and whose characterization of Colonel Winthrop has already
been quoted. 247 Full details appear in a 1,400-page booklet,
about a third of it in fine print, which the present author has
read in full on four separate occasions. 248 As a matter of
contemporary psychiatry, former General Ansell's conduct
can be expertly diagnosed as an adjustment disorder; in
Victorian terms of disesteemed behavior, as unforgivable
disloyalty. 249
The issue significant here is that, throughout the World
War I court-martial dispute, Professor Morgan was fully on
General Ansell's side, and, with the tenacity of a mountaineer
feudist who has outlived all of his earlier opponents, adhered
for thirty years more to the views he had then formulated. 250
Accordingly, Professor Morgan agreed with General
Ansell's statement that "Colonel Winthrop was first a military man, and he accepted easily and advocated the view that
courts-martial are not courts, but are simply the right hand of
the military commander," 251 a view fully concurred in by
Professor Morgan 252 Yet Morgan, following Ansell, entirely
overlooked Winthrop's insistence, just seven pages further
along in his treatise, that a court-martial was indeed "a court
of law and justice." 253 In this unjustifiable omission, Morgan
was simply repeating Ansell's earlier inaccuracy.'" Still believing that the constitutional basis for military jurisdiction
lay in the "cases arising in the land and navalforces" clause of
the Fifth Amendment, Professor Morgan carried into the
Uniform Code in Articles 2 (11) and 2 (12) the provision in the
Second Article ofthe 1916, 1920, and 1948 Articles of War that
granted military jurisdiction over all persons serving with,
employed by, or accompanying the armed forces without the
United States.
It was Colonel Winthrop's view that "a statute cannot be
framed by which a civilian can lawfully be made amenable to
military jurisdiction in time of peace." 255
Who was correct, Professor Morgan or Colonel Winthrop?
The bitterly fought issue was before the Supreme Court in six
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cases over a period extending from February 17, 1956, when
the first case was filed/ 56 to January 18, 1960, when the last
four cases were decided. 257
At first that tribunal sustained the right of the armed
forces to try by court-martial an Air Force sergeant's wife who
had accompanied her husband to an airbase in England (Reid
v. Covert)'" and an Army colonel's wife staying with her
husband in Japan (Kinsella v. Krueger). 259 But, on rehearing
both appeals, the Court diametrically altered its holdings; on
further reflection, it held that there could be no military
jurisdiction in time of peace over military dependent wives
charged with capital offenses and ordered its earlier opinions,
rendered just 364 days earlier, "withdrawn." 260 According to
the Court, such jurisdiction could be sustained only in time of
war, as provided in Article 2(10) of the Uniform Code. 261
Two and a half years later, these new restrictions were
widened. Military jurisdiction over civilians in time of peace
was denied in the case of a dependent wife charged with a
non-capital offense/ 62 over a civilian employee of the Army
charged with a capital offense, 263 and over civilian employees
of the armed forces charged with non-capital crimes. 264
Accordingly, in both areas of military jurisdiction- exservicemen and accompanying dependents or employeesthe crowning paradox was that, whereas Professor
Morgan had mordantly decried Colonel Winthrop's
concept of a court-martial as intolerable, an author
whom he had earlier denigrated as 'first a military
man,' in the end it was that career officer's perception
of the Constitution's limitations on military power
that ultimately prevailed over the rejection of those
limitations by the lifetime professor of law. 265
The world about which Colonel Winthrop had written, far
from being moribund, was authoritatively shown to be leading a very healthy and active existence.
We now turn, in the light of the foregoing modern decisions, to our ultimate legal question: Was the tribunal that
tried Mudd et al. legally constituted?
At this point we can, for two reasons, overlook the infirmities of Ex parte Milligan,' 66 first because Winthrop disagreed
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with the dicta in the majority opinion, deeming the views of
the dissenters more sound; 267 and, second, because Judge
Boynton of the Southern District of Florida, whose opinion
denied Dr. Mudd a writ of habeas corpus, distinguished Milligan
on the ground that Mudd's crime was indeed a war offense. 268
Richmond, the Confederacy's capital, had fallen on April
3, 1865, and Lee had surrendered at Appomattox on April 9.
President Lincoln was shot on April14 and died the next day.
It was only after this that Johnston offered his surrender to
Sherman on April18, but that offer lay unaccepted until April
26, because the assassination had so greatly curdled Northern
sensibilities. All other Confederate forces laid down their
arms by May 26. And it was not until May 29 that President
Johnson's proclamation of amnesty officially ended the Civil
War. 269
Thus Lincoln's assassination took place more than a full
month before all the shooting stopped. True, no one can be
tried by a military tribunal for spying once a war has ended, 270
but those charged with other war crimes are still subject to
both trial and punishment once hostilities cease and before
peace is formally declared. That proposition is demonstrated
by the trial of Captain Henry Wirz, commandant of the infamous Andersonville prison where so many Union prisoners
of war died of mistreatment and neglect, 271 and by post-World
War II war criminal trials held at Nuremberg and Tokyo.
How then does Winthrop treat what in his treatise he
designates as "the Assassination Conspirators Trial?" He
mentions it on seven occasions to illustrate procedural details. 272 But nowhere in all1,596 pages of the second and last
edition of his Military Law and Precedents does Winthrop say a
single word about the legality of that proceeding; on that
central issue the silence of the Blackstone of military law is
positively deafening. The only inference possible is that
Colonel Winthrop, like all contemporary military lawyers a
century later, deemed utterly illegal the trial of the Assassination Conspirators by military commission. 273
What then did Winthrop think of Judge Boynton's decision? We know that, on occasion, he cited unreported decisions in his treatise. 274 But it can easily be established that
Winthrop never saw what Judge Boynton had written in the
only judicial opinion considering (and upholding) the juris-
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diction of the tribunal that had tried Mudd and the others.
We know that the Winthrop treatise does not cite Ex parte
Mudd; it is not in his table of cases and trials. We also know
that the reference to Mudd's case in the Federal Cases states,
"Nowhere reported; opinion not now accessible." Finally, we
know that one copy of that opinion was printed in a Washington daily newspaper, and that another can be seen in a Library
of Congress scrapbook. 275
Broadening our search, we find in 1895 four significant
dates, three of them dealing directly with Winthrop. On
January 3, he was promoted to Colonel and Assistant Judge
Advocate General. 276 On August 3, he was retired for age by
operation of law. 277 And, on November 1, he signed the
Preface to the second edition of his treatise. 278 Finally, during
the same year, without the exact date anywhere shown, there
was published Volume 17 of the Federal Cases series, at page
954 of which there appears the reference to Ex parte Mudd, Fed.
Case No. 9899.
On the basis of using and relying on Winthrop's Military
Law and Precedents for almost 50 years, often on a daily basis,
the present author firmly believes that, even if the Assistant
Judge Advocate General of the Army had ever seen the
Boynton opinion- which, it clearly appears, he never in fact
did - it would not have changed his views. He did so
inferentially, no doubt because he did not wish to declare
publicly his disagreement with his erstwhile chief, General
Holt. But his silence on the merits of the trial make it crystal
clear that, in his opinion, the military trial of the assassination
conspirators was a precedent that should never be followed.
This necessarily leads to the conclusion that what the
Acting Assistant Secretary of the Army ultimately determined in 1992, namely, that the legality of the trial was, by
those in authority in the late 1860s, regarded differently than
it would be regarded in the 1990s, more than a century and a
quarter later. Or, otherwise stated, the aim of Dr. Mudd's
descendants before the Army Board for the Correction of
Records was not only a request to set aside a conviction for
which their ancestor had already been pardoned, but also one
to rewrite history. Therefore the Army Secretariat correctly
disposed of Dr. Mudd's case.
We are however left with the inquiry whether, in the light
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of all the facts and circumstances, Samuel A. Mudd, M.D. was
done an injustice.
Bear in mind that Mudd lied about his not recognizing
Booth throughout his being questioned on that point, and that
he was afraid to tell of [Booth's] having been at his house on
the 15th of April, "fearing that his own and the lives of his
family would be endangered thereby."'"
Thus, Mudd was not innocent; he knew that Booth was a
fugitive from justice who had shot the President- why else
the fear for his and his family's lives? - and yet he aided
Booth in several non-medical ways, and took significant steps
to facilitate Booth's escape. Mudd was, at the very least, an
accessory after the fact, conduct for which his actual confinement for somewhat less than four years was surely not excessive punishment.
The Secretary of the Army was in consequence fully correct, 127 years afterward in 1992, in refusing to alter, and thus
refusing to falsify, the record of Dr. Mudd's conviction for
substantially assisting the murderer of Abraham Lincoln to
elude capture, even if only for an additional eleven days.
Intensive study of the record of trial and of every relevant
background factor inevitably lead to this clear conclusion: Dr.
Samuel A. Mudd was, beyond any reasonable doubt, guilty of
the charge against him, and suffered no injustice whatever in
the ultimately attenuated sentence that he so deservedly
served.
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The Curious Case
of Dr. Mudd
Forest J. Bowman*

It was about 4:00 on the morning of April 15, 1865, when

John Wilkes Booth and David E. Herold turned their horses
onto the narrow, rutted lane which led to the home of Dr.
Samuel A. Mudd, a quarter of a mile off the main road to
Bryantown, in southern Maryland's Charles County. After a
few minutes the riders could make out the doctor's plain, twostory clapboard house silhouetted against the sky at the top of
a long rise. They stopped at the edge of the lawn and Herold,
who had ridden ahead of Booth, dismounted and pounded on
the door while Booth sat hunched on his horse, the very image
of misery and discomfort.
The doctor and his wife were asleep in a back room on the
first floor of the house and they were startled by the heavy
pounding on their door. Dr. Mudd had not been feeling well
so he asked his wife to answer the door. But the loud banging
frightened Mrs. Mudd and she told her husband, "I would
rather you would go and see for yourself."' So the 31-year-old
doctor rose and trudged wearily to the door in his nightshirt,
curious who should be knocking so loudly at that hour.
Without opening the door he asked who was there and was
told - or so he always insisted - that his callers were two
*The Hale J. Posten Professor of Law, West Virginia University, Morgantown,
West Virginia 26506.
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"strangers" on their way to Washington. One of their horses
had fallen, the voice said, and the rider believed his leg had
been sprained or fractured.' Dr. Mudd opened the door and
helped the dismounted rider bring the injured man into the
parlor where they laid him on a sofa. Trouble -big trouble
- had descended on the little household of Dr. Samuel A.
Mudd.
With the possible exception of Mrs. Surratt, no other
person punished for complicity in the Lincoln plot has been so
steadfastly and vociferously defended as an innocent victim
of the federal government's thirst for vengeance as has Dr.
Mudd. He has had a school named after him, historical
pageants have been presented in honor of his memory, and
his plight has been publicized in radio and television programs.
In 1936, Twentieth Century-Fox released a film, Prisoner of
Shark Island, which portrayed the doctor's imprisonment.'
That same year, Congressman Jennings Randolph, Democrat
of West Virginia, introduced a resolution to place a tablet in
the ruins of Fort Jefferson in recognition of Dr. Mudd's "innocence of a crime for which he was held prisoner for four
years." 4 In 1973, the Michigan Legislature, atthe urging of Dr.
Richard Mudd, who has spent a lifetime trying to clear his
grandfather's name, adopted a resolution stating that Dr.
Samuel A. Mudd "was innocent of any complicity in the
assassination of President Abraham Lincoln," that "[h]istory
has subsequently revealed that Dr. Samuel A. Mudd acted
only as a physician and not as a conspirator," and that he had
been unjustly convicted.' In 1979, President Jimmy Carter
declared his personal belief in Dr. Mudd's innocence.'
He is remembered as a kind and gentle country doctor
who was sucked into the whirlwind of violence by his innocent ministrations to an injured nighttime visitor who, unbeknownst to him, had shot the President of the United States a
few hours earlier. Dr. Mudd, his supporters maintain, was the
American Dreyfus, an innocent man convicted and sent to
prison for a crime he did not commit, by an unconstitutional
military commission comprised of second-rate officers who
were on a government-sanctioned blood quest. Even his
place of confinement- Fort Jefferson in the Dry Tortugassmacks of Devil' s Island.
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I. JURISDICTION OF THE MILITARY COMMISSION
Dr. Mudd's conviction by a military tribunal, instead of a
trial before a civil court, has been one of the most persistent
complaints of his supporters. And, since a civil jury failed to
convict John H. Surratt Jr. in 1867, this view has strongly
reinforced the doctor's supporters in their belief that the
military commission was a "hanging court." F. Lee Bailey, cocounsel for Dr. Mudd in the Mudd appeal, "predicted" that
Surratt would not be convicted by civil jury and used that
possibility to attack the military tribunal?
However, to argue that the same evidence was brought
out in the military commission and John Surratt's civil trial
and use this circumstance to criticize the military tribunal is
unreasonable. Given the inflamed conditions of 1865 it appears that a civil trial would have dealt with the conspirators
in a similar manner.' By 1867, the interest of the public had
moved on from the Lincoln murder to Reconstruction policy,
the power struggle in President Johnson's cabinet, and the
possible impeachment of the President. The trial of Dr. Mudd
and the other conspirators before a military commission in
1867 may well have resulted in a different outcome than
before the 1865 military commission.
Before Dr. Mudd could be convicted by the military commission he first had to be tried before that body. As with the
grand jury process by means of which defendants are brought
to trial before civil courts on criminal charges, it took more
than just being a Southern-leaning doctor who had treated the
President's assassin to be named a defendant before the
military commission. The government's list of defendants
who were ultimately brought to trial for the murder of
Abraham Lincoln was a curious one, not so much because
innocent citizens were dragged before this military body as
for the fact that so many individuals who might reasonably
have been indicted were not.
The government decided not to prosecute Samuel Cox,
Thomas Jones,' John Lloyd, 10 and James Maddox, 11 all known
to have aided Booth's escape or to have obstructed justice.
There were others who almost certainly knew about the
conspiracy, but against whom no hard evidence had been
gathered. Booth's brother, Junius Brutus Jr., was the author
of, and recipient of, some suspicious correspondence with
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Wilkes Booth, and their sister, Blanch Booth DeBar, clearly
knew of the plot.l' Anna Surratt, the daughter of Mrs. Mary
Surratt and younger sister of John Surratt Jr., cannot seriously
be considered to have been unaware of the plotting going on
around her at her mother's boarding house and some papers
that were confiscated at the Surratt house support this suggestion.!' Sara Antoinette Slater, a Rebel spy and dispatch
carrier who sometimes traveled withJohnSurrattJr., and who
had stayed at the Surratt boarding house at the height of the
plotting, hovered somewhere on the periphery of the plotting
against Lincoln. 14 Yet none of these was indicted.
The government settled on nine conspirators: David E.
Herold, Lewis Payne,'' George A. Atzerodt, Mary E. Surratt,
Edman Spangler, 16 Samuel B. Arnold, Michael O'Laughlin/ 7
and Dr. Samuel A. Mudd, all of whom were in custody, and
John H. Surratt Jr., who was hiding in Canada. The inclusion
of Dr. Mudd among the conspirators to be tried reflected the
government's sense of the strength of the evidence that had
been gathered against him, not some sinister plot to punish an
innocent physician.
However, a major question loomed: Before what tribunal
should the conspirators be tried? President Andrew Johnson
turned to Attorney General James Speed, 18 who, on April28,
at what one writer calls "the prodding of the War Department,"19 advised the President that trial before a military
commission, rather than before a civil court, was proper. 20
This was not a universally-accepted opinion. Gideon
Welles, Secretary of the Navy, was of the opinion that Secretary of War Stanton had pressured Speed into this opinion,
perhaps even converting the Attorney General from an earlier
inclination. Welles wrote in his diary on May 9, 1865: "[T]he
rash, impulsive, and arbitrary measures of Stanton are exceedingly repugnant to my notions, and I am pained to
witness the acquiescence they receive. He carries others with
him, sometimes against their convictions as expressed to
me."21

Former Attorney General Bates shared the view that
Stanton was behind Speed's opinion. He wrote in his diary on
May 25, 1865: "I am pained to be led to believe that my
successor, Atty Genl. Speed, has been wheedled out of an
opinion, to the effect that such a trial is lawful. If he be, in the
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lowest degree, qualified for his office, he must know better ...
. I do not doubt that that unwise determination was the work
of Mr. Stanton. He believes in mere force, so long as he wields
it, but cowers before it, when wielded by any other hand." 22
Bates then summed up the problem with a remarkable prophesy: "[I]f the offenders be done to death by that tribunal,
however truly guilty, they will pass for martyrs with half the
world." 23
Bates exhibited a incredible sense of clairvoyance. While
he was imprisoned, not executed, the martyrdom of Dr. Samuel
A. Mudd began with the difficult question of the jurisdiction
of the military commission.
A great deal of the difficulty stems from the fact that no
real precedent existed for what the government faced- the
trial of civilians engaged in paramilitary actions at the close of
a civil war. Military commissions were created during the
Mexican War to try civilians who committed crimes normally
cognizable by a civil court, and they had limited jurisdiction
to try civilians for crimes not cognizable by a court martial,
but committed during a period of martial law; and for violations of the laws of war. 24
The two major arguments raised against the commission
which tried Dr. Mudd were that the laws of war did not apply
with respect to the American Civil War and, even if they did,
the Civil War was over and the civil courts were open, so no
necessity required trial before a military commission.
The first of these arguments was grounded on the contention that the United States had not formally recognized the
Confederacy as a belligerent, 25 a condition deemed necessary
for the application of the laws of war. But this argument was,
at best, a weak reed. Three years before the President's
murder the Supreme Court, speaking through Justice Grier in
The Prize Cases, 26 said that:
Insurrection against a government may or may not
culminate in an organized rebellion, but a civil war
always begins by insurrection againstthe lawful authority
of the government. A civil waris never solemnly declared;
it becomes such by its accidents - the number, power
and organization of the persons who originate and carry
it on. When the party in rebellion occupy and hold in a
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hostile manner a certain portion of territory; have declared
their independence; have cast off their allegiance; have
organized armies; have commenced hostilities against
their former sovereign, the world acknowledges them as
belligerents, and the contest is war. They claim to be in
arms to establish their liberty and independence in order
to become a sovereign state, while the sovereign party
treats them as insurgents and rebels who owe allegiance,
and who should be punished with death for their treason
.... As a civil war is never publicly proclaimed, eo nomine
against its insurgents, its actual existence is a fact in our
domestic history which the court is bound to notice and
to know. 27
Moreover, the Confederate Congress had formally recognized the existence of war on May 6, 1861. 28 The Act declared
that "war exists between the Confederate States and the
Government of the United States and the States and territories
thereof except the States of Maryland, North Carolina, Tennessee, Kentucky, Arkansas, Missouri, and Delaware, and the
territories of Arizona and New Mexico, and the Indian Territory south of Kansas," thus suggesting the Confederate Congress' conception of where the authority of the Confederacy
extended (and placing Dr. Mudd's home State of Maryland
squarely within the Confederacy)."
General Orders No. 100, which was issued after the Supreme Court's decision in the Prize Cases, recognized that the
rebellion was "civil war. " 30 And the mere fact that the Union
did not document its recognition of the Confederacy's status
as a belligerent did not alter the fact that both sides accorded
the other belligerent rights. 31
The central issue, however, in the trying of the conspirators before a military commission was whether a military
commission was the proper body to try the conspirators since
(1) the civil courts were open in the District of Columbia at the
time the commission was convened, and (2) with the surrender of Lee's Army of Northern Virginia on April9, 1865, and
of Joseph E. Johnston's army on April26,1865, the Civil War
had ended in the East, and, thus, there was no "military
necessity" such as to justify trying the conspirators before a
military commission.
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In 1867, the Supreme Court held, in Ex parte Milligan, 32 that
military commissions organized during the Civil War, in a
state not invaded and not engaged in rebellion and in which
the federal courts were open and exercising their judicial
functions, had no jurisdiction to try a civilian33 for any criminal offense. Supporters of Dr. Mudd and other conspirators
have long sought to apply this decision to the trial of the
Lincoln conspirators in an effort to demonstrate the trial's
illegality. Fitting Milligan into the case of the Lincoln conspirators is a more difficult exercise than it first appears.
The Milligan case arose out of Indiana, where federal
authority had never been seriously challenged during the
Civil War. 34 In Washington, however, the threat to federal
authority had been, and remained, very real. Despite the
surrender of the armies of Lee and Johnston, the "war" had
not yet ended. The government argued in the Mudd appeal
that the United States and the Confederate States had fought
a battle near the Rio Grande on May 12 and that Confederate
warships continued to wage war against Union vessels until
November 6, 1865. But the danger from Confederate "wartime" activity was even more real to Union authorities in
Washington, D.C. in early May, 1865, than the Government's
argument suggested.
John Singleton Mosby, the noted Confederate guerrilla
leader, had disbanded his command, but still remained in
hiding, a potential threat. Mosby had been Lewis Payne's
commander and had, in 1863, captured General Edwin H.
Stoughton from the midst of his army at Fairfax Court House,
Virginia. 35 On February 22, 1865,Lieutenant Jesse C. McNeill
had led the McNeill Rangers" from near Moorefield, West
Virginia, into Cumberland, Maryland, and there, from the
midst of the Army of West Virginia a command of over 10,000,
had spirited away Generals George Crook and Benjamin F.
Kelly along with the command's adjutant and a passel of
headquarters flags.
A few days later, as Lieutenant Isaac Welton, McNeill's
second-in-command, was escorting the prisoners to Richmond by train, he encountered Colonel Mosby. In an obvious
reference to his earlier capture of General Stoughton, Mosby
told Lt. Welton, "You boys have beaten me badly. The only
way I can equal this is to go into Washington and bring out
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Lincoln." 37 The threat posed by a man like Mosby could not
be lightly dismissed. Lincoln might be dead, but Washington,
D.C. contained other tempting targets.
On May 8, 1865, Jesse McNeill and his Rangers had met
with Union authorities on the Northwest Turnpike a mile
west of Romney, West Virginia, deposited a pile of "arms" on
the road, signed parole documents, and disbanded. But the
"arms" they left on the road consisted of little more than
ancient shotguns and nonfunctioning weapons of dubious
ancestry." These hard-riding, hard-hitting cavalrymen were
still armed and could be called into action. Undoubtedly,
many of them would have relished taking to the hills and
continuing the guerrilla war against the Yankees, as would
many of Mosby's men and others who were not anxious to
accept the fact of Southern defeat.
Hindsight is always "20/20." We now know that, with
Lee's surrender ofthe Army of Northern Virginia, the soldiers
of the Confederacy marched off the battlefield into the peaceful glory of the "Legend of the Lost Cause." But in late April
and early May of 1865 the direction of the rebel soldiers'
march was not nearly so certain. Had Lee or some other
charismatic Southern leader issued the call to guerrilla warfare, Mosby and McNeill and other still-armed and still-angry
Southern soldiers may well have taken up the call, on the very
outskirts of the nation's capital. The history of civil wars is
that they end in this fashion far more commonly than as did
the American Civil War. 39 At the time of Attorney General
Speed's opinion that trial before a military commission was
proper and President Johnson's order establishing the military commission, the idea that a "state of war" existed in
Washington, D.C. was not a mere fanciful notion.
One of the myths that surrounds the assassination of
President Lincoln is that his death was uniformly mourned
throughout the South, where it was seen as a catastrophe, at
least by all but the most ardent firebrands.
In truth, Southerners reacted to Lincoln's death much the
same as Americans reacted to the news of the death of
Mussolini. 40 They saw it as the fitting end for a tyrant. 41 As the
government brief in the appeal stated:
Washington, D.C. remained a fortified city and
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headquarters for directing military operations against
the rebels during Mudd's trial. Sentries manned and
controlled the flow of people into and out of the city.
The city was fully guarded by national forces.
Washington was a city policed by soldiers with the
army as the protector as well as the defender of the
Capitol ... . The war was still in effect and President
Andrew Johnson did not declare martial law over and
peace within the United States until20 August 1866. 42
Whether it was politically astute to try the conspirators
before a military commission or whether the conspirators
received fair trials before the commission are not the issues
here. The question is whether the United States had the legal
right to try the conspirators before a military commission. It
is clear that it did.
H. THE QUESTION OF DR. MUDD'S GUILT
Dr. Mudd's defense clearly rested on the argument that
his treatment of Booth's leg had merely been the act of mercy
of a medical doctor, performed on a man he had not recognized, having met him briefly only once before. That position
underlies the appeal of Dr. Mudd before the Special Court of
Military Review. In the brief on behalf of Dr. Mudd, 43 as well
as in counsels' argument before the Special Court, there is
virtually no reference to the evidence on which Dr. Mudd was
convicted, except to argue that the testimony of the witnesses
against Dr. Mudd had been discredited.<'
That Dr. Mudd recognized Booth and knew at some time
before Booth left his home that he had murdered President
Lincoln, that Dr. Mudd might have been involved in the
Confederate underground in Charles County, that Dr. Mudd
was well acquainted with two of the main characters in the
plot against Lincoln and had met with them on several occasions, or that Dr. Mudd deliberately misled government officials in an effort to assist Booth and Herold in avoiding
capture, are all matters that supporters of the doctor would
prefer to pass over quickly.
But it is not that simple. The facts are these. In November
1864, Booth had gone into lower Maryland, armed with letters
of introduction to Dr. William Queen and Dr. Mudd.45 He was
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introduced to Dr. Mudd following church services on November 20. Later that afternoon, Dr. Mudd called for Booth at
Montgomery's Hotel in Bryantown and brought him back to
the Mudd farm. 46 Booth spent the night with the MuddsY
During this visit Booth bought a horse from a George Gardiner,
coming to Gardiner's place in the company of Dr. Mudd. 48
On December23, 1864, Dr. Mudd was in Washington-in
the company of John Wilkes Booth! That evening the doctor
introduced Booth to Louis J. Weichmann, a friend of John H.
Surratt Jr., and a clerk in the Office of the Commissary General
of Prisoners, a bureau ofthe War Department. 49 As Weichmann
described the meeting, he and Surratt were walking down 7th
Street when Dr. Mudd hailed them, calling out, "Surratt,
Surratt!" Weichmann and Surratt turned and saw Dr. Mudd
with John Wilkes Booth. Surratt introduced Dr. Mudd to
Weichmann and then the doctor introduced Booth to
Weichmann. 50 The four men went to Booth's room at the
National Hotel where Mudd, Booth, and Surratt, all seated
around a table, discussed what appeared to be a map Booth
was sketching 5 1 While Weichmann claimed to have stayed in
the room the whole time, he testified that at times the others
went out into the hall for a while, with Booth and Dr. Mudd
going out first, staying "not more than five or eight minutes."52

At the conspiracy trial Dr. Mudd's former slave, Mary
Simms, testified that John Surratt had visited with the Mudds
during the summer of 1864. He visited there "often," she said
in response to the Judge Advocate's leading question. "He
was there from almost every Saturday night to Monday night.
When he would go to Virginia, or come back from there, he
would stop." 53 Ms. Simms said he slept in the woods with
others (most of whom were Confederate soldiers), and they
took their meals in the house while the Mudds "put us all out
to watch." The Mudds provided the bedclothes for the rebel
soldiers to sleep on in the woods. 54 Three other witnesses,
Elzee Eglent, Melvina Washington, and Milo Simms, corroborated Ms. Simms' testimony. 55 Bennett F. Gwynn, a neighbor
of Dr. Mudd, testified that he and his brothers, who were
trying to avoid arrest by General Dan Sickles, had slept in the
woods behind the Mudd home, on bedclothes provided by
the Mudds, and were fed by the Mudds. Gwynn testified he
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feared arrest because he was a captain in the home guard, a
militia unit organized "to stand by the State in any disloyal
position it might take against the [United States] Government," and that Dr. Mudd, knowing of his concern over being
arrested (and being aware of why Gwynn was concerned, i.e.,
aware that Gwynn was a member of the Rebel militia), sheltered him. 56 Then Gwynn, under cross-examination, revealed
a bit of information that serves to take Dr. Mudd out of the
"civilian" class and into the class of "enemy soldier," so far as
the United States government was concerned. He admitted
that Dr. Mudd was a member of one of these militia companies57 If Bennett Gwynn's testimony is to be believed, and
there is no reason not to believe it, Dr. Mudd was a member of
the Confederate underground in Charles County and a member of the organized Confederate militia.
In another damaging, if not wholly credible bit of testimony, one witness at the conspiracy trial, William A. Evans,
a minister of the Presbyterian Church, swore he saw the
doctor enter Mrs. Surratt's boarding house on H Street a day
or two before Lincoln's second inauguration. 58 In truth, Dr.
Mudd's involvement in the rebel militia and his dealings with
Booth and Surratt is less a condemnation of Dr. Mudd than a
recognition that all of lower Maryland was rebel territory and
that the men who lived in the area were very likely to be rebel
sympathizers. In Maryland and the Confederacy, a book privately published in 1976 by Harry W. Newman, an author
who describes himself as a "one-time member of the Sons of
Confederate Veterans," and which is exceedingly sympathetic to the Confederate cause, the author writes:
If any portion of Maryland was the heart and soul of
the Confederacy, Southern Maryland definitely
possessed that quality, especially Prince Georges,
Charles and St. Mary's Counties .... This portion of
Maryland furnished more men to the Confederate
Army and Navy than any other section and thus
sustained the heaviest casualties and sorrows."

But the important thing to understand here is that, while
Dr. Mudd's behavior may well have been understandable,
and certainly in line with that of his neighbors, it is nonethe-
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less a fact that he was involved in the pro-rebel underground
in lower Maryland, that he was rather well acquainted with
Booth and Surratt, two prime plotters against President Lincoln, and that he lied about all this. Understandable this may
be (including his lying about it to save his neck), but that does
not alter the evidence.
To this decidedly suspicious portrait of Dr. Mudd must be
added his curious behavior after taking Booth into his parlor
shortly before dawn on April 15, 1865. After placing his
visitor on the sofa in the parlor, the doctor went into the back
bedroom to dress and to tell his wife who had barged in upon
them at that hour. He explained that one ofthe men appeared
to have broken his leg and asked his wife to tear some
bandages for him. After dressing he returned to the parlor
with a light and he and Herold helped Booth into the same
upstairs bedroom where the actor had slept the previous fall.
With Booth stretched out on an ornate Victorian bed in the
corner of the room, the doctor cut a 12-inch slit in the actor's
long riding boot and pulled the boot from the swollen ankle.
On examination he found a straight fracture of the left tibia
about two inches above the ankle, an injury he did not regard
as particularly painful though Booth appeared to be suffering
intensely. The doctor had no proper pasteboard for making
splints so he took wood from an old bandbox and put together
a homemade splint. Then, with his patient as comfortable as
possible, he and Herold left Booth to rest as the faint light of
dawn appeared across the sky 60
Dr. Mudd then either returned to bed (Mrs. Mudd's statement}61 or went out into the barnyard to do his chores (Dr.
Mudd's statement}. 62 When breakfast was ready, he called
Herold to the table and they ate.
For the rest of the morning the doctor worked about his
farm pretty much as usual. After the noon meal he took
Herold and rode over to his father's place to see about a
carriage for the wounded man, a rather strange accommodation for two men he later described as total strangers. Finding
no carriage available, the two went into Bryantown to look for
a conveyance. Dr. Mudd said later that only Herold went into
Bryantown and gave the impression, though he did not clearly
say so, that he had called on a neighbor instead of going to
town. And, so he implied, he had missed learning of the
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President's death, the news of which had all of Bryantown
abuzz.
However, a number of witnesses at the conspiracy trial
recalled seeing Dr. Mudd and Herold riding into town together and several remembered seeing the doctor alone in
town that afternoon. 63 Both prosecution and defense witnesses agreed that word of the President's murder reached
Bryantown by the time the doctor arrived and that Lincoln's
assassin had been identified as a man named "Booth.""
On his return from Bryantown the doctor stopped at the
farm of a neighbor, John F. Hardy. At the conspiracy trial
Hardy was called as a defense witness for Dr. Mudd but,
curiously, was not questioned about this visit. Later, however, he was called to the stand for the prosecution and
testified that Dr. Mudd had told him during the visit that he
had learned in Bryantown that "the President and Mr. Seward
and his son had been assassinated the evening before." 65 The
assassin was John Wilkes Booth, Dr. Mudd said, and Hardy
asked if Booth had not visited the doctor the previous autumn. Dr. Mudd replied that he didn't know whether his
visitor was the same man or one of his brothers. He said
nothing, however, about the two horsemen who had called at
his home before dawn. Francis R. Farrell, Hardy's hired hand,
corroborated this testimony. 66
While Hardy and Farrell were both called by the prosecution, neither man could be called a hostile witness. Both
witnesses seemed genuinely sympathetic to Dr. Mudd and
said that he had expressed his sorrow at the death of the
President and that this expression of sorrow seemed genuine.67

Dr. Mudd returned home an hour or so before dark, just as
Booth and Herold were leaving, he later testified. Herold
asked for directions but the doctor claimed he did not see
them leave. "I do not know where they went" he told a federal
officer the day after his arrest 68
Doctor and Mrs. Mudd put together a fanciful tale about
the visit of Booth and Herold which has been universally
accepted by the doctor's supporters and repeated as if it were
Holy Writ. Yet this story is so incredible as to nearly collapse
of its own weight, and it came very close to sending Dr. Mudd
to the gallows. Studied carefully, the Mudds' story was a
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classic case of the use of the magician's favorite tool misdirection. Much was made of the doctor's" duty" to assist
the injured Booth, while the crux of the case against Dr. Mudd
was not that he had given medical aid to an injured nighttime
visitor, but that he had delayed telling authorities of the visit
of the President's assassin long enough to permit him to
escape.
The Mudds always claimed that the doctor became suspicious about his visitors about an hour after he returned home
on Saturday afternoon (after his guests had already left) and
decided he had best go into Bryantown and notify the authorities." Mrs. Mudd agreed that the men were suspicious all
right but said that she begged the doctor not to leave her alone
because she was afraid there might be guerrillas about.
So it was not until the following morning at church that
Dr. Mudd sought out his second cousin, Dr. George Mudd, an
older man with a reputation as a staunch Union loyalist and
a resident of Bryantown. Dr. George Mudd was close to Sam
and had served as his preceptor in the study of medicine. 70
Sam told George that two strangers had come to his home a
little before daybreak on Saturday; that they were very excited; that one of the men had a broken leg; that he had set the
leg and improvised some crutches for him; that the man had
shaved his mustache; and that the pair had left in the direction
of Parson Wilmers' place. 71
At least that is what George Mudd later testified under
oath that his cousin had told him. And considering George's
reputation and the candid nature of his testimony, it seems
likely that this was precisely what Sam had related to his
cousin. In any event, the two doctors parted with the understanding that the elder Mudd would pass this information on
to the military authorities in Bryantown. And the following
morning, Monday, April 17, George reported to Lieutenant
David D. Dana the story Sam had told him of the strangers'
visit to his farm.
On Tuesday Lt. Dana sent Lieutenant Alexander Lovett
along with Dr. George Mudd and three "special officers" to
the Samuel Mudd farm to question the doctor. The doctor's
statements to Lt. Lovett and his men that day are of scant
comfort to those who insist that the doctor tried to be helpful
to the federal authorities.
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Dr. Mudd told Lt. Lovett: (1) His visitors had remained at
the farm for" a short time" (from which the lieutenant reasonably inferred that they had left Dr. Mudd's on Saturday
morning, instead of Saturday evening, as was actually the
case); (2) He had learned of the President's assassination at
church on Sunday (which, if the pair had left his home on
Saturday morning, would have placed Dr. Mudd's knowledge of the crime at twenty-four hours after the departure of
his visitors, a circumstance which argued strongly for the
doctor's innocence); and (3) The lame man walked away on
crutches (a disclosure which would have encouraged the
federal troopers to look for" a man on crutches" instead of two
men on horseback)." Understandably, Lt. Lovett left the
Mudd farm with more questions than answersn
Three days later, on Friday, April 21, Lt. Lovett and his
men returned to Dr. Mudd's and questioned him again. When
the lieutenant announced that he would have to search the
place, Dr. Mudd suddenly "remembered" that, since the
soldiers' last visit, he had "found" the boot he had cut off the
injured man. The doctor said something to his wife and Mrs.
Mudd went upstairs and returned with the boot. She handed
it to Lt. Lovett who turned the top of the boot down and spied
the name "J. Wilkes" written in it. Dr. Mudd said he had not
noticed the name before but that it now appeared that his
injured guest had indeed been John Wilkes Booth. 74
The atmosphere in the room changed immediately. Lt.
Lovett had stumbled over the assassin's trail and Mudd was
in deep trouble. Both men sensed it. The lieutenant asked the
doctor if either of his visitors had been armed. Dr. Mudd
replied that the "injured man" - he still could not bring
himself to call him "Booth" - "had a pair of revolvers." He
did not mention Herold's carbine, a more effective defense to
pursuing cavalry. 75
Lt. Lovett had heard enough. He placed the doctor under
arrest and they took off for Washington. The next day, Dr.
Mudd was brought before Colonel H.H. Wells and interrogated at length. At the conclusion of that interview he signed
a sworn statement for Wells in which he continued his game
of playing the loyal Southerner for his neighbors and the
cooperating witness for the federal officials."
Dr. Mudd said that Booth, his former house guest and
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sometime companion in Washington - a man he surely
should have recognized - did not show his face at all. He
"had his cloak thrown about his head," said Dr. Mudd, strange
and mysterious behavior for one whose injury was at the
other end of his body. Yet the doctor professed not to have
been curious. He merely set the man's leg, presumably
without asking him the sorts of professional questions one
would expect of a doctor treating an injured patient, and went
about his daily business.
At breakfast, the doctor's statement continued, the injured man's companion was talkative. He gave his name as
"Henston" and said that his injured companion's name was
"Tyson." The only thing he thought suspicious, Dr. Mudd
said, was that after breakfast the wounded man asked for a
razor and he later noticed that "Tyson" had shaved his mustache but that he still had his beard. Mrs. Mudd said she
noticed his whiskers had become partially detached as the
stranger was coming downstairs and concluded that the whiskers were false .77
Covered up head, face to the wall, shaved mustache, false
whiskers, and fictitious name. On this slender thread hung
Dr. Mudd's story that he did not recognize his nighttime
visitor. Viewed in the cold light of hindsight, Dr. Mudd's
statement to Colonel Wells raises more questions than it
answers.
First, the doctor said, "I have never seen Booth since that
time to my knowledge" (i.e., since Booth's firstvisitto Charles
County in November 1864). 78 He later admitted, however,
that he had seen Booth in Washington on December 23,1864. 79
Why would Dr. Mudd lie about this relationship with Booth
if the relationship were innocent?
Second, the doctor said he did not recognize Booth as the
injured man who called at the house on AprillS because: (1)
he had his head covered; (2) he kept his face turned to the wall;
(3) he shaved his mustache; (4) he wore false whiskers; and (5)
he and Herold gave fictitious names.
In 1877 Dr. Mudd and Samuel Cox Jr. were Democratic
candidates of the Maryland Legislature from Charles County.
Cox told O.H. Oldroyd in 1901 that when he and the doctor
were alone during that campaign Mudd talked often of the
assassination. He told him, Cox related, that Booth came to
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him early in the morning of Aprill5, 1865, without any effort
at concealment of his identity but without telling him of his
deed. The doctor treated his injury and made him as comfortable as possible and that afternoon went into Bryantown
where he learned of the murder and of Booth's involvement.
He went home and upbraided Booth angrily for involving
him and his family, and Booth pleaded pitifully, in the name
of his mother, not to deliver him up to the authorities. Dr.
Mudd yielded, he said, but he made Booth and Herold leave
his home immediately. 80
Cox's story has a ring of truth to it and is not altogether
unflattering to the doctor. Even with his admission that he
recognized Booth, however, the story doesn't fit. Dr. Mudd
also told Cox he had met Booth only once before, on the
weekend of November 12, 1864, when the actor spent the
night at his farm. Since we know that Dr. Mudd also saw
Booth in Washington on December 23, it is obvious the doctor
still felt constrained to lie about his role in the kidnap conspiracy as late as 1877.
Yet, aside from Cox's story, a mass of circumstantial
evidence suggests that Dr. Mudd was lying about not knowing Booth when he set the assassin's leg that morning.
The doctor's story that Booth kept his cloak over his head,
for example, is discredited by his detailed description of his
patient's forehead- "He had a pretty full forehead and his
skin was fair."- and his hair-" ... black and seemed to be
inclined to curl." 81
That he kept his face turned to the wall, as Dr. Mudd
swore, is also highly unlikely, particularly since the doctor
noted later that he had shaved off his mustache. How could
he have known Booth had shaved his mustache if he had not
seen the mustache earlier and how could he have seen it if
Booth had kept his head covered and his face to the wall?
Admittedly this argument runs to the ridiculous but only
because Dr. Mudd's story leads it there.
The shaved mustache is yet another story. Dr. Mudd's
apologists use this fact as a central argument in support of the
doctor's claim that he did not know who his visitors were.
There is, however, substantial evidence that Booth did not
shave his mustache at Dr. Mudd's. In Thomas A. Jones' little
book, John Wilkes Booth, Jones described his introduction to
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Booth on April16, the morning after the pair had left Mudd's
place. "Though he was exceedingly pale and his features bore
the evident traces of suffering, I have seldom, if ever, seen a
more strikingly handsome man," Jones wrote. "He wore a
mustache and his beard had been trimmed about two or three
days before." 82
Lieutenant A.R. Bainbridge, one of three young Confederates who came upon Booth and Herold at the Rappahannock
crossing on April 24, nine days after they had left Dr. Mudd's,
described that experience: "His long dark mustache swept
over his mouth in a straggling, unkempt manner, though it
was evident that he had tried to preserve its shape by frequent
handling. " 83
Richard B. Garrett was an eleven-year-old boy when Booth
came to his father's farm to die. Garrett, who grew up to be a
Baptist minister, wrote his recollection of Booth's brief visit to
his father's farm and in the early 1880s often lectured on the
subject. In his written account, the Reverend Garrett recalled
going into Booth's room early one morning: "The stranger
was still sleeping and as I dressed myself his face was turned
toward me. I remember vividly the impression made upon
me at that time. I had never seen such a face before. Jet black
curls clustered about a brow as white as marble and a heavy
dark mustache shaded a mouth as beautiful as a babe's." 84
The conclusion is inescapable- Booth did not shave his
mustache at Dr. Mudd's. The Mudds also insisted that Booth
wore false whiskers. Since he made no effort to conceal or
alter his appearance anywhere else along the escape route,
even though his description was being widely broadcast
throughout the land, this, too, can be dismissed as another
effort to explain away their failure to recognize their "mystery" guest. This conclusion is bolstered by the fact that no
one else with whom Booth came into contact during his flight
mentioned whiskers, false or otherwise. None were found on
his body or discovered along the route. The reason is, of
course, because it is highly unlikely that Booth wore such an
absurd device.
Dr. Mudd and Mrs. Mudd also insisted that their guests
gave fictitious names and did not mention their involvement
in the assassination, an exceedingly curious assertion in view
of the conduct of the pair elsewhere along their flight. Booth
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gave his name to Sergeant Cobb at the Navy Yard bridge as he
fled the city. 85 At Lloyd's Tavern Herold was acquainted with
the proprietor and no introduction was necessary. Booth did,
however, volunteer to Lloyd: "We have assassinated the
President." 86 When the pair finally emerged from Zekiah
Swamp and made their way to Colonel Samuel Cox's farm,
about seven miles from Bryantown, they told Cox who they
were and what they had done. 87 They made no effort to
conceal their identities or their deed from Thomas A. Jones
who hid them for five days.
Across the Potomac, they appear to have identified themselves to Mrs. Quesenberry who nervously refused to help
them. At the Rappahannock River, the pair readily identified
themselves, first to Major Ruggles and then to Jett and
Bainbridge, as "the assassins of the President." Only at the
Garrett farmhouse do they appear to have used aliases and
even that is questionable since everything the Garretts told
about their mysterious visitors must be balanced against the
family's interest in avoiding the gallows for harboring the
assassins. Assuming, however, that the Garrelts' story is true,
Booth's alias of "John William Boyd" makes a great deal more
sense, in view of the initials "JWB" which Booth had tattooed
on his hand, than the name "Tyson."
Thus if Booth and Herold so readily identified themselves
and talked openly of their accomplishment to almost everyone they encountered along the escape route, how can we
believe the Mudds' incredible story that the pair identified
themselves only by the names of "Tyson" and "Henston?"
Third, the final absurdity in Dr. Mudd's statement to
Colonel Wells was his story that, though he gave the pair
directions, he did not know where they went when they left
his home. From other sources we know, however, that the
pair departed, not by the main road but by a path through
Zekiah Swamp since the country was crawling with soldiers
searching for them. Not even Herold, whose intimate knowledge of the lower Maryland countryside had brought him into
the plot, was acquainted with the interior of the Zekiah
Swamp. No, Dr. Mudd, though he wanted very much to keep
it a secret, had sent his visitors on a hidden route to Colonel
Cox's plantation. As accessory before the fact to the kidnap
conspiracy, Dr. Mudd became an accessory after the fact to the
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murder of the President by aiding his killer's escape.
The Mudds always insisted that the doctor did not return
to Bryantown on Saturday night to inform the authorities
about his visitors because Mrs. Mudd was afraid to be left
alone. Her fear appeared to be centered in a Confederate
guerrilla, John H. Boyle, a desperate character who had assassinated Captain Thomas H. Watkins of Anne Arundel County,
near the Prince Georges County line, on March 25, and who
was still at large. This fear of Boyle would have been perfectly
justified. At the time of the general election of 1864, Boylewho knew of Dr. George Mudd's Union sympathies- sent
word to him that he would kill him and steal his horses. Mrs.
Mudd surely heard of this threat to her husband's cousin.
Moreover, about ten days before the President's murder,
Boyle was allegedly involved in a robbery and murder near
Nottingham in Prince Georges County and federal authorities
were on the lookout for Boyle even as the search for Booth was
taking place. 88
By Saturday morning, April 15, Lt. Dana was sent into
Southern Maryland to search for the two suspicious characters who had crossed the Navy Yard bridge late the night
before. He became convinced that the "person who murdered
Secretary Seward is Boyce or Boyd, the man who killed
Captain Watkins in Maryland." 89 That afternoon someone
put Dana straight as to the names and the feared desperado
John H. Boyle was identified as Seward's "assassin." When
the doctor told Mrs. Mudd that Boyle was supposedly involved, she understandably became frightened and asked
him not to leave her that night.
This does not, however, explain Dr. Mudd's roundabout
way of sending his suspicions about his visitors to the authorities in Bryantown. He left Mrs. Mudd alone while he
rode to church when, if he were truly concerned about informing the authorities, he could as well have ridden to Bryantown
and back and been gone from home no longer than he was on
his trip to church. And Lt. Dana would have had the word
twenty-four hours earlier.
Yet the truth was that Dr. Mudd was trapped. He knew
who his visitors were and what they had done, and realized
that sooner or later the federal authorities would make the
connection to his former association with Booth. Surratt's
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name was also appearing as a conspirator and the doctor had
met with him as well and this association, too, was bound to
surface and cause him trouble. On the other hand he could not
turn Booth over to the Federals without becoming an outcast
among his neighbors, who were largely pro-Southern. Then
there was Boyle. Mrs. Mudd later swore that she begged her
husband not to leave her alone that Saturday night. "I told
him that if he went himself that Boyle was reported to be one
of the assassins and who had killed Captain Watkins ... might
have him assassinated for it .... " 90 So the doctor tried to
straddle the issue and failed.
Everything considered, however, the most damning evidence against Dr. Mudd is circumstantial. The doctor's defenders have always insisted that Booth and Herold were
merely seeking medical attention when they stopped at Dr.
Mudd's, and that this gentle country physician was simply
obeying his Hippocratic oath when he set Booth's leg that
night. But this argument ignores the fact that by 1865 Dr.
Mudd was no longer a practicing physician. Charles County
had two or three other physicians, all competing for what
little medical business there was in a 19th century rural
county, and medicine was not a particularly easy way to make
a living. Dr. Mudd's father had given him a 500-acre farm and
ten slaves, and Sam had sensibly abandoned a medical practice which had earned him little to become a full-time farmer.
He was not, then, the simple country doctor who has
become an American folk hero, a kindly follower of
Hippocrates who hitched up his buggy night after night and
drove across the lower Maryland farmlands to care for the
sick. He was a farmer, and Booth's early morning call to his
home had less to do with his medical knowledge than his past
association with Booth in conspiracy against Lincoln.
Consider. When Booth fled south on the night of April14,
he passed near the dwellings of at least three other physicians
whose presence would likely have been known to him or to
Herold. Given Davy Herold's intimate knowledge of Southern Maryland and Booth's recent trips to the area, either or
both of them must have been aware of the presence of one or
more of these doctors. And there were, very likely, other
medical practitioners whose presence in 1865 we cannot be
certain of today, and of whom Booth and Herold would have
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been aware. Yet the fugitives raced south, ignoring these
medical doctors and abandoning the route which Atzerodt
said they intended to follow (straight south to Maryland
Point) in their haste to reach Dr. Mudd's house. 91
They did not make their way to Dr. Mudd's then, simply
because Booth was in need of any doctor. They arrived there,
having ignored the presence of other doctors who could have
afforded Booth relief earlier, because they knew Mudd was a
fellow conspirator on whom they could rely. The doctor
himself indirectly suggested as much in his sworn statement
to Colonel Wells. He said Booth "wanted to get back, or get
home and have [his leg] done by a regular physician." 92 Yet he
had already by-passed a number of "regular physicians" on
his way to Dr. Samuel A. Mudd, a retired, or inactive, physician. The selection of Dr. Mudd had, it seems, a good deal
more to do with the doctor's politics than with his medical
reputation.
In August 1865, Captain George W. Dutton of Company C,
lOth Regiment of the Veterans' Reserve Corps, who was the
commanding officer of the guard which accompanied Dr.
Mudd to Fort Jefferson in the Dry Tortugas, made a sworn
statement before a notary public in Washington. He swore
that Dr. Mudd had told him while under his charge enroute to
prison that Mudd knew Booth when he came to his house with
Herold, on the morning after the assassination of the President; that he had known Booth some time but was afraid to tell
of his having been at his house on the 15th of April fearing that
his own and the lives of his family would be endangered
thereby; that he was with Booth on the evening referred to by
Weichmann in his testimony (December 23, 1864); and that he
came to Washington on that occasion to meet Booth by appointment."
From his prison cell at Fort Jefferson, Dr. Mudd denied
having made this confession, and there is no way of knowing
who was telling the truth on this score. It is difficult to
imagine what would have prompted Capt. Dutton to swear to
such an outrageous lie as Dr. Mudd suggested the "confession" was, particularly sinceitis in accord with what we know
the facts to be. It is equally difficult to imagine why Dr. Mudd
would have abandoned the story he had stood by publicly
when public belief in his innocence was his one big hope of
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ever leaving prison a free man.
Dr. Mudd's repudiation of Captain Dutton's statement
does confirm to us, however, his position within the Rebel
underground. The doctor said that Booth, on his visit to the
farm in November 1864, had inquired into the political sentiments of the residents of lower Maryland and the contraband
trade that existed between the North and the South. "These
and many minor matters spoken of," Mudd wrote, "caused
me to suspect him to be a Government detective and to advise
Surratt regarding him. " 94 So Dr. Mudd would have us believe
that he suspected Booth of being a federal detective when he
first met him, though the opposite is almost certainly true.
The doctor nonetheless admitted that his reaction to the
suspected presence of a Union spy was to warn a known
Confederate agent. It is a telling commentary on the loyalty
of Dr. Samuel Alexander Mudd.
But we should not be surprised. Dr. George Mudd, testifying as a witness for Dr. Sam, said of his cousin at the
conspiracy trial: "From my association with him, I have to
consider him as sympathizing with the South.""
That he did. And when the time came he sided with the
South in a dangerous game - protecting the assassin of
President Lincoln. The wonder is that Dr. Mudd did not hang.
Yet, the Special Military Court of Appeals would now set
aside Dr. Mudd's conviction, two judges because they believe
the military commission lacked jurisdiction and one because
he believed Dr. Mudd's guilt was not proven.
CONCLUSION
The effect of this decision cannot be underestimated. It
was more than a mere exercise in the moot court process of
training lawyers. Because of the prominence of the lawyers
and judges involved, the United States Government will now
be required to take notice. The decision ofthis "court" will
demand respect, no matter how flawed it might be. It will
become an important tool in the Mudd family's struggle to
overturn the conviction of the 1865 military commission. Dr.
Richard Mudd, the 92-year-old grandson of Dr. Mudd has
already declared: "This will be a wonderful help in dealing
with the Secretary of Defense and [President] Clinton." 96
Lincoln, as might be expected, has the last word. On
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December 1, 1862, in his Annual Message to the Congress, the
President said, "Fellow citizens, we cannot escape history.""
He was right, of course. We cannot escape history. But, as the
Special Military Court of Appeal has shown, we can try to alter
it.
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4 0 "The wretched end of Benito Mussolini marks a fitting end to a wretched
life." N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 30, 1945, at 18.
Albert Spalding, a noted violinist who worked in Italy for the U.S. Office
of War Information, said at a news conference when asked about the killing of the
fallen dictator, that it was "the typical reaction of people who have been living in
tyranny for many years," and compared Mussolini's death to the summary justice
administered by the vigilante groups in the American West. N.Y. TIMES, May 1,
1945, at 3.
41 Charles Hardee of Georgia wrote that when the news was received at a
nearby store, everyone hurrahed and threw his hat in the air. Mrs. Cornelia
McDonald said that when she first heard of Lincoln's death, she felt it was just
what he deserved; and Robert Park, who personally opposed the assassination,
said that one of his comrades had expressed a willingness to share his last crust of
bread with Booth. TURNER, supra note 8, at 96.
Historians ... have generally assumed that the South abhorred Lincoln's
assassination and treated Booth with scorn and contempt. At a
superficial level this was the reaction of many southerners. However,
there is much evidence that many acted because of fear of their own
helpless position and the belief that Johnson could only be much
worse than Lincoln had been. Still others secretly applauded the deed
where circumstances permitted. When northerners assumed that the
South would exult over the murder and that it might pump new life into
the dying Confederacy, they would not have been so far wrong as
historians have assumed, if only conditions had been slightly different.

!d. at 99.
42
Respondent's Brief, supra note 31, at 6.
43
Petitioner's Brief, supra note 28, at 37-50.
" Jd. at 49-50.
45
1 POORE, supra note 10, at 430 (Testimony of Eaton G. Horner).
46
CHAMLEE, supra note 3, at 306; SAMUEL CARTER Ill, THE RIDDLE OF DR.
MUDD 73-75 (1974).
47

THE LIFE OF DR. MUDD, supra note 1, at 29 (Statement of Mrs. Samuel A.

Mudd).
48

/d.; 1 POORE, supra note 10, at 361 (Testimony of Thomas L. Gardiner).
Weichmann was a leading government witness.at the conspiracy trial and
undoubtedly was a Confederate agent who had been involved on the periphery of
the Lincoln plot. Samuel Arnold swore that Booth had told him that Weichmann
had provided him with information on the number of prisoners held by the north,
information that would come to Weichmann by reason of his clerkship at the
Commissary General of Prisoners. SAMUEL B. ARNOLD, DEFENCE AND PRISON
49

EXPERIENCES OF A LINCOLN CONSPIRATOR, STATEMENTS AND AUTOBIOGRAPHICAL NOTES 31 (1943).

Augustus "Gus" Howell, a Rebel blockade runner who was caught and

The Curious Case of Dr. Mudd

209

imprisoned shortly before the assassination, wrote (in an unpublished holographic
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that he was a member of a company?" Gwynn replied, "I think he was. I do not
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Mudd or seen him at a company gathering. Just as obviously, however, he knew
who among his neighbors were members of the militia companies. 2 id. at 300.
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the two led nowhere and the best modern opinion is that Rebel sympathizers in the
area were using decoys to keep the Federals off of Booth's trail. ROSCOE, supra
note 69, at 351.
73 1 POORE, supra note 10, at 258-72 (Testimony of Lieutenant Alexander
Lovett).
74
1 id.
15 1 id.
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~ 3 Prentiss Ingraham, Pursuit and Death of John Wilkes Booth, 39 CENTURY
MAG. 443 (1890). The same meeting was described in the same issue of the
magazine by Major Mortimer B. Ruggles, an operative of Captain Thomas Nelson
Conrad of the Confederate Secret Service. Ruggles wrote: " ... though he had
shaved off his mustache, upon his lip and face was a beard of some ten days'
growth." !d. at 494 (emphasis supplied).
We cannot have it both ways. If Booth had shaved his mustache at Mudd's
there would have been none for Jones to have seen and, even with ten days growth,
it would not have been long enough to have swept over his mouth by the time
Bainbridge saw Booth. Someone is mistaken or someone is lying. Fortunately for
the sake of historical accuracy, we know that other facets of Ruggles' account are
false, leaving his recollection of Booth's mustache open to question. Then, too,
aside from the Mudds, Ruggles was the only eyewitness to Booth's flight who
spoke of his mustache having been shaved. Most witnesses to the flight and those
who viewed his body later never mentioned his mustache. This omission would
not be unusual if the mustache were still in place but would be very curious if it
had been shaved.
84
Richard B. Garrett, End of a Manhunt, 17 AMERICAN HERITAGE 41 (June
1966).
85
1 POORE, supra note 10, at 252.
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1 id. at 119.
87
JONES, supra note 82, at 71-72.
"' James 0. Hall, The Guerrilla Boyle, THE MD. INDEPENDENT, May 7, 1975,
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89
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1975, pt. II, at 1.
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91
EISENSCHIML, supra note 2, at 470; see also ATLAS OF FIFTEEN MILES
AROUND WASHINGTON, INCLUDING THE COUNTY OF P~INCE GEORGE, MARYLAND (Philadelphia, G.M. Hopkins 1878). This atlas reveals the dwellings or
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were at least two other physicians Charles County in 1865. The physicians in
Prince Georges County in 1878 were as follows:
At the little crossroads village of Good Hope, still in the District of
Columbia, Booth's route passed, on his right, the home of a Dr. Wads worth. /d.
at 36. Just beyond Silver Hill, about two-and-one-half miles out of Washington
and barely a mile beyond the District line, the residence of Dr. McKim sat just off
the road to the ri ght of Booth's route. !d. at 22. Perhaps a mile south of Dr.
McKim's by road and no more than half a mile across country, Dr. William Gunton
made his home near the gristmill on Hensons Creek. /d.
At Surratsville the pair was less than a mile from the home of Dr. John L.
Waring, a physician in the Robeystown-Surrattsville area since 1841. !d. at 11.
Four-fi fths of a mile out of Surrattsville the road branched to the right southwest
toward the Potomac. About a mile down this road, in the spring of 1865 (and since
1842) lived the country doctor and member of the Doctors' Line (a Confederate
underground dispatch route), Dr. Edward H. Wyvill. A mile beyond Dr. Wyvill's,
in Piscataway Post Office, lived two physicians, Dr. Hurtt and Dr. Edelin. /d. at
19. But Booth and Herold rode on past the two physicians who were undoubtedly
there in 1865, bearing to the east toward Dr. Mudd 's.
At the same time they declined to turn west to Dr. Wyvill' s ho me for
medical care their route passed the home of Dr. P. H. Heiskell , just a mile due east
of the Surrattsville-Tee Bee Road . /d. at 26. As they raced on toward Tee Bee their
route passed by the roadside residence of Dr. Joseph H. Blanford and, to the east,
a mile off the main road, sat the home of Dr. Morgan. /d. at 27. In Tee Bee tbe
pair ignored the presence of Dr. JosephS. Latimer, a physician since 1825, and
made an abrupt turn to the southeast, beading for Dr. Mudd's and abandoning their
direct route south to the Potomac. /d. at 11 .
Their new route took them within two miles of the homes of Dr. Ri chard
Perry and Dr. Lewis Mackall, both nestled along a back road where cavalry was
unlikely to look in the first dragnet. /d. at 18, 27. Assuming the pair had taken that
route and fo und Doctors Perry and Mackall un available, they would have been
only a mile's ride from th e home of yet another physician of the area, Dr. J.H.
Skinner. /d. at 10, 18.
Still they rode on toward Dr. Mudd 's. At Horse Head their route took them
within half a mile of Dr. Skinner's. /d. at 18. Just a mile or so southeast of Horse
Head sat the home of Dr. M.R. Latimer. /d. at 23.
These fourteen physicians are merely some of those scattered along the
route followed by Booth and Herold through Prince Georges County, Maryland,
in 1878. Three of them, Drs. Waring, Wyv ill, and Joseph S. Latimer, the Atlas
reveals, were along Booth's route in 1865. Undoubtedly, others from the 187 8
Atlas were also there in 1865. Moreover, Drs. Waring, Wyvill and Latimer were
better situated for immediate medical care than was Dr. Mudd.
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Was the Assassination
of Abraham Lincoln a
War Crime?
Howard S. Levie*

There does not appear to be any dispute about the following facts concerning the assassination of President Abraham
Lincoln: that on 14 April1965, while sitting in a box at Ford's
Theater in Washington, D.C., watching a performance of
"Our American Cousin," Lincoln was shot and killed by John
Wilkes Booth; that in jumping from the box to the stage
(where he delivered the sic semper tyrannis pronouncement)
one of Booth's spurs caught on a flag decorating Lincoln's box
with the result that he fell and broke his leg; that despite this
he was able to escape from the theater and from Washington;
that he was later joined in his flight by David E. Herold; that
Dr. Samuel Mudd, a Booth acquaintance living in Maryland,
treated Booth' sleg and provided him with a makeshift crutch;
and that all this occurred five days after Lee's surrender to
Grant at Appomattox.
From that point on there is little agreement on the facts 1 and even less on the applicable law. However, as to some of
the facts which are disputed, there is really no basis for
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argument. For example, it is sometime argued that with Lee's
surrender the Civil War (or the War Between the States) came
to an end. That is not so. Lee had merely surrendered the
Army of Northern Virginia. The Confederate States of America
had other armies in the field, armies which continued to fight,
armies which did not surrender until well after the date of the
assassination 2 Moreover, because of the presence of thousands of Confederate sympathizers in Washington, martial
law had been declared for that city, which was fortified and
heavily guarded by Union troops, and that status still existed
on 14 April1865, when the assassination took place.
The current manual on the law of war of the United States
Army defines a war crime as "a violation of the law of war by
any person or persons, military or civilian."' Adopting this
definition, the sole question that this article will attempt to
answer is: Was the assassination of Abraham Lincoln by John
Wilkes Booth (and any co-conspirators) a violation of the law
of war and, hence, a war crime? To refine our discussion even
further: Is the murder of an individual committed in wartime
by one or more individuals of the same nationality as the
victim a war crime?
If the answer to these questions is in the affirmative, under
the law of war a military commission would unquestionably
have jurisdiction to try the accused persons, including Dr.
Samuel Mudd, brought before it charged with such an offense. If the answer to these questions is in the negative, the
question of the jurisdiction of a military commission becomes
one of constitutional and national law which is beyond the
purview of this discussion.'
For our purposes we will assume the worst case for the
accused: 1) that the evidence established that there was a
conspiracy to assassinate President Lincoln; 2) that the eight
individuals convicted by the military commission on 30 June
1865, including Dr. Samuel Mudd, as well as others who were
not charged, were parties to that conspiracy;' 3) that all of the
conspirators charged, being residents of the District of Columbia or of the State of Maryland, were nationals of the
Union; 4) that, nevertheless, all of the conspirators were
strong supporters of the Confederate cause; and 5) that the
conspiracy to assassinate Lincoln was motivated by a desire
on their part to help that cause. 6
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The charge with respect to which the military commission
opened its hearings on 9 May 1865, and to which the eight
accused pleased "Not Guilty" on the following day, alleged
that they "maliciously, unlawfully and traitorously" combined, confederated, and conspired to kill and murder
Abraham Lincoln and others? There is no allegation that their
acts were in violation of the law of war. The wording of the
charge itself demonstrates that the prosecution considered
the offense charged to be a conspiracy to commit treason by
murdering the President and his successors-to-be and that it
did not consider this to be a war crime.' As the present author
has said elsewhere:'
There are a number of actions which, while they are
wartime criminal offenses and are punishable by the
injured belligerent, do not come within any definition
of war crimes. Thus, while there is a wide-spread
belief that espionage and treason are violations of the
laws and customs of war and are, therefore, war
crimes, 10 this is not soY International law does not
forbid espionage and treason; national laws do 12
Presumably, the accused, Union citizens, assumed their acts
of assassination would in some manner benefit the Confederate cause, even at that late date in the war. Their acts were,
therefore, traitorous- but, as it has just been shown, treason
is not a violation of the law of war, and it is not a war crime.
The post-World War II trials in which Germans tried
Germans, Austrians tried Austrians, Hungarians tried Hungarians, etc., were not true war crimes trials. For the most part
they were collaborationist (treason) cases and, in many cases,
prosecuted misuse or abuse of power. Nor were the euthanasia cases or the concentration camp cases (involving actions
which took place prior to, and after, 1 September 1939, the
official date of the beginning of World War II in Europe),
which were tried by the Germans, true war crimes cases. They
were violations of German criminal law, which had existed at
the time of the offenses, but which, for obvious reasons, had
not been enforced by Nazi officials 13
In the Nordhausen Concentration Camp case, the review
of the case contains the following statement:
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For an illegal act to be a war crime certain elements
must be present, viz., (1) the act must be a crime in
violation of international law; (2) there must be a
disparity of nationality between the perpetrator and
the victim; and (3) the criminal act must have been
committed as an incident of war. 14
These elements were not present in the trial of those alleged
to have been parties to the conspiracy to assassinate Abraham
Lincoln. The act charged was not a violation of international
law; there was no disparity of nationality between the persons
charged as perpetrators and the victim; and it is extremely
doubtful that the assassination of Lincoln may be considered
to have been an incident of the war. Therefore, it was not a
war crime.
Proponents of the argument that the law of war governed
the assassination of Abraham Lincoln, a Union citizen, by
those who were likewise Union citizens, will find support in
the trial of Mariano Uyeki, 15 a case for which the present
author can find no justification:
Mariano Uyeki was born in 1924 in Iloilo, Panay, the
Philippines, of Japanese parents. When the war broke
out in 1941 he apparently suffered at the hands of his
Filipino schoolmates because he was pro-Japanese
and it was alleged that on 10 May 1942, after the
Japanese occupation of Panay, and without any
justification, he shot and killed a fellow Filipino
teenager. There was some evidence at that period he
was acting as an interpreter for the Japanese and that
he was wearing at least parts of a Japanese Army
uniform. However, he was not conscripted into the
Japanese Army until October 1944. He became a
prisoner of war on 1 September 1945. Early in 1946 he
was tried for the murder by a United States Military
Commission. He was convicted and sentenced to
death. That conviction was vacated because "the
validity of the proceedings is faulty." Unfortunately,
there is no explanation of the basis for that statement.
He then made an application to the Supreme Court of
the Philippines for a writ of habeas corpus, claiming
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that he was a Filipino citizen and that the United States
Military Commission had no jurisdiction to try him.
His application was denied on the ground that even if
he had originally been a national of the Philippines, he
had forfeited that nationality by rendering military
service to the Japanese Government. This was not a
decision that the military commission had jurisdiction
to try him, it was a decision that the Supreme Court of
the Philippines had no jurisdiction to rule on the
jurisdiction of the United States court because he was
not a citizen of the Philippines. He was retried by
another United States Military Commission in April
1946 and was again convicted and sentenced to death. 16
Concerning this case the present author went on to say:
When the offense was committed in 1942, it was a
matter of the murder of one (pro-American) Filipino
civilian by another (pro-Japanese) Filipino civilian. It
was a violation of the criminal law of the
Commonwealth of the Philippines. Surely, this was a
case for the courts of the Philippines and not a war
crime for trial by a United States Military Commission.
Even though the accused may have lost his Filipino
nationality in 1944, upon entering the Japanese Army,
and even though the Philippines were not yet fully
independent, it did have its own fully-developed
criminal justice system. It is difficult to find a basis for
the jurisdiction of the United States military
commission for this offense committed in 1942.
Regrettably, no application for a writ of habeas corpus
was made to the United States Courts 17
In other words, it is not believed that motive alone can
convert an offense which is a violation of national law into one
which is a violation of international law. Had Booth and his
fellow conspirators been disappointed office seekers, the assassination of President Lincoln would certainly not have
been a war crime; and the fact that they acted as they did
because of their political motivation, because of their desire to
support the Confederacy, does not convert a common law
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national crime into an international crime.
The conclusion is reached that the assassination of President Abraham Lincoln by John Wilkes Booth and his fellow
conspirators was not a violation of the law of war and, therefore, was not a war crime, but was a politically motivated,
treasonous act committed by Union citizens in the hope that
it would help the Confederate cause. Accordingly, even if we
assume that the evidence supported Dr. Mudd's conviction of
conspiracy to commit treason and murder under national
law, he was properly convicted only if a trial by military
commission at that time and place complied with the constitutional and statutory law of the United States.
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The Appeal of
Dr. Samuel Mudd
Jeffrey F. Addicott*

I. INTRODUCTION

The Legal Forum did an outstanding job in sponsoring the
moot appeal of Dr. Samuel A. Mudd. From start to finish, the
logistics of the presentation were superbly handled.
Set against the backdrop of the War Between the States,
the most tragic and yet defining historical event in our nation,
the audience was guaranteed a production sure to capture the
imagination. While the legal arguments on both sides clearly
demonstrated how our system of jurisprudence has evolved
since the War Between the States, in a larger sense, the moot
appeal also challenged the audience to reflect back on
many of the fundamental issues attendant to the war.
In weighing the appeal of Dr. Mudd, the moot court of
appeals faced two primary issues - jurisdiction and sufficiency of evidence. Of these two issues, only the evidentiary
question was easily and expeditiously resolved.
H. SUFFICIENCY OF EVIDENCE
Regarding the sufficiency of evidence question, even under the most favorable standard available to the government
- a "more like! y than not standard" - the moot court of
*Lieutenant Colonel, U.S. Army, Attorney at Law; Office of the Judge Advocate
General, International & Operational Law Division.
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appeals was certainly obliged to overturn Dr. Mudd's conviction. Indeed, a fair review of the evidence presented against
Dr. Mudd revealed that there was probably not enough of a
case developed to charge Dr. Mudd, let alone bring him to
trial.
There can be little serious debate that the public hysteria
surrounding the assassination of President Lincoln and the
attempted assassination of several members of the Union's
top leadership had completely prejudiced the impartiality of
the fact finders.' Accordingly, the three member appellate
panel was unanimous in finding that there was insufficient
evidence presented at Dr. Mudd's trial to sustain the guilty
findings of the military tribunal.
HI. JURISDICTION
The jurisdictional question faced by the moot court of
appeal posed a more difficult issue. Indeed, there were two
theories by which the tribunal could have asserted jurisdiction: (1) under the test set out in Ex parte Milligan,' or (2} under
the traditional "common law of war" standard.
In spite of the existence of these two distinct theories for
establishing jurisdiction, most of the attention of the moot
court was directed toward assessing the Milligan approach.
The" common law of war" approach, which is a firm basis on
which to assert jurisdiction, did not receive due consideration. Thus, on the question of whether the military tribunal
had jurisdiction to try Dr. Mudd, the three member moot
court split, with the majority finding that no jurisdiction
existed. In my opinion, gauged by either the Milligan approach or the common law of war approach, this conclusion
was erroneous. The military commission had jurisdiction to
try Dr. Mudd.

A. Milligan
The test for asserting jurisdiction as set out in Milligan is
rather straightforward. In short, the Court in Milligan held
that a military tribunal' could not properly try a civilian
unless "exigent circumstances" exist, e.g., unless legitimate
government control is seriously challenged.
Simply put, the question is whether such exigent circumstances existed in Washington City' at the time that the com-
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mission asserted jurisdiction over Mudd and the other conspirators. Two of the moot panel members found that no such
exigent circumstances existed, and therefore held that the
accused should have been tried in a civilian court.
The greatest obstacle in evaluating historical events rests
in the ability to accurately grasp the full range of facts surrounding the event in question. Although one might argue
that this task is not difficult, as hindsight is "20 /20," many
fundamental issues relating to the War Between the States are
extremely complex and require careful study.
In this sense, it seems that the primary problem in properly gauging the exigencies related to the Milligan standard
turn on accurately comprehending issues related to the very
nature of the war. Unfortunately, even after 130 years, there
exists much confusion about the War Between the States. This
confusion ranges from a fair understanding of the causes,' to
the very name of the conflict- it was not a "civil war." 6
The exigencies that allowed jurisdiction under Milligan
are fairly convincing. First and foremost, the war had not
ended when the plot was carried out, nor at the time the
military tribunal was established by President Johnson. In
addition, Washington City was still the seat of the Union war
effort. Although the Army of Northern Virginia had surrendered in April 1865, there were several major Confederate
armies still in the field.' The closest to Washington City after
the assassination of Lincoln was Confederate General Joe
Johnston's in North Carolina (30,000 strong). This force was
only a few days' march away. Indeed, it was not inconceivable
that Washington City might once again be attacked by a
detached portion ofthat army, as it had been in the Fall of 1864
when General Lee detached General Jubal Early from his
army to strike north behind enemy lines.
Second, the Confederate cabinet was still intact and operational as it traveled through Virginia and into Georgia with
the design to reach the trans-Mississippi region. President
Davis was actively engaged in gathering forces to carry on the
war and was not captured until May 10, 1865. 8
Finally, bands of armed Confederates were still operating
in Maryland and Virginia 9 This, coupled with a war that had
already caused over 600,000 casualties, convinced many prominent Union officers that the assassination of Lincoln was part
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of a last ditch effort by the Confederacy. 10
The majority opinion failed to properly recognize these
pertinent historical facts that supplied sufficient exigent circumstances. The conclusion of the court that exigent circumstances were absent, was inaccurate and reflected a misunderstanding of the historical facts that should have been applied
to the Milligan standard.
13. Common Law of War
Customary international law has long recognized the legality of military commissions or tribunals to try those accused of violations of the laws of nations or, to use the generic
term, those accused of "war crimes." A war crime is a generic
term for all illegal actions relating to the inception or conduct
of warfare. 11
A military commission derives its authority from the U.S.
Constitution which provides that Congress has the power to
"define and punish offenses against the law of nations." 12 In
turn, Congress has traditionally turned jurisdiction over to
the military to conduct military tribunals for those accused of
war crimes. Armed with this authority, military tribunals
have tried hundreds of individuals since the War for Independence.
During the War Between the States, the jurisdictional
basis for trying war criminals was specifically authorized in
Article XIII of General Orders No. 100 (issued April24, 1863),
promulgated as "Instructions for the Government of the
Armies of the United States in the Field," and known as the
Lieber Code 13 "Military jurisdiction is oftwo kinds: first, that
which is conferred and defined by statute; second, that which
is derived from the common law of war." In addition, Article
VIII of General Orders No. 30 (issued April 22, 1863) states:
"The laws of war apply equally to all portions of our country
while war exists." 14 Thus, the President had the authority to
use military commissions or military tribunals to try those
accused of committing war crimes.
Customary international law holds that anyone can commit a war crime, since the offense is a violation against the
laws of nations. Thus, the fact that Dr. Mudd was a civilian
does not exclude him from being tried in a military tribunal as
a war criminal. The critical question is whether the killing of
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President Lincoln by the conspirators was a war crime in
violation of the laws and customs of war.
President Lincoln, as the Commander in Chief of all Union
forces, was a legitimate war target. For example, had President Lincoln been shot and killed by a regular Confederate
cavalry attack into Washington City, the killing would have
been lawful. Under this set of facts, and because a state of
hostilities existed between the Confederate States and the
United States, President Lincoln would have been a legitimate military target and the Confederate soldiers would have
been lawful combatants, entitled to all the protection of prisoners of war.
In the case of the Booth conspiracy, however, while Lincoln was still a legitimate military target, Booth and his
conspirators were not lawful combatants. Therefore, the coconspirators had no lawful right to kill President Lincoln,
hence, the term assassination is used to describe the unlawful
killing. Those who committed the killing of President Lincoln, as well as those who conspired, were guilty of a violation
of the law of war under customary international law.
To address such war criminals, General Orders No. 30,
Section II, specifically defined individuals who conduct activities outside of the color of legitimate authority. 15 The
Booth conspirators could fall under either the definition for
the "brigand," or the "guerrilla proper." The brigand is
described as one who "assails the enemy without or against
the authority of his own Government." 16 The guerrilla proper
is defined as those who do not abide by the laws of war and do
not belong "to a regular army, consisting of volunteers, perhaps self-constituted." 17 General Orders No. 30 prescribes
that all who fall under either category shall "suffer death,
according to the usage of nations, by sentence of a military
commission." 18
In the case ofthe Booth conspirators, it is certain that none
were in the military service of the Confederacy, nor were they
acting under any authority whatsoever from Confederate
authorities, civil or military 19 These individuals were engaged in acts of unlawful belligerency. Although they sought
to hinder the Union war effort - the plot had been in the
planning stage for over a year- they had no standing under
the laws and customs of war to do so. Thus, they were clearly
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guilty of committing war crimes and subject to being tried by
a military commission for their acts.
III. CONCLUSION
More than a century and a quarter after the original trial of
Dr. Mudd, amid the vastly different modus vivendi of modern
American society, the moot appeal offered a unique opportunity to visit the origins and early applications of legal principles that most citizens now take for granted.
Although the court reached the correct conclusion- that
Dr. Mudd should have been released- this conclusion should
have rested on the sufficiency of the evidence, rather than on
a jurisdictional basis.
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So far from engaging in a war to perpetuate slavery, I am rejoiced that
slavery is abolished. I believe it will be greatly for the interests of the
South. So fully am I satisfied of this ... that I would cheerfully have
lost all I have lost by the war and suffered all I have suffered, to have
this object attained.
6
See LIEBER'S CODE AND THE LAW OF WAR 18 (RichardS. Hartigan ed.,
1983) [hereinafter cited simply as LIEBER's CODE]. Although the War Between
the States is popularly called the Civil War, it was not a civil war. Francis Lieber,
the author of the Union's rules regulating warfare, set forth a definition of "civil
war" that clearly did not fit the facts of the conflict between the North and South.
Lieber defined the term civil war as, ''War between two or more portions of a
country or state, each contending for the mastery of the whole, and each claiming
to be the legitimate government." Clearly, the Southern Confederacy only sought
legal separation from the United States, not to conquer the United States. If the
War Between the States is classified as a "civil war" then the American War for
Independence with Great Britain must also be termed a "civil war."
1
See THOMAS B. ALLEN, THE BLUE AND THE GRAY 309 (1992). The last
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major Confederate army, commanded by General Watie, surrendered on 23 June

1865.
See MICHAEL B. BALLARD, A LONG SHADOW: JEFFERSON DAVIS AND
THE FTNAL DAYS OF THE CONFEDERACY (1986).
9 But see T . HARRY WILLIAMS , THE HISTORY OF AMERICAN W ARS PROM
1745 TO 1918, at 301 (lst ed. 1981). Ju st before the surrender at Appomattox,
Virginia , several high ranking Confederate officers suggested that the Army of
Northern Virginia should scatter and "take to the hills." Lee, however, would not
permit continued resistance by guerrilla methods. He replied that "this kind of
warfare would bring o nl y devastation and misery to the people the army had been
defending."
10 !d. While Lincoln' s assassination was no t sponsored by the Confederacy,
there were several "last ditch plans." One was a plan to free and arm thousands
of Confederate prisoners of war at Point Lookout, Maryland, and use them to
attack Was hington City. This had been planned in Richmond for more than a year.
11
See John Triffterer, Jurisdiction over States for Crimes of State, in 2 A
TREATISE ON I NTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW 86-96 (M. Cheri[ Bassioun i &
Ved P. Nanda eds., 1973).
11
U.S. CONST. art. I,§ 8, c l. 10.
1l Francis Lieber, a German international law schol ar and professor at
Columbia University , was asked by the Federal a uthorities to draft a code for the
conduct of war on land. THE MILITARY LAWS OF THE UNITED STATES, War
Dep' t Doc. No. 64, at 779-799 (Washingto n, GPO, George B. Davis ed., 1897).
See also NATIONAL SECURITY LAW 309-10 (John N. Moore et al. eds., 1990);
DIETRICH SCHINDLER & JIRI TOMAN, THE LAWS OF ARMED CONFLICT: A
COLLECTION OF CONVENTIONS, RESOLUTIONS, AND OTHER DOCUMENTS 3
(Dietrich Schindler & Jiri Toman eds., 3d ed. 1988). Southern forces adopted their
own code of conduct for land warfare in 1861: "Articles of War, Regul ations of
the Army of the Confederate S tates." In June of 1863, Ja mes A. Seddon, the
Confederate Secretary of War, pledged to abide by most of the su bstanti ve
provisions of the Lieber Code.
14
LIEBER'S CODE, supra note 6, at 104.
IS Jd. at 92.
16
/d. at 95.
17 !d. at 96.
II /d.
19
Although numero us accusations were made to link President Davis and
General Lee to th e plot, it soon became clear that such machinations were totally
false. Indeed, Lee's sense of humanity made such accusations totally absurd. Lee
even refused to e ngage in legitimate reprisals, a concept well recognized in
international law. This is one of the reasons he has been called the "Christian
General ," as ret1ected in his address to the troops as they marched into Pennsylvania during the Gettysburg campaign of 1863: "It must be remembered that we
make war on ly on armed men, and that we cannot take vengeance for the wrongs
our people have suffered withou t lowering ourselves in the eyes of ... Him to whom
vengeance belongeth." THE WAR OF THE REBELLION: A COMPILATION OF THE
OFFJClAL RECORDS OF THE UNION AND CONFEDERATE ARMIES, ser. I , vol.
XXVII, pt. HI , at 943 (Washington, GPO 1899).
8
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INTRODUCTION
In 1865, a nine-man military commission, presided over
by Major General David Hunter,' convicted Dr. Samuel A.
Mudd of complicity with John Wilkes Booth in the assassination of President Lincoln. The commission sentenced Dr.
Mudd to life imprisonment and he was sent to Fort Jefferson,
a federal prison on an island off the gulf coast of Florida. Less
than four years later, on February 8, 1869, President Andrew
Johnson pardoned him. By definition, a pardon reaches both
the punishment prescribed for the offense and the guilt of the
offender 2
Dr. Samuel Mudd was not satisfied with his pardon and
neither is his grandson, Dr. Richard D. Mudd, an elderly
resident of Saginaw, Michigan. Richard Mudd has conducted
a long and highly skillful public relations and political campaign to clear his grandfather's name. Since the pardon
already did this in the eyes of the law, Richard Mudd is really
seeking historical vindication of his grandfather.
Pressed by Richard Mudd and several members of Congress, the Army Board for Correction of Military Records
*J.D., 1995, University of Richmond; B.A. cum laude, 1990, Denison University.
** Editor of Louis Weichmann' sA True History of the Assassination of Abraham
Lincoln and the Conspiracy of 1865 (Alfred A Knopfed., 1975) and author of The
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agreed to review Samuel Mudd's 1865 conviction and consider expungement of the record created by the military
commission.
The Board held a hearing in the Pentagon on January 22,
1992, taking testimony only from those sympathetic to Dr.
Mudd. As a result of this hearing, the Board recommended to
the Secretary of the Army that the conviction be set aside
because the military commission lacked jurisdiction to try Dr.
Mudd. Concluding that Dr. Mudd should have been tried in
a civil court, the Board did not proceed to rule on his guilt or
innocence. Subsequently, William D. Clark, Acting Assistant
Secretary of the Army, denied the Board's recommendation
for two reasons: (1) that it is not the role of the Board to settle
historical disputes; and (2) that the Board had no judicial
function.'
Later in 1992, the T.C. Williams School of Law at the
University of Richmond organized a "moot appeal" from Dr.
Mudd's 1865 conviction, inventing a fictional Special Court of
Military Appeal for this purpose. Three highly regarded
judges with military and international law backgrounds were
recruited to hear the appeal. Law students were assigned to
prepare briefs for Dr. Mudd's counsel and for the government's
counsel. The case was argued at the law school on February
12, 1993.
Afterward, two of the judges decided that the military
commission lacked jurisdiction to try Dr. Mudd. The third
thought that Dr. Mudd's trial by military authorities was
legal, but that the evidence presented was insufficient for
conviction.
Careful review of the arguments made for Dr. Mudd in
this court reveals several errors and omissions. Our intent
here is to call the public's attention to the many facts ignored
in the mock appeal and thus to defend the integrity of history.
This article will begin by taking a look at the man who was Dr.
Mudd. It will then go on to discuss procedural and evidentiary
matters, demonstrating how their correct resolution by the
appellate tribunal would have left a case by the prosecution
sufficient to sustain Dr. Mudd's conviction. Finally, certain
misleading statements made to the appellate tribunal on
behalf of Dr. Mudd in the brief and oral arguments will be
analyzed and corrected.
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DR. SAMUEL A. MUDD
In evaluating Dr. Mudd's actions, it is proper to start with
the man. Viewed by some as a simple country doctor, he was
not only avowedly pro-Confederate, but also demonstrably
pro-slavery. The 1860 slave census shows that Dr. Mudd's
father, Henry L. Mudd, owned sixty-one slaves and that
Samuel Mudd owned five himself. At the 1865 trial, two
Mudd slaves, Mary Simms and her brother, Elzee Eglent,
testified that Dr. Mudd shot Elzee for not obeying orders. 4
Concerning his views on slavery, Dr. Mudd did not differ
from his state and his community. In the election of 1860,
92,502 votes were cast in Maryland, of which only 2,294 were
for Lincoln. In Charles County where Dr. Mudd lived, 1,197
votes were cast in that election, of which only six were for
Lincoln.' Dr. Mudd had little reason to be an admirer of
Abraham Lincoln or of the Union.
On January 13, 1862, Dr. Mudd wrote a long letter to O.A.
Brownson, the publisher of Brownson's Quarterly Review. In
this missive, Dr. Mudd gives the full flavor of his views on
slavery, "the north" and its people, and Lincoln (the "head of
the government") and his administration. Dr. Mudd was not
only "pro slavery," but also anti-Lincoln. He supported the
Confederacy and its war aims. To take just one quote from
that letter: "I confidently assert, that if there was any other
man at the head of the Government of true conservative and
constitutional principles, the Revolution would immediately
cease so far as the South is concerned."'
TRIAL BY MILITARY COMMISSION
Much attention has been given to whether the Booth
conspirators should have been tried by a military court.
Proper analysis of this issue requires placing in military and
political context PresidentJohnson's decision to refer the case
to a military commission. Because of the crisis gripping
Washington at the time of the conspirators' arrests, prosecution in a military court was justified. Washington was the
wartime headquarters of the armed forces of the Union. The
city was ringed by some sixty forts. It had been invaded in the
summer of 1864, and great battles had been fought around or
near it. At the time President Lincoln was assassinated, the
rebellion had not yet been extinguished. There were still
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substantial Confederate armies in the field, and Confederate
leaders continued to express hope of ultimate success. Under
conditions such as these, any attempt to assassinate the Commander in Chief by persons sympathetic to the enemy should
be viewed as a furtherance of the war efforts of the enemy, and
accordingly prosecuted under the laws of war.
At the time, President Johnson asked Attorney General
James Speed for his opinion regarding the jurisdiction of a
military commission to try the assassination conspirators.
Mr. Speed's opinion confirmed the legality of this jurisdiction. In essence, the Attorney General's opinion held that, in
time of war, the military could try civilians if they were
"public enemies." The opinion rested in part on a constitutional provision regarding offenses against the law of nations'
and on common rules called the "laws of war." 8 With respect
to the term "public enemies," it is worth noting that a conspiracy to assassinate the heads of government, that is President Lincoln, Vice President Johnson, and Secretary of State
Seward, for the purpose of affecting the course of the war,
could hardly have been organized by "friends."
The whole purpose of the conspiracy, whether to capture
Lincoln or to assassinate him, was to throw the Union government into confusion and disrupt its military operations. The
assassination of Abraham Lincoln was a threat to the very
existence of the government. There was a crisis.
DR. MUDD'S HABEAS CORPUS PETITION
It is important to remember that a question of jurisdiction
is one of procedure. While resolution of procedural questions
in a defendant's favor may moot any examination by a court
of facts related to the underlying substantive offense, it does
not magically erase those facts from existence. In this case,
facts unrelated to jurisdiction prove Dr. Mudd conspired, as
charged at the 1865 trial, to "advise, encourage, receive,
entertain, harbor, and conceal, aid, and assist the said John
Wilkes Booth."' Neither a subsequent presidential pardon,
nor a modern-day judgment that a military commission was
the wrong tribunal, can change the facts that prove Dr. Mudd's
guilt.
With respect to the question of jurisdiction, Candida Steel
at the "mock appeal" argued on behalf of Dr. Mudd that the
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December 1866 Supreme Court decision in Ex parte Milligan 10
applied retroactively to the 1865 trial of Dr. Mudd and the
other conspirators. Lambdin P. Milligan, a rabidly pro-Confederate Indiana man, was arrested by military authorities for
clearly treasonable activities. He was brought to trial before
a military commission convened in Indianapolis on October
21, 1864. He was convicted and sentenced to be hanged. The
execution was delayed, and the case ultimately reached the
Supreme Court by way of an appeal from a lower federal
court's denial of a petition for writ of habeas corpus. In a
complex decision, the Court held that circumstances in Indiana did not justify the use of a military commission because
law and order had not broken down under invasion or threats,
and because the civil courts were open and free to function.
Four justices, led by Chief Justice Chase, dissented in partY
Prompted by the decision in Milligan, Baltimore attorney
Andrew Sterrett Ridgely filed a petition for a writ of habeas
corpus for Dr. Mudd with Chief Justice Chase on December
19, 1866. Chase returned the petition on December 29th with
a brief note suggesting that it be filed " ... in the District in
which the prisoner is held." This was the Southern District of
Florida.
In 1868, such a petition, Ex parte Mudd et al., came before
Judge Thomas J. Boynton of the United States District Court
for the Southern District of Florida. Judge Boynton reviewed
Milligan and held that the circumstances in Washington,
where the assassination conspiracy case arose, were fundamentally different. In his September 1868 opinion, Judge
Boynton concluded that Milligan did not apply to the military
trial of the Lincoln conspirators and denied the writ. The key
paragraph of his opinion reads thus:
The President was assassinated not for private
animosity nor for any other reason than a desire to
impair the effectiveness of military operations and
enable the rebellion to establish itself into a
Government; the act was committed in a fortified city
which had been invaded during the war, and to the
northward as well as the southward of which battles
had many times been fought, which was the
headquarters of all the armies of the United States,
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from which daily and hourly went military orders.
The President is the Commander in Chief of the army,
and the President who was killed had many times
made distinct military orders under his own hand,
without the formality of employing the name of the
Secretary of War or Commanding-General. It was not
Mr. Lincoln who was assassinated, but the Commander
in Chief, for military reasons. I find no difficulty,
therefore, in classing the offense as a military one, and
with this opinion arrive at the necessary conclusion
that the proper tribunal for the trial of those engaged
in it was a military one." 12
An appeal from Judge Boynton's decision reached the
Supreme Court in late February 1869 as Ex parte Arnold and
Spangler. Dr. Mudd's name was deleted from the title of the
case because he had already been pardoned by President
Johnson. The Supreme Court calendar shows that this case
was argued on February 26 with P. Phillips appearing for the
other two conspirators and Assistant Attorney General Ashton
appearing for the government. Before the Court could reach
a decision and write an opinion, President Johnson pardoned
both Arnold and Spangler. Consequently, Chief Justice Chase
ordered the appeal dismissed on March 19, 1869, presumably
because the pardons had rendered it entirely moot. This
action by Chase left Judge Boynton's decision on the propriety of military jurisdiction undisturbed and in place. His
opinion that the facts of the Milligan and Mudd cases were
sufficiently different so that the former decision did not
control the latter has never been reversed. It seems clear from
this history of Dr. Mudd's habeas petition that it cannot today
be asserted that the Supreme Court's decision in Ex parte
Milligan should dictate the outcome of a "mock appeal" in Dr.
Mudd's case.
THE RIGHTS OF DR. AND MRS. MUDD TO TESTIFY
In the brief filed on behalf of Dr. Mudd in the "mock
appeal," it is charged that:
1. Dr. Mudd was denied the right to offer testimony on
his own behalf; 13 and
2. Mrs. Mudd should have been deemed competent to
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testify."
These charges plainly infer that both Dr. Mudd and his wife
had a legal or Constitutional right to testify and that the
military commission perversely denied them that "right."
The Constitution, however, is silent on the point, and according to the common law of the time, the defendant in a criminal
case was not a "competent witness." Such testimony was
considered an invitation to perjury. 15 Unless there was a
statute permitting a defendant to testify, the common law
governed in all criminal cases, both federal and state. In 1865,
only Maine by law permitted testimony by the defendant in
criminal cases. 16 It was not until March 16th, 1878, that
Congress enacted a similar lawY Therefore, no testimonial
right belonging to the accused, Constitutional or otherwise,
was violated by the military commission in the trial of the
conspirators. Under the prevailing law, Dr. Mudd was simply not a competent witness.
Furthermore, there is nothing in the records of the 1865
trial before the military commission to show that Dr. Mudd's
attorneys ever sought to call him as a witness. They certainly
were not clamoring to put him on the stand. Indeed, it is
doubtful that they would have taken this risky step even if it
had been permitted.
With respect to Mrs. Sarah Mudd, there was no legal bar
in 1865 to calling her as a defense witness. Even so, there was
no record in the transcript that the defense ever attempted to
call Mrs. Mudd. It is therefore disingenuous for Mudd's
counsel to say in the petitioner's brief that her testimony was
"not allowed" by the military commission. The question
simply did not come up. Dr. Mudd's original attorneys,
General Thomas Ewing and Frederick Stone, were good lawyers and probably recognized that Mrs. Mudd might have
tripped on a material fact under cross-examination and
wrecked the defense plans.
DID MUDD RECOGNIZE BOOTH THAT NIGHT?
At roughly four o'clock in the morning on Saturday, April
15, 1865, two men, one with a broken leg, came to the door of
Dr. Mudd's country farm house. It was on that morning that
Dr. Mudd set the broken leg of and otherwise assisted Lincoln's
assassin.
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A question long debated by Lincoln historians is whether
Dr. Mudd recognized the injured man as John Wilkes Booth.
The answer bears on Dr. Mudd's membership in the conspiracy. Dr. Mudd claimed that he never recognized either of
the men who visited that morning. Why would he lie if not to
conceal his own culpable involvement? When Dr. Mudd was
questioned by Lt. Alexander Lovett, he said that the injured
man had borrowed a razor to shave off his mustache. Lovett
then asked Mudd if this man had any other beard. According
to Lovett, Dr. Mudd replied, "'Yes, he had a long pair of
whiskers."' When asked if they might be false, Mudd was
said by Lovett to have answered "he did not know." 18 Later,
Dr. Mudd admitted to another Union officer that the beard
may have been false. However, according to that officer,
Mudd insisted that the man whose leg he set '"had his cloak
thrown around his head' and that he 'did not see his face at
all"' the entire time he was being treated. 19 This self-serving
account of the doctor's is uncorroborated; other evidence
shows that Dr. Mudd in fact knew whom he was treating. It
shows that Dr. Mudd had met Booth before the assassination;
indeed it establishes several meetings between the two.
The first meeting between Dr. Mudd and John Wilkes
Booth took place on November 13, 1864, at St. Mary's Catholic
Church in Bryantown, Maryland. Booth had come from
Washington by stage the day before and spent the night as a
guest of Dr. William Queen, an elderly leader of the Confederate underground apparatus in Charles County. Booth
brought with him a letter of introduction to Dr. Queen. It had
been given to Booth in Montreal about two weeks before by a
Confederate agent, Patrick Charles Martin. 20 The purpose of
Booth's visit to Bryantown was to line up clandestine assistance for a Confederate plan to capture Lincoln and carry him
off to Richmond. The cover story used to explain Booth's visit
was that Booth had an interest in buying land. John C.
Thompson, Dr. Queen's son-in-law introduced Booth to Dr.
Mudd at church that Sunday morning. There is no other
satisfactory explanation of why Dr. Mudd was at St. Mary's
that day; his own church, St. Peter's, was some eight miles
distant and nearer to his home.
The second meeting between Dr. Mudd and Mr. Booth
took place between December 17 and December 22, also in
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Bryantown. Booth again carne by stage from Washington and
spent one night as a guest of Dr. Queen. Dr. Mudd had
requested Confederate agent Thomas H. Harbin (alias Wilson) to come up from Virginia to meet Booth and discuss the
plan to capture Lincoln. Dr. Mudd was present for this
discussion, which was held in Booth's room at the old
Bryantown tavern. Harbin agreed to participate in the plan
and was active in carrying out details along the lower Potomac
River right up to the time Lincoln was shot. After the war,
Harbin told the famous war correspondent George Alfred
Townsend about his meeting with Booth and Dr. Mudd.
Townsend published an account of this meeting years later in
the Cincinnati Enquirer for April18, 1892.
During his second visit to Bryantown, Booth was an overnight guest in Dr. Mudd' shorne, probably on Sunday, December 18. The next morning the two rode over to the horne of Dr.
Mudd's near neighbor, George Gardiner, where Booth purchased a one-eyed horse for eighty dollars. He rode the horse
back to Washington." It was this horse that Lewis Payne used
on the night of April14, 1865, when he attacked Secretary of
State William H. Seward and members of his household.
There was yet a third meeting between Dr. Mudd and Mr.
Booth before the assassination. This occurred on December
23, 1864, when Dr. Mudd carne to Washington to meet Booth
by appointment. It was during this meeting that Dr. Mudd
met with Confederate agent and courier John H. Surratt.
Evidently, this encounter grew out of the Booth, Harbin, and
Mudd conference in Bryantown a day or so before. On the
evening of December 23, Dr. Mudd met Booth at theN ational
Hotel and the two set out for the boarding house of Mrs. Mary
E. Surratt with the intent of finding her son. 22 On the way,
they accidentally ran into John Surratt and one of his mother's
boarders, Louis J. Weichrnann, on the street. After introductions, the four went to Booth's room to talk and have refreshments. At the 1865 trial, Weichrnann testified that he was
present at this meeting, did not hear all that was said there,
and did not quite understand what he did hear. He said that
the three others, Booth, Surratt, and Mudd, frequently stepped
out into the hallway for private discussions. 23
On the witness stand, Weichrnann recalled the hotel meeting as having taken place on or about January 15, 1865. He
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went on to say that he could be more precise as to the date if
he had access to the register of the Pennsylvania House where
Dr. Mudd had a room that night. Thomas Ewing, Jr., Dr.
Mudd's attorney, knew the correct date to be December 23,
not January 15. Thus, Ewing was able to exploit Weichmann' s
confusion about the date by calling witnesses to show that Dr.
Mudd was not in Washington on or about January 15. Ewing
argued that Weichmann should not be believed on other
matters as well and argued that his testimony should be
disregarded. Judge Advocate John A. Bingham countered
with the argument that any uncertainty about the date did not
change the substance ofWeichmann's testimony, and the fact
of a meeting of Mudd, Surratt, and Booth remained. 24
Ewings' arguments on this point were ultimately to no
avail. Whatever the Commission may have thought about
Weichmann's error, it obviously did not deter them from
finding Dr. Mudd guilty. Afterward, Mudd admitted in a
statement issued from his prison cell at Fort Jefferson that
the meeting described by Weichmannn had, in fact, taken
place, on December 23, not January 15.
At the "mock appeal," the Mudd attorneys argued that
Weichmann's testimony could not be believed, because he
had been "largely discredited." On the contrary, additional
evidence emerged after Dr. Mudd's conviction that goes to
establish the relationship between Dr. Mudd and Booth and
the credibility of Weichmann. Captain George W. Dutton,
who commanded the guard detail on the ship transporting
Dr. Mudd to prison, signed an affidavit dated August 22, 1865
in which he stated in part:
[Dr. Mudd] confessed that he knew Booth when he
came to his house with Herold, on the morning after
the assassination of the President; that he had known
Booth for some time, but was afraid to tell of his having
been at his house on the 15th of April, fearing that his
own and the lives of his family would be endangered
thereby. He also confessed that he was with Booth at
the National Hotel on the evening referred to by
Weichmann in his testimony; that he came to
Washington on that occasion to meet Booth, by
appointment, who wished to be introduced to John
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Surratt; that when he and Booth were going to Mrs.
Surratt's house to see John Surratt, they met, on Seventh
Street, John Surratt, who was introduced to Booth.""
THE FALSE BEARD
These three prior meetings make it difficult to believe Dr.
Mudd did not recognize Booth when the assassin called at
Mudd's home on April 15, 1865. However, the mysterious
false beard still persuades some that Booth could remain
incognito for as long as he was in Dr. Mudd's company. The
only mention by anyone of a beard or whiskers occurs in Dr.
Mudd's statement to Colonel H.H. Wells at Bryantown,'' and
in the reports of interviews of Dr. Mudd and his wife by
federal detectives." More curious still is that, after the assassination, Booth felt comfortable sharing his identity with
complete strangers, but not with Mudd, a man whom he had
met three times in the past.
Eyewitness reports described Booth's sudden appearance
on the stage at Ford's Theater. A well-known actor, Booth was
certainly recognizable by many of those theater goers who
witnessed the attack and the assassin's dramatic exit across
the stage. Hundreds in the audience or backstage saw Booth;
some afterwards identified him to the authorities. None
spoke of a beard.
Some twenty minutes later, when Booth paused at the
Navy Yard bridge, he gave his true name to the provost guard,
Sergeant Silas Cobb. 28 Cobb never mentioned a beard; however, he did identify Booth from a beardless picture.
Later that night, David E. Herold, another conspirator,
caught up with Booth on the road out of Washington. The two
stopped briefly at the Surratt tavern in Prince Georges County,
Maryland. The reason for the stop was to pick up arms and a
set of field glasses. John M. Lloyd, the tavern operator, saw
and talked with both men. Lloyd testified aboutthis midnight
meeting both at the conspiracy trial in 1865 and at John
Surratt's trial in 1867. 29 Lloyd said he recognized Herold but
not the other man. Lloyd never described the stranger as
wearing a beard. In addition, Herold included no mention of
a disguise in his long statement made on April 27, while a
prisoner aboard the warship Montauk.
After Booth and Herold left the Mudd farm late in the
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afternoon of April15, they met and talked with several people
as they fled to the Garrett farm in Caroline County, Virginia.
Not one of those who later described meeting the two fugitives during this period ever mentioned Booth's wearing a
beard, false or otherwise.
Among the people on record are Oswald Swann, Samuel
Cox, Jr., Thomas A. Jones, William Bryant, Dr. Richard Stuart,
William Lucas, William Rollins, John Garrett, William Garrett,
and three ex-Confederates: Lt. Mortimer B. Ruggles, Pvt. A.R.
Bainbridge, and Pvt. William S. Jett. Private William Jett
testified at Dr. Mudd's trial that he and two other Confederate
soldiers met Herold and Booth at the Rappahannock River
ferry. According to Jett, Herold first sought to pass Booth and
himself off as brothers, James W. and E. Boyd, but later,
bragging to the three veterans that he and his companion
were the "assassinators" of President Lincoln, he revealed
their real names. Recounting this story to the miliary commission, Jett never mentioned that either of the fugitives made an
attempt at disguise. 30
The brief filed with the Special Court of Military Appeal
on behalf of Dr. Mudd argues that the doctor should be
excused for not recognizing his injured visitor because of his
false whiskers disguise. Blatantly bootstrapping, the brief
cites the testimony of Lt. Alexander Lovett as the basis for its
claim that Booth visited Mudd incognito. As a close reading
of the trial transcript shows, 31 however, Lovett was not himself asserting that the actor arrived at Mudd's farm in disguise; Lovett was merely reporting what Mudd had told him
at the time of the doctor's arrest on April 21. According to
Lovett, Dr. Mudd told him that Booth had "had a long pair of
whiskers."
An objective look at the false beard claim leads to the
conclusion that it is fiction concocted by Samuel Mudd as a
desperate attempt to shore up his claim that he did not
recognize Booth during his stay at the Mudd home on April
15, 1865. In effect, Samuel A. Mudd hid behind a false beard
- notJohn Wilkes Booth.
DID DR. MUDD KNOW BOOTH HAD
ASSASSINATED LINCOLN?
It ought to be clear by now that Dr. Mudd recognized
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Booth when the assassin came to the doctor's home in the
early morning of April 15. This leaves the important questions of how and when Dr. Mudd learned that Lincoln had
been assassinated and that Booth was being sought as the
assassin.
On appeal, counsel for Dr. Mudd argued that the record
showed that Dr. Mudd did not even learn of the asssassination
until Sunday, April16, when he attended mass at St. Peter's
Catholic Church. According to counsel, Dr. Mudd would
have had no reason to suspect his two visitors of anything
until after they had left his farm. Bootstrapping again from Lt.
Lovett's testimony, counsel pointed to the Lieutenant's statement, "He told me that he heard, at church, that the President
had been assassinated, but he did not mention by whom."
Lovett was merely repeating what Dr. Mudd had told him, so
only the defendant's self-serving statement made out of court
supports his claim of ignorance after the early-morning arrival of Herold and Mudd at his door.
In Dr. Mudd's holographic statement given to Colonel
H.H. Wells at Bryantown, Dr. Mudd stated that he first learned
of Lincoln's assassination on April15 at roughly three o'clock
in the afternoon. Dr. Mudd did not indicate to Colonel Wells
who had told him this, nor did he refer to Booth as the
reported assassin. Twelve years later he would supply such
details.
In 1877, Dr. Mudd told a friend, Samuel Cox, Jr., how and
bywhomhe was first informed of the assassination. In the fall
of 1877, the two were the Democratic candidates for the two
Charles County seats in the state legislature. They traveled
around together seeking votes. Cox was very interested in the
Lincoln assassination. As an eighteen year-old boy, he was at
the home of his adoptive father, Samuel Cox, when Oswald
Swann brought Booth and Herold to their door at midnight on
April15. Therefore, the matter of Dr. Mudd's part in this was
a natural subject of conversation.
As Cox subsequently recalled the discussion, Dr. Mudd
said he learned of the assassination when he rode into
Bryantown on the afternoon of April 15 to forward some
clandestine rebel mail. He was stopped by a Union cavalry
picket, who informed him that Lincoln had been assassinated
by Booth.
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On August 7, 1893, Samuel Cox, Jr., wrote out his recollection of this discussion on the blank pages and wide margins of
his copy of a book written by a former Confederate agent."
Here is the pertinent portion of this entry by Cox:
[W]hen Booth and Herold came to his [Dr. Mudd's]
home the night after the assassination they told him
they were just from Virginia and that Booth's horse
had fallen soon after leaving the river and had broken
his [Booth's ]leg. That he had rendered him medical
assistance while in utter ignorance of the assassination.
That after he had set the broken leg, he, Dr. Mudd ... ,
letters he had but a short time gotten through the
contraband mail for distribution, and that in going to
Bryantown to mail them he was surprised to find the
village surrounded by soldiers and being stopped by a
sentry ... he was horrified when told the President had
been shot the night before, and, upon asking who shot
him the fellow had answered Booth. He then told me
his first impulse was to surrender Booth, that he had
imposed upon him, had twice forced himself upon
him, and now the third time, had come with a lie upon
his tongue and received medical assistance which
would be certain to have him in serious trouble. But he
determined to go back and upbraid him for his
treachery which he did. And that Booth had appealed
to him in the name of his mother, whom he professed
to love so devotedly and that he acted and spoke so
tragically that he told them [Booth and Herold] they
must leave his house which they did and after getting
with Oswald Swann they were piloted to Rich Hill
[home of Samuel Cox]. 33
Coupled with the affidavit of Captain George W. Dutton
(Dr. Mudd's previously mentioned escort aboard the vessel
taking him to prison), the Cox recollections of what Dr. Mudd
told him in 1877 utterly destroy any contention that Dr. Mudd
did not recognize Booth when he came to the Mudd home on
the morning of April 15.
The testimony of two of Dr. Mudd's neighbors, Francis R.
Farrell and John F. Hardy, shows that Dr. Mudd knew Booth
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had assassinated Lincoln before Booth and Herold left the
Mudd farm. On his way home from Bryantown on the afternoon of April 15th, Dr. Mudd stopped off at the Farrell home,
where Hardy was visiting. Dr. Mudd told Farrell and Hardy
that Lincoln had been assassinated. When asked by Farrell
who had assassinated the President, Dr. Mudd responded: "A
man by the name of Booth."" In Dr. Mudd's statement to
Colonel Wells, Dr. Mudd stated that after leaving Bryantown
on April 15, "I then went down to Mr. Hardy's, and was in
conversation with him fully an hour when I returned home
leisurely, and found the two men were just in the act of
leaving. " 35
One can almost feel the grim reaction of the court as Farrell
and Hardy testified. The members knew from circumstances
and from bits and pieces of prior testimony that Booth and
Herold were still at the Mudd farm at the time Dr. Mudd
stopped to talk with Farrell and Hardy at about 4:00p.m. on
April 15. So here was testimony that Dr. Mudd knew that
Booth was being sought as the President's assassin while the
doctor was in town and the actor was back at the farm. Why
did Dr. Mudd not notify the troop commander at Bryantown,
Lt. David Dana, that the two men he sought were then at
Mudd's house? Dr. Mudd faced a dilemma. To surrender
Booth might be to reveal Dr. Mudd's prior participation in the
plot to capture the President, a scheme that led directly to
Lincoln's assassination. Caught on the horns of this dilemma,
Dr. Mudd went to prison and almost to the gallows.
THE MISSING CONFESSION OF GEORGE A. A TZERODT
The confession of George A. Atzerodt is perhaps the most
convincing evidence of Dr. Mudd's complicity in the assassination. The confession was taken between eight and ten
o'clock in the evening of May 1, 1865, at the Arsenal Prison,
Washington, D.C., by Maryland Provost Marshal James L.
McPhail and one of his detectives, John L. Smith. Smith was
Atzerodt's brother-in-law. A letter book of General John F.
Hartranft, found at Gettysburg College, shows that the General admitted McPhail and Smith to the prison that night for
the interrogation. This confession, by Atzerodt, never reached
the War Department.
In 1867, former Assistant Secretary of War, Thomas T.
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Eckert, was asked about this confession while testifying before the Judiciary Committee of the House of Representatives
during the Johnson impeachment investigation. Eckert admitted knowledge of it and said it had been taken by one of
McPhail's men named Smith. Eckert supposed the confession
might be found in War Department files. At the 1865 trial,
McPhail testified
that a brother-in law of Atzerodt is on my force, and for
a time a brother of the prisoner was on it, and they
repeatedly told me that Atzerodt desired to see me.
After consulting with the Secretary of War, a pass was
given me, and I saw the prisoner. I saw him first on the
gun-boat, and afterward in his cell. There was no
threat, or promise, or inducement of any kind made. 36
There was no move to produce this confession for the commission trying the conspirators." At one point in the confession,
Atzerodt made the following statement about Dr. Mudd and
his relationship with Booth, "I am certain that Dr. Mudd knew
all about it, as Booth sent (as he told me) liquor & provisions
for the trip with the President to Richmond, about two weeks
before the murder to Dr. Mudd." 38 This shows that Dr. Mudd
was cooperating with Booth in late March, when Booth still
planned to capture Lincoln and ransom him for Confederate
prisoners of War.
Atzerodt' s statement on this point is not without support.
In early December 1881, F.A. Burr, a crack reporter for the
Philadelphia Press, located John Matthews, an actor friend of
Booth. Matthews had been in the cast at Ford's Theater on the
night Lincoln was shot. Matthews told Burr that, in March
1865, Booth had asked him to take a trunk to Baltimore to be
routed on to another destination. The trunk was filled with
provisions to feed a captive Lincoln on the way to Richmond.
Matthews refused to give Burr the names of those involved
because some were stillliving. 39
WHAT MUDD'S LAWYER THOUGHT OF
MUDD'S GUILT AS AN ACCESSORY
In June of 1883, the reporter George Alfred Townsend
made a swing through the lower counties of Maryland and
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interviewed several people who had knowledge of the Lincoln assassination. He called on Frederick Stone and, among
other things, discussed Dr. Mudd. Townsend (who also made
public the Confederate agent Harbin's account of the conspiracy) published this interview, under the heading, BroadwayNote Book, in the NewYorkTribune for June 17,1883. In
pertinent part, Townsend quoted Stone as saying:
The court very nearly hanged Dr. Mudd. His
prevarications were painful; he had given his whole
case away by not trusting even his counsel, neighbors,
or kin. It was a terrible thing to extricate him from the
coils he had woven about himself. He denied knowing
Booth when he knew him well. He was undoubtedly
accessory to the abduction plot, though he may have
supposed it would never come to anything, when this
was preposterous. He had been even intimate with
Booth.
Frederick Stone here spoke of Dr. Mudd's prevarications.
Consider, for example, the doctor's sworn statement to Colonel Wells. In this statement, Dr. Mudd told of going with
Booth to the nearby home of George Gardiner, where Booth
purchased a one-eyed horse for eighty dollars. This was on
Monday, December 19, 1864. Dr. Mudd went on to tell
Colonel Wells that "I have never seen Booth since that time to
my knowledge until last Saturday night [April 15]."40 Dr.
Mudd was obviously concealing from the Union authorities
his conference with Booth at the National Hotel on December
23, 1864. Surely, this is one of the prevarications that Stone
had in mind.
CONCLUSION
A simple country farmer, Dr. Mudd was not.
Well-documented confessions and testimony taken near the
time of the trial, coupled with common sense establish this
fact, and it has been ratified by accounts coming to light only
long afterward. Although it might be convenient to believe
that a false beard could disguise an acquaintance with whom
Dr. Mudd had met recently more than once, that argument
has already been made, and properly been rejected. Dr. Mudd
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may have gotten his pardon, but he doesn't deserve to have
his record expunged. To do so would be to rewrite history as
fiction, a result that threatens the meaning of our past, and
serves to dictate our future.
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Appendix A:
The Decision Denying Dr.
Mudd a Writ of Habeas Corpus

This is an application for a writ of habeas corpus to release
from imprisonment SAMUEL A. MUDD, SAMUEL ARNOLD
AND EDWARD SPANGLER, who were sentenced by a military commission sitting in the City of Washington, in the
Spring of 1865, to military confinement at Fort Jefferson,
within this judicial district.
It is usual rather than otherwise for judges or courts to
grant the writ of habeas corpus on application, and await the
return and response of the person to whom the writ is addressed, before deciding the main question, whether the
petitioner ought to be discharged from custody (3 Peters, 193;
4 Wallace, 100), but where the petition states the facts fully,
and the return can throw no new light on the matter, or where
the petition contains insufficient allegations on which to base
a demand of discharge, the provision of the Constitution,
relating to this subject, is as fully answered by a determination of the question, whether there ought to be a discharge
from imprisonment, in the first instance, on the application,
as by the granting of the writ and its determination afterward.
And the propriety of this course has been fully remarked
upon by the Supreme Court in the case of Ex parte Milligan, the
principal case relied upon in this application, so that I need
not further occupy attention with my reasons for pursuing
that course in this case. The facts here are a part of the history
253
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of the country: the return of the officer who has charge of the
prisoners would add nothing to the date on which a decision
ought to be based.
Let us proceed, therefore, at once to the question, whether
the prisoners ought to be discharged. Two points are relied
upon in support of the affirmative of this question: First, that
the military commission had at the time and the place at
which it was held no jurisdiction to try and sentence for the
offense these persons were charged with. Second, if they were
rightfully imprisoned up to the 4th of July last past, they were
pardoned by the proclamation of the President of that date,
and ought now to be set at liberty.
I think there are clear, definite and solid reasons which
necessitate the overruling of both these points, and the consequent refusal of the application. The reported case principally relied upon in support of the first position, is that of Ex
parte Milligan (4 Wallace, Sup. C.R., 110), in which the Supreme Court decided that the trial and conviction of a resident
of Indiana by a military commission during the war were
invalid, and generally that miliary tribunals have no authority to try civil offences in districts where the regularly organized civil courts of the country are in undisturbed possession
of all their powers. There was a minority opinion by four
members of the Court in this case, in which it was maintained
that the Congress may, if it chooses, in time of war, establish
military tribunals in parts of the country undisturbed by war
operations to exercise the functions ordinarily exercised by
the civil courts of the country. The decisions of the Supreme
Court are binding on the inferior courts; and no decision was
every more willingly followed than would be the decision
and the reasoning of the majority of the Supreme Court in
Milligan's case by this court in any case where that decision
was in point. I believe that the further we recede from
troublous times the more will the public judgment, from calm
reflection, settle down on the opinion that the power to detain
evil-disposed or suspected persons until the public peril has
ceased, is all the power the Government can ever need in time
of war for purposes of national security, or can ever exercise
with safety to private rights. If the Supreme Court had been
equally divided in opinion on this point, I should find it
impossible to follow any other reasoning in any case present-
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ing that point, than such as would lead to the conclusion
arrived at by the majority of the Court. But I do not think that
Ex parte Milligan is a case in point here. There is nothing in the
opinion of the Court in that case, nor in the third article of the
Constitution, nor in the Habeas Corpus Act of 1863, to lead to
the conclusion that if an army had been encamped in the state
of Indiana, (whether in the immediate presence of the enemy
or not), and any person, a resident of Indiana or any other
state (enlisted Soldier or not) had, not from any private
animosity, but from public reasons, made his way within the
Army lines and assassinated the Commanding General, such
a person could not have been legally tried for his military
offense by a military tribunal and legally convicted and sentenced.
The President was assassinated not from private animosity nor any other reason than a desire to impair the effectiveness of military operations and enable the rebellion to reestablish itself into a Government; the act was committed in a
fortified city, which had been invaded during the war, and to
the northward as well as the southward of which battles had
many times been fought, which was the headquarters of all
the armies of the United States, from which daily and hourly
went military orders. The President is the Commander-inChief of the Army, and the President who was killed had
many times made distinct military orders under his own
hand, without the formality of employing the Secretary of
War or commanding general. It was not Mr. Lincoln who was
assassinated but the Commander-in-Chief of the army, for
military reasons. I find no difficulty, therefore, in classing the
offense as a military one and with this opinion arrive at the
necessary conclusion that the proper tribunal for the trial of
those engaged in it was a military one.
I understood the counsel who last addressed the Court in
support of the application to admit at least a doubt whether
the original trial was illegal; but he contended that the
President's proclamation of amnesty and pardon of July 4,
1868 embraces these persons, and that they ought therefore to
be discharged. But that proclamation plainly excludes all
persons standing in the position of these petitioners, whether
they have been convicted or not. It pardons the crime of
treason; that is, it pardons persons who have levied war
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against the United States, or given aid and comfort to their
enemies, within the laws and usages of war; but it pardons no
person who has transgressed the laws of war, no spy, no
assassin, no person who has been guilty of barbarous treatment of prisoners. Let us bring out the point by a supposed
case. Two soldiers or officers fight side by side in the same
battle; their forces remain masters in the field. After the
battle, one conducts himself in an unimportant manner, and
the other sabres the wounded or prisoners. They are both
guilty of treason, but one is guilty of treason with an important plus sign added. It is the opinion of the Court that the
proclamation of the President reaches one of these cases and
not the other. Can it be supposed that if England and France
were at war, and a party of men (soldiers or not) should, for
the purpose of affecting military operations, enter the military lines of one of the armies of one nation and assassinate the
commanding general, that a subsequent peace, with provisions for the rendition of ordinary prisoners of war, would
necessitate the delivery of those persons? I think not. Such a
provision would refer to those prisoners who had made open
and honorable war, and not transgressed the fearfully wide
rules which war allows to be legal.
The proclamation ofMay25, 1865, the principal proclamation of pardon anterior to the one here recited, pardons "all
persons who have, directly or indirectly, participated in the
existing rebellion," on certain conditions, and with fourteen
excepted classes. If the present proclamation had employed
the same language and not excepted these persons or persons
in their position, I should have doubted whether they ought
longer to be imprisoned. But the proclamation grants "to all
and every person who participated, directly or indirectly in
the late rebellion (with certain exceptions) full pardon and
amnesty for the crime of treason against the United States or
the adhesion to their enemies during the late civil war."
I think it is clear that the President, wishing no longer to
make other than necessary exceptions, and to pardon all who
were only guilty of participating in the rebellion, purposely
chose this language to effect his purpose; and no other one. I
do not see that under it a person who transgressed the laws of
war, who was guilty not only of treason but of additional
military crimes, may not still be tried for additional crimes.
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It is not improper to add a word upon a point not necessary to be alluded to for the purpose in this decision. It is a
matter of public notoriety that some persons, more or less
acquainted with the evidence on which these convictions
were based, doubt the fair sufficiency of that evidence to
necessitate beyond reasonable doubt the conclusion arrived
at. but this is a question with which I have nothing to do. For
the purposes of this application the prisoners are guilty of the
charge on which they were convicted - of a conspiracy to
commit the military crime which one of their number did
commit, and some of them of more or less participation. The
question which I have to decide is whether the military
tribunal had jurisdiction to try and sentence, and whether the
proclamation of the President reaches their case. It is my
opinion, for the reasons which I have stated, that the military
commission not only had jurisdiction, but was the proper
tribunal for the purposei and that the President's proclamation does not embrace the situation occupied by these petitioners.

Appendix B:
The Report of the
Board for Correction
of Military Records

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
Board for Correction of Military Records
1941 Jefferson Davis Highway, 2nd Floor
Arlington, VA 22202-4508

PROCEEDINGS:
IN THE CASE OF:
MUDD, SAMUEL A., M.D. (Deceased)
BOARD DATE:
22 JANUARY 1992
DOCKET NUMBER: AC91-05511
I certify that hereinafter is recorded the true and complete
record of the proceedings of the Army Board for Correction of
Military Records in the case of the above-named individual.
The following members, a quorum, were present.
Mr.
Mr.
Mr.
Mr.
Mr.
Mr.
Mr.

Charles A. Chase
James C. Hise
John Lee
James T. Lucas
Eugene P. Visco
David R. Kinneer
Richard H. Allen

Chairperson
Member
Member
Member
Member
Executive Secretary
Examiner
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The applicant, who is the grandson of Dr. Mudd, appeared before the Board and was represented by counsel.
The applicant requests correction of military records as
stated in the application to the Board and as restated herein.
The Board considered the following evidence:
Exhibit A: Application for correction of military records.
Exhibit B: Summary of Archival Records (including advisory opinions).
Exhibit C: Case Summary.
Exhibit D: Transcript of Hearing.

FINDINGS:
1. The applicant has exhausted all administrative remedies afforded by existing law or regulations.
2. The applicant requests, in effect, that his grandfather,
Dr. Samuel A. Mudd, now deceased, who was tried and
convicted by a "military commission" in June 1865 of conspiracy to assassinate President Lincoln, be declared innocent.
3. The applicant states that his grandfather's trial was
illegal because the civilian courts were open and functioning.
Further, that his grandfather's only act was to medically treat
and harbor a disguised John Wilkes Booth while not then
knowing that President Lincoln had been assassinated.
4. The applicant submits a copy of Dr. Mudd's defense
counsel's argument to the military commission in May 1865,
questioning whether the commission was even a court and
whether it had jurisdiction over his client and the other seven
individuals with whom he was jointly tried, or over the crimes
with which they were charged. A copy of the defense counsel's
argument on the pertinent law and the evidence in Dr. Mudd's
case is also submitted. Two independent reports to contemporary Presidents are also submitted, one by the applicant,
the second by a Lincoln scholar, which attempt to prove Dr.
Mudd's innocence. He also submits correspondence from
several members of Congress who support the granting of the
requested relief, and he states that a number of state legislatures have gone on record supporting relief. Finally, he
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submits information intended to show why Dr. Mudd did not
know about the plans of John Wilkes Booth to kidnap President Lincoln, and a map which he contends shows that the
route most likely to have been used to move the kidnapped
President to the Confederate lines was not even close to his
grandfather's home.
5. The applicant has made two prior applications to this
Board. Until now, the Department's position had been that
while this Board might have jurisdiction to review the case,
the Secretary of the Army did not have the authority to set
aside the conviction. The applicant had also previously been
advised by the Office of the President that no Presidential
relief, other than the pardon issued by President Andrew
Johnson, could be granted by that office.
6. Then, on 7December 1990and 24June 1991, in connection with the applicant's current submission, the offices of the
Judge Advocate General and the Army General Counsel,
opined that not only may it review the case, but that this
Board, under certain circumstances, may recommend to the
Secretary that he set aside the conviction. In expansion of
their opinions, each stated, in essence, that the Board may
review the record of conviction, but only to determine whether
the Commission lacked jurisdiction over Dr. Mudd, or over
the offense (that is, whether he was convicted of an offense for
which he was not charged, or not arraigned, or which was not
a crime at all) or that Dr. Mudd was denied due process to
such an extreme extent that it amounted to fundamental
unfairness. The General Counsel also opined that since clemency has already been granted in the form of the pardon by
President Johnson, the only meaningful relief that could be
granted by the Secretary would be to set aside the conviction.
7. History records that Dr. Mudd was born on 20 December 1833, in Charles County, Maryland. He was educated at
several institutions of higher learning and was certified as a
physician in 1856. He then returned to his home in Charles
County, where he set up a medical practice and farmed
tobacco. He married and fathered nine children. He never
served in the military, and during the Civil War continued to
practice medicine and to farm. On 21 April 1865, he was
arrested by Federal authorities on suspicion of being involved
in the plot to assassinate President Lincoln. He was subse-
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quently tried and convicted of conspiracy to assassinate the
President and then spent four years of a "life" sentence in a
military confinement. After his pardon in 1869, he returned to
his home in Maryland and resumed his medical practice and
farming. He died in January 1883 at the age of 49 from
pneumonia.
8. On 3 March 1863, because of the Civil War existing
between the various states, Congress passed" An Act Relating
to Habeas Corpus and Regulating Judicial Proceedings in
certain Cases." In effect, this law authorized the President to
suspend the right to request a writ of habeas corpus from a
civilian court in any part of the United States, whenever it was
deemed necessary to ensure the public safety. This empowered the military to establish martial law in any given area of
the United States and to arrest violators, either military or
civilian. Under this law, not only were military personnel to
be tried by courts-martial for violations of military rules and
regulations, but civilians who violated any laws, military
rules or regulations, or the laws of war, were also subjected to
immediate arrest by military authorities. Theoretically, these
civilians could then be tried by a military commission comprised of military officers, and if convicted, fined, imprisoned, or even put to death. A military commission was,
therefore, akin to a military court-martial and operated under
the same general principles.
9. As is generally accepted by historians, John Wilkes
Booth, a fairly famous actor in 1865, entered the Presidential
Box at Ford's Theater on Friday evening, 14 April 1865, at
approximately 22:15 hours, and shot President Lincoln in the
head while he was watching a play at the theater. Booth then
jumped from the box to the stage, injuring his left ankle/leg,
but escaped on horseback. At about the same time, an unsuccessful attempt was made by Lewis Paine (alias Powell) elsewhere in Washington to assassinate Secretary of State William Seward. Early the next morning, Booth and a companion,
David E. Herold, knocked on the door of Dr. Mudd's home
and requested medical assistance. The story ostensibly given
was that Booth's horse had fallen on his leg and ankle. Dr.
Mudd examined the leg and found that it was broken just
above the ankle. After cutting off his boot, Dr. Mudd placed
a homemade cast on Booth's leg and fashioned some crude
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crutches. Supposedly, he was paid $25.00 for this treatment.
Later in the morning of the same day, Dr. Mudd and Herold
attempted to rent a carriage in the area for movement of
Booth, but were unsuccessful. While the two men were still at
his home, Dr. Mudd is said to have gone into the nearest town
where he learned of the assassination of President Lincoln.
Federal troops were already in the area looking for the assassin. Booth and Herold supposedly left Dr. Mudd's home on
horseback, at about the time he returned in the late afternoon,
having asked for directions to a minister's house, which was
across a large swamp near Dr. Mudd's farm.
10. On the next day, after attending Easter Sunday church
services, Dr. Mudd, expressing no sense of urgency, asked his
cousin, a respected local citizen and also a physician, to report
the details of the visit of the two "strangers" to his home to the
military authorities in the nearby town. His cousin informed
the local military authorities on Monday; however, the local
military authorities did not visit Dr. Mudd until Tuesday, and
then asked only a few questions before leaving. On Friday, 21
April1865, Dr. Mudd was arrested. At that time Booth's boot,
which had been left behind, was produced by the family. Two
written statements were also obtained from Dr. Mudd that
day. In both statements he maintained that he had not
recognized Booth, claiming the injured man had been wearing false whiskers. These disclaimers were made despite the
fact that Dr. Mudd supposedly knew Booth, having met him
on one or more previous occasions. He was then taken to
Washington and held in a military prison, along with the
other alleged conspirators, and witnesses in the case. There is
no evidence that he was ever charged with any offense during
the investigative phase of the case.
11. Booth was subsequently killed on 26 April 1865, in a
tobacco barn on the Garrett farm, near Bowling Green, Virginia. Herold was taken prisoner at that time and was also
taken to Washington to await trial.
12. On 1 May 1865, President Andrew Johnson ordered
the establishment of a military commission by the Department of War to try the persons implicated in the assassination
of President Lincoln and the attempt on the life of the Secretary of State. This order was supported by a one-line opinion
from the Attorney General that the military had jurisdiction
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in the case.
13. Accordingly, on 9 May 1865, a military commission
was convened at the Old Penitentiary Building located at the
Washington Arsenal, now known as Fort McNair. The ninemember Commission, chaired by Major General David Hunter,
consisted of six more general grade officers, a colonel and a
lieutenant colonel. The chief prosecutor was Brigadier General Joseph Holt, Judge Advocate General of the Army. He
was assisted by a special prosecutor, the Honorable John A.
Bingham, a former Congressman, and Brevet Colonel H. H.
Burnett.
14. Eight persons, including Dr. Mudd, were arraigned
and charged, on 9 May 1865, with conspiring to kill the
President and other government and military officials. Dr.
Mudd was also specifically charged with conspiring with the
named conspirators to aid and assist in their escape from
justice after the assassination.
15. The commission's rules were established at the first
session. The eight defendants, all of whom were handcuffed
and some of whom were also in foot chains, were to be tried
jointly. The defendants were entitled to defense counsels (but
were unable to obtain them until after the initial session on 9
May. The actual trial process began on 10 May.) The commission overruled all requests for a change in venue to the
civilian courts in the District of Columbia, which were open
and functioning. Several requests by some of the defendants
to separate the trials were also denied. The defense attorneys
were to present evidence only on matters raised by the prosecution or the commission. Dt. Mudd and the other defendants were not permitted to testify in their own behalf. The
trial lasted from 10 May to 30 June 1865.
16. Dr. Mudd had two defense counsels, Mr. Thomas
Ewing, Jr., formerly a brigadier general and military lawyer,
and Mr. Frederick Stone, a well-known local attorney. Twentyfour witnesses were presented by the government against Dr.
Mudd. Seventy-four witnesses appeared on his behalf.
17. All eight of the conspirators were found guilty of the
charge and specification. Four were sentenced to be hanged
and were hanged after review of their sentences by the President. Dr. Mudd and two other conspirators were sentenced to
life imprisonment, initially at Albany, New York. The place
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of confinement was later changed to Fort Jefferson, Dry
Tortugas, Florida (a military prison on an island approximately 70 miles by water from Key West). The eighth conspirator was sentenced to six years in prison.
18. In the summer of 1867, a very serious yellow fever
epidemic struck Fort Jefferson. After the regularly assigned
military medical officer died early in the epidemic, Dr. Mudd
served for a time as the prison physician. He was credited
with saving many lives, both prisoners and military troops
assigned to guard the prison. He, himself, contracted the
disease, but survived.
19. On 9 February 1869, President Andrew Johnson issued
a pardon directing that Dr. Mudd be released from Fort
Jefferson. In the pardon, the President stated that Dr. Mudd's
direct involvement in the assassination was only after the fact,
that it was within the obligations of professional duty, and
that there was uncertainty as to the true measure and nature
of his complicity in the escape of the assassins. The President
then cited Dr. Mudd's dedicated efforts during the yellow
fever epidemic.
20. After the war had ended, John Surratt, a named conspirator who had escaped to Canada before the trial, and the
son of Mary Surratt, the lone woman conspirator who was
hanged, was found in Europe and brought back for trial. He
was tried by a civil court in Washington in the summer of
1867. The jury, however, was unable to reach a unanimous
verdict; therefore, it was dismissed, and the government
chose not to prosecute the case further.
21. In July 1865 the Attorney General issued a written
opinion expanding his earlier guidance to the President in
May 1865, in which he had stated that a military commission
had jurisdiction to try the eight conspirators for the assassination of the President. His assessment was that the Civil War
was still going on; Washington was a city under "siege" and
was surrounded by fortifications; the President was the Commander-in-Chief of the armed forces; and the laws of war
were in existence at the time of the conspiracy and assassination. Referencing the Constitution, which speaks of "law of
nations" and the "laws of war," he opined that since the
offenses were essentially against the President and the military, and the acts were a violation of the laws of war, the
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offenses should be tried by the military authorities, under
such rules and regulations that were in effect at the time. The
Attorney General went on to state that if the offenses had been
civilian in nature, then the matters could have been settled in
the civil courts, which he acknowledged were open and in
operation.
22. On 3 April 1866, the United States Supreme Court
decided by a vote of five to four in Ex Parte Milligan, that the
military authorities in Indiana had not had jurisdiction to try
a citizen of the United States for such offenses as conspiracy
against the government in the time of war or for inciting
insurrection. In the opinion of the Court, as written by Justice
Davis, it was noted that the 3 March 1863 Act of Congress
authorizing the President to suspend the right of a citizen to
request a writ of habeas corpus, required that if the military
had arrested a civilian, that fact and the particulars of the case
must be reported to a civilian judge of the nearest district or
circuit court within 20 days of the arrest. Further, it was noted
the law required that if a grand jury then met and did not
indict or present the case for trial, the individual should be
released from military confinement and discharged. In reviewing the Milligan case, the Court observed that he was a
United States citizen of a non-secessionist state; that he was
not held as a prisoner of war; and that he had never served in
the military or naval service. The Court also noted that his
arrest by the military had never been reported to a Federal
court as required by the Act.
23. The Supreme Court's opinion went on to note that the
Constitution guarantees the right of trial by jury in all cases
involving a crime, except impeachment. Further, the Fifth
Amendment to the Constitution states "that no person shall
be called to answer for a capital or otherwise infamous crime
unless on presentment by a grand jury, except in cases arising
in the land or naval forces, or in the militia, when in actual
service in time of public danger, nor be deprived of life,
liberty, or property without due process oflaw." The opinion
next noted that, "The Constitution ofthe United States is a law
for rulers and people, equally in war and in peace, and covers
with the shield of its protection all classes of men, at all times,
under all circum-stances." The Court then questioned the
judicial power of the commission which tried Milligan and his
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companions stating that the commission was not a court
ordained or established by Congress; rather, it had been
created at the mandate of the President, who is charged with
the execution of the law, not to make laws. The Court noted
there is "no unwritten criminal code to which resort can be
had as a source of jurisdiction." Therefore, the rights of
Milligan were infringed upon because he and his companions
were tried by a court not ordained and established by Congress, and not composed of judges appointed "during good
behavior."
24. The Court emphasized that martial law could not be
imposed solely by a military commander because of a "threatened" invasion; it must be an actual invasion, with closure of
the courts and loss of civil administration. That had not been
the case in Indiana in 1864 and 1865. The civilian courts had
been open and operating. The Court also noted that the
imposition of martial law should only be temporary, until the
return of civilian law and the civilian courts were again in
operation; any further imposition of martial law beyond that
point would be a "gross usurpation of power."
25. The minority opinion in that case, which was written
by Chief Justice Chase, while concurring in the granting of the
writ of habeas corpus in the Milligan case, stated that Congress could, in fact, legislate the imposition of martial law,
even if the civilian courts were open and operating during the
time of war.
26. Dr. Mudd's case was appealed to the Supreme Court
early in 1867, and to a district court in the state of Florida later
in 1867, citing the decision in Ex Parte Milligan. However, the
appeals were denied.
27. In the processing of this case, the staff of the Board has
reviewed the Articles of War, 1806 (Chapter XX, Statute I,
Ninth Congress, session 1) and the Articles of War, 1874 (Title
XIV, United States Code, chapter 5), as well as various treatises written between 1841 and 1943 on the subject of military
courts-martial and military commission rules of operation,
including "The Practice of Courts Martial" by Major General
Alexander Macomb, 1841; "Observations on Military Law,
and the Constitution and Practice of Courts Martial" by Captain William C. De Hart, 1846 and 1859; "A Treatise on
Military Law and the Practice of Courts-Martial" by Brevet
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Lieutenant Colonel S.V. Benet, 1866 and 1868; "An Abridgment of Military Law by Lieutenant Colonel W. Winthrop,
1892 and 1893; "A Treatise on the Military Law of the United
States: by Major General George B. Davis, 1898, 1913 and 1915;
and "The Law of Martial Rule" by Lieutenant Colonel Charles
Fairman, 1930 and 1943. There appears to be a general
consensus that an accused should be presented (arraigned on)
the charges on a timely basis, that the trial should be held
within a short period of time (the term of 8 days is sometimes
quoted) and that the accused had the right to a defense
counsel. It appears that in the mid-1800s, the accused was
expected to conduct his own defense, with the assistance of
counsel; however, the counsel usually was not permitted to
verbally present any matters to the court. One more recent
authority (ibid., Fairman) noted that military commissions,
while generally following the procedural methods of a courtmartial, could make deviations which would not entitle the
accused to an acquittal.
28. The official record of the proceedings before the Hunter
Commission is not maintained by the Department of the
Army. That record, entitled: "Investigation and Trial Papers
Relating to the Assassination of President Lincoln," consisting of more than 4400 handwritten pages, all of which were
reviewed by the staff of this Board, is maintained by the
Archivist of the United States, under Record Group 153,
Office of the Judge Advocate, War Department. It is also
available on microfilm, National Archives Microcopy No 599.
In addition, several other references were reviewed by the
staff of the Board, to include the Pitman and Poore versions of
the testimony before the commission, the book "Come Retribution" by William A. Tidwell, with James 0. Hall and David
Winfred Gaddy, 1988, and "The Milligan Case" by Samuel
Klaus, 1929.
29. During the formal hearing before this Board, the 90year old applicant appeared with counsel, two of them being
descendants of Dr. Mudd, the third being a descendant of Mr.
Ewing, Dr. Mudd's primary defense counsel in 1865. Several
expert witnesses were called. Much of the testimony centered
on the lack of proof of direct involvement of Dr. Mudd in any
conspiracy to assassinate or kidnap the President. Another
witness testified as to the professional requirement for Dr.
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Mudd to provide medical treatment for the injured Booth,
irrespective of whether he knew him. One witness, a recognized expert on the constitutional aspects of civilian versus
military law, concentrated on the jurisdiction of the commission to try Dr. Mudd for the alleged offenses, noting that the
civilian courts were open in the District of Columbia and that
no state of war existed in the area. He further noted that Dr.
Mudd was a citizen of Maryland, a Northern state which did
not secede from the Union. He stated that the principles cited
by the Court in the Milligan case also applied in Dr. Mudd's
case. He then went on to compare the criteria for martial law
and trial by military commissions. He observed that in
several more recent decisions by the Supreme Court and by
lower Federal courts during World War II, it was ruled that
United States citizens are entitled to trial by civilian courts,
even if the offenses were military in nature and had occurred
in a military theater of operation. In conclusion, he stated that
in his expert opinion, Dr. Mudd had been denied his right to
due process under the Constitution.
30. Title 10, United States Code, section 1552, provides, in
pertinent part, that the secretary of a military department,
acting through boards of civilians, may correct any military
record of that department when he considers it necessary to
correct an error or remove an injustice. The statute further
provides that except when procured by fraud, a correction
under this authority is final and conclusive on all officers of
the United States.
CONCLUSIONS:
1. The record of Dr. Mudd's conviction is a military
record over which this Board has jurisdiction under Title 10,
United States Code, section 1552.
2. Under that authority and within the guidelines set
forth in the recent opinions of The Judge Advocate General
and the Army General Counsel, this Board has carefully
reviewed the available records to determine if the Military
Commission had jurisdiction over Dr. Mudd and, if so, whether
he was denied due process to such an extent that it amounted
to fundamental unfairness. Those guidelines do not authorize the Board to consider the innocence or guilt of Dr. Mudd.
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3. In its analysis of the case, the Board has had the
advantage of hindsight and, therefore, has looked at the facts
and circumstances of the case with more calmness, deliberation, and detachment than was possible in the emotionally
charged atmosphere that existed after the Civil War.
4. Another advantage the Board has had is the availability of the Supreme Court's decision in Ex Parte Milligan, which
was decided after Dr. Mudd's trial, but which the Board finds
so analogous to Dr. Mudd's case that it should not be ignored.
5. Borrowing from the rationale in that case, the Board
concludes that the evidence submitted by the applicant and
the information uncovered during the Board's research clearly
show that the civilian courts were fully open and operating in
the District of Columbia in the spring of 1865; that at the time
President Lincoln was assassinated, Dr. Mudd was a civilian
and a citizen of Maryland, a nonsecessionist state; and that he
had never served in the military or naval service. Notwithstanding the Attorney General's opinion in 1865, the crimes
he is alleged to have committed were not uniquely military in
nature, and none of the individuals with whom he was alleged to have conspired were members of, or closely involved
with, the military.
6. Furthermore, the Board notes that General Robert E.
Lee had surrendered at Appomattox on 9 April1865, a month
before the trial began. There is no evidence that the capital
was "under siege" or that any Confederate forces had invaded or were likely to invade the District of Columbia in the
spring of 1865.
7. Under these circumstances, the Board finds no good
reason why Dr. Mudd should not have been tried by a civilian
court. It, therefore, unanimously concludes that the military
commission did not have jurisdiction to try him, and that in so
doing denied him his due process rights, particularly his right
to trial by a jury of his peers. This denial constituted such a
gross infringement of his Constitutionally protected rights,
that his conviction should be set aside. To fail to do so would
be unjust.
RECOMMENDATION:
That the Archivist of the United States, the custodian of
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the Hunter Commission's report of the conviction of Dr.
Samuel A. Mudd for his complicity in the assassination of
President Abraham Lincoln, a Department of Army record,
correct the records in his possession by showing that Dr.
Mudd's conviction was set aside pursuant to action taken
under Title 10, United States Code, section 1552.
/s/ Charles A. Chase
Charles A. Chase
Chairperson

Appendix C:
The Decision of the Assistant
Secretary of the Army

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
OFFICE OF THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY
Washington, D.C. 20310-1813
22 July 1992
MEMORANDUM FOR EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, ARMY
BOARD FOR CORRECTION OF MILITARY RECORDS
SUBJECT: Dr. Samuel A. Mudd
I have carefully considered the records in this case, including the findings, conclusions and recommendation of the
Army Board for Correction of Military Records (ABCMR), as
set forth in its Report of Proceedings dated 22 January 1992. I
have ultimately concluded that the ABCMR's recommendation should be denied.
This application is founded upon actions which took place
more than 127 years ago. The applicants, descendants of Dr.
Samuel A. Mudd, have asked the Board to review the historical facts and declare Dr. Mudd innocent in the conspiracy to
assassinate President Lincoln.
I note at the outset that the ABCMR did not consider the
guilt or innocence of Dr. Mudd, and that its recommendation
273
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does not speak to the question of his guilt or innocence.
The ABCMR concluded that the military commission which
tried Dr. Mudd did not have jurisdiction over civilians and
recommended that Dr. Mudd's conviction be set aside on that
basis.
Accordingly, my denial of that recommendation should
not be taken as a determination of either the guilt or the
innocence of Dr. Mudd. It is not the role of the ABCMR to
attempt to settle historical disputes. Neither is the ABCMR an
appellate court. The precise issue which the ABCMR proposes to decide, the jurisdiction of the military commission
over Dr. Mudd, was specifically addressed at the time in two
separate habeas corpus proceedings, one before the Chief
Justice of the Supreme Court, the other before a U.S. District
Court. There also was an opinion by the Attorney General of
the United States.
The effect of the action recommended by the ABCMR
would be to overrule all those determinations. Even if the
issue might be decided differently today, it is inappropriate
for a nonjudicial body, such as the ABCMR, to declare that the
law 127 years ago was contrary to what was determined
contemporarily by prominent legal authorities.
Accordingly, I have rejected the ABCMR's recommendation and have denied the application for relief. A memorandum for the Commander, U.S. Army Reserve Personnel Center, indicating that the application has been denied, is attached.
/s/ William D. Clark
William D. Clark
Acting Assistant Secretary of the Army
(Manpower and Reserve Affairs)
Attachment
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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
OFFICE OF THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY
Washington, D.C. 20310-1813
22 July 1992
MEMORANDUM FOR COMMANDER, ARMY RESERVE
PERSONNEL COMMAND
ATTN:
SUBJECT:

DARP-PAS
ABCMR application Regarding Dr. Samuel A.
Mudd

Having considered the findings, conclusions and recommendations of the Army Board for Correction of Military
Records, and under the provisions of 10 U.S.C. 1552, it is
directed:
That in the case of Dr. Samuel A. Mudd, the application
for correction of military records be, and hereby is,
denied.
/s/ William D. Clark
William D. Clark
Acting Assistant Secretary of the Army
(Manpower and Reserve Affairs)
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